Delhi Development Authority Vs Rajender Kumar Sharma (Supreme Court of India)
Gratuity Cannot Be Withheld Merely Because Challenge to Acquittal Is Pending: Supreme Court
Introduction
An employee’s acquittal after a full-fledged criminal trial cannot be deprived of its effect merely because the State has sought leave to appeal. Where the acquittal remains operative and no stay has been granted, the pendency of that challenge cannot, in the circumstances considered by the Supreme Court, justify withholding gratuity indefinitely.
In Delhi Development Authority v. Rajender Kumar Sharma, 2026 INSC 1213, decided on 16 November 2026, the Supreme Court upheld the release of gratuity with applicable interest, subject to an undertaking to refund the amount with interest if the pending judicial proceedings ultimately went against the employees.
Background of the Dispute
The respondents, Rajender Kumar Sharma and Satendra Pal, joined the Delhi Development Authority in 1984. A criminal case arose from allegations that officials involved in a survey of slum dwellers had included fictitious beneficiaries for relocation and allotment of alternative plots, in connivance with property dealers.
An FIR was registered in 2001 under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, read with provisions of the Indian Penal Code concerning cheating, forgery and criminal conspiracy.
By judgment dated 28 February 2017, the Special Judge acquitted the respondents and certain other accused, while convicting four co-accused. The State subsequently filed Criminal Leave Petition No. 481/2017 before the Delhi High Court under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking permission to challenge the acquittal.
The High Court issued notice on the leave petition and the accompanying application for condonation of delay. However, the acquittal was not stayed.
Why Was Gratuity Withheld?
The respondents retired on 30 September 2021 and 31 December 2018, respectively. The Authority withheld their gratuity of ₹18,52,224 and ₹15,43,113, relying on Rule 69(1)(c) of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972.
That provision prohibits payment of gratuity until departmental or judicial proceedings conclude and final orders are issued.
The Authority treated the pending criminal leave petition as sufficient justification for continuing to withhold the amounts, notwithstanding the respondents’ acquittal.
Their representations for release were rejected, prompting them to approach the Central Administrative Tribunal.
Tribunal and High Court Grant Relief
The Tribunal directed release of gratuity with applicable interest, subject to each employee furnishing an undertaking to refund the amount with interest if the judicial proceedings ultimately concluded against him.
It relied on Kishan Lal Taneja v. Government of NCT Delhi, W.P.(C) No. 3016/2021, decided on 24 May 2022. That case concerned a co-accused acquitted by the same trial judgment who had received relief on similar terms.
The Delhi High Court upheld the Tribunal’s approach. The Authority consequently appealed to the Supreme Court.
An Operative Acquittal Must Be Given Effect
The Supreme Court observed that the respondents had been honourably acquitted after the same full-fledged trial. The reasoning adopted in Kishan Lal Taneja therefore applied equally to them.
The Court emphasised that the mere pendency of the application under Section 378, particularly since 2017, could not justify withholding terminal dues when no stay operated against the acquittal.
The crucial distinction was that the criminal trial had already concluded with a final order of acquittal. An appellate court might subsequently disturb that decision, but until such interference, the acquittal continued to hold the field.
The Court also rejected the Authority’s contention that Kishan Lal Taneja was per incuriam, noting that similarly situated persons had obtained relief on its strength.
Earlier Supreme Court Decision Distinguished
The Authority relied on Bikram Chand Rana v. Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation, 2026 INSC 326.
The Supreme Court distinguished that decision because, in that case, the criminal trial remained pending, although departmental proceedings had concluded. The statutory restriction on gratuity therefore continued to operate.
The observations concerning the possibility of future recovery were made in that setting. An undertaking could not justify payment of an amount otherwise prohibited by the applicable rule.
Here, however, the trial had concluded in acquittal, making gratuity payable in the circumstances before the Court. The undertaking served as a financial safeguard accompanying release.
Retirement Benefits Cannot Become Illusory
The Court recognised the practical hardship caused by prolonged litigation. A retired employee, necessarily of advanced age, could be required to await the outcome of appellate proceedings for an uncertain number of years.
Such delay could render the enjoyment of pensionary benefits illusory, particularly where the delay was not attributable to the employee.
The undertaking adequately balanced protection of public funds with the employees’ right to enjoy benefits earned through decades of service. The Supreme Court accordingly dismissed the Authority’s appeals.
Author’s Comments
The judgment draws an important distinction between a pending criminal trial and a pending challenge to an operative acquittal. Authorities should examine the actual stage of proceedings and the existence of any stay before continuing to withhold retirement dues.
The ruling should be applied with attention to the governing service rules and facts. Its central message is clear: an unstayed acquittal cannot be ignored indefinitely merely because the State has initiated further proceedings.
Cases Discussed
- Kishan Lal Taneja v. Government of NCT Delhi and Ors. — W.P.(C) No. 3016/2021, Delhi High Court, 24 May 2022
- Rajinder Khurana v. Government NCT of Delhi & Anr. — W.P.(C) No. 10400/2021, Delhi High Court, 23 November 2022
- Laxmi Narain v. Government of NCT of Delhi & Ors. — W.P.(C) No. 112/2023, Delhi High Court, 24 April 2026
- Bikram Chand Rana v. Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation — 2026 INSC 326, Supreme Court of India
FULL TEXT OF THE SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT/ORDER
1. Leave granted.
2. The appellant – Delhi Development Authority1 challenges the common judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi dated 25 March 2026 dismissing Writ Petitions (Civil) Nos.3866/2026 and 3861/2026 preferred by it, thus affirming the orders of the Central Administrative Tribunal2, Principal Bench, New Delhi dated 15 January 2026 in Original Application Nos. 2658/2023 and 2659/2023 preferred by the respondents herein respectively. The Tribunal had directed the release of the respondents’ gratuity, together with applicable interest, subject to the respondents furnishing the undertaking to refund the amount if the pending judicial proceedings ultimately concluded against them.
3. The facts in brief are this: the respondents, Shri Rajender Kumar Sharma joined the service of the appellant-Authority as a Lower Division Clerk on 19 December 1984, whereas Shri Satendra Pal joined the service as an Assistant Field Investigator on 30 July 1984. Shri Rajender Kumar Sharma was subsequently appointed as Assistant Field Investigator on 3 January 1985. On 18 May 2001, an FIR being FIR No. 29 of 2001 was registered by the Anti-Corruption Branch3 of the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi under Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 19884 read with Sections 420, 468, 471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 against certain officials of the appellant-Authority (including the respondents herein), the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, and the Slum and Jhuggi-Jhopri Department. The allegation was that said officials had conducted a joint survey of slum dwellers for determining their eligibility for relocation and alternate plots and that they had, in connivance with property dealers, included the names of fictitious dwellers therein for wrongful gain. Sanction for prosecution was granted by the Vice-Chairman of the appellant-Authority on 8 April 2004.
4. By judgment and order dated 28 February 2017, the learned Special Judge (PC Act/ACB), Delhi in Criminal Case No. 111/2008 convicted four co-accused and acquitted the respondents and seven others, while one accused was discharged for want of sanction. The State thereafter instituted Criminal Leave Petition No. 481/2017 before the High Court of Delhi under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19735 seeking leave to appeal against the acquittal. On 24 August 2017, the High Court issued notice on the said Criminal Leave Petition as well as the accompanying application seeking condonation of delay.
5. The appellant-Authority provisionally promoted both the respondents – Shri Rajender Kumar Sharma and Shri Satendra Pal, to the post of Research Assistant (Group B) on 1 March 2019 and 5 April 2018 respectively, subject to the outcome of the State’s challenge to the acquittal. The respondents – Shri Rajender Kumar Sharma and Shri Satendra Pal were superannuated from service on 30 September 2021 and 31 December 2018 respectively.
6. However, owing to the pendency of the Criminal Leave Petition before the High Court, the appellant-Authority withheld the respondents’ gratuity (amounting to ₹18,52,224 and ₹15,43,113 respectively) under Rule 69(1(c) of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972. The Rule is reproduced below for reference:
“69. Provisional pension where departmental or judicial proceedings may be pending.—
(…)
(c) No gratuity shall be paid to the Government servant until the conclusion of the departmental or judicial proceedings and issue of final orders thereon:
Provided that where departmental proceedings have been instituted under Rule 16 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, for imposing any of the penalties specified in Clauses (i), (ii) and (iv) of Rule 11 of the said rules, the payment of gratuity shall be authorized to be paid to the Government servant.”
(emphasis supplied)
7. In 2023, the respondents made representations to the appellant-Authority for the release of their gratuity, relying also on a precedent where the gratuity of one co-accused was released subject to an undertaking. However, the said representations were rejected by the appellant-Authority.
8. Subsequently, the respondents preferred O.A. No. 2658/2023 and 2659/2023 before the Tribunal. Vide separate orders dated 15 January 2026, the Tribunal directed release of the gratuity with applicable interest, subject to an undertaking by each respondent to refund the amount received, together with interest, should the judicial proceedings ultimately be decided against them and in favour of the appellant-Authority. The Tribunal expressly relied on the Delhi High Court’s judgment dated 24 May 2022 in W.P. (C) No. 3016/2021 (Kishan Lal Taneja vs. Government of NCT Delhi and Ors.) wherein a co-accused, acquitted vide the same judgment, had been granted relief on the same terms. It also noted that other affected persons had also subsequently secured similar relief in W.P. (C) No.10400/2025. Aggrieved, the appellant-Authority preferred W.P. (C) Nos.3861/2026 and 3866/2026 before the High Court. The High Court was similarly of the view that petitions ought to be disposed of in terms of the judgment in Kishan Lal Taneja (supra) and the same was done. The appellant- Authority now prefers the instant Appeals.
9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
10. At the outset, we note that the appellant-Authority has not controverted that relief was extended to another acquitted-accused in Kishan Lal Taneja (supra) and only submits that the said decision was per incuriam. Needless to say, such a contention cannot be accepted, especially given that other similarly placed persons have also obtained relief on the strength of Kishan Lal Taneja, (supra) including in Rajinder Khurana vs. Government NCT of Delhi & Anr. (W.P. (C) No.10400/2021) vide order dated 23 November 2022 and Laxmi Narain vs. Government of NCT of Delhi & Ors. (W.P. (C) No. 112/2023) vide order dated 24 April 2026.
11. Moreover, the reasoning in Kishan Lal Taneja (supra) is equally applicable to the case of the respondents, who were honourably acquitted after the same full-fledged trial. The High Court had rightly held that mere pendency of the appellant’s Section 378 Cr.PC application (with no stay operating on the Trial Court’s judgment), especially since 2017, could not justify withholding the terminal dues of the retired employees after long years of service.
12. Reliance on Bikram Chand Rana vs. Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation6 is totally misplaced given that the said case pertained to an employee against whom the departmental proceedings had concluded, but the trial remained pending. The relied upon observations qua ‘downstream’ recovery were also made in that context i.e., future possibility of recovery from the employee could not justify releasing an amount that could otherwise not be paid in view of the express statutory embargo in Rule 69(1)(c) of the CCS Pension Rules. In this case, however, the amount has become payable once the trial concluded and resulted in the issuance of final order of acquittal therein. An Appellate Court may or may not disturb the same, but until then, the acquittal continues to hold the field.
13. The requirement to furnish the undertaking has been imposed solely to balance the competing equities of safeguarding public funds with the right of a retired employee to receive and enjoy terminal benefits earned over decades of service. Practically speaking, if a superannuated employee (being necessarily of advanced age) were required to await the conclusion of even appellate proceedings against acquittal for an uncertain number of years, it is most probable the pensionary benefits would itself be rendered illusory. They should not have to suffer due to long pendency of such a challenge preferred by the State, particularly when the delay is not attributable to them.
14. We are of the considered opinion that the condition imposed by the Tribunal and the High Court adequately safeguards the financial interests of the appellant-Authority.
15. We find no reason whatsoever to interfere with the common impugned judgment. The Appeals are, accordingly, dismissed.
Notes:
1 For short, ‘the Authority
2 For short, ‘the Tribunal
3 For short, ‘the ACB
4 For short, ‘the PC Act
5 For short, ‘the Cr.PC
6 2026 INSC 32





