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Percent Paradox: Does India’s 10% User Threshold Appropriately Capture Data-Driven M&A?

Sapna Kumari & Shristy Shrestha

The Percent Paradox: Does India’s 10% User Threshold Appropriately Capture Data-Driven M&A?

Abstract: The 2023 Competition (Amendment) Act introduced a Deal Value Threshold (DVT) under Section 5(d) of the Competition Act, 2002, to include high-value acquisitions of user-rich, revenue-poor digital platforms that systematically escaped review under the pre-2023 asset- and-turnover regime. This paper examines whether the 10% user-based substantial business operations (SBOI) test, operationalized through the Competition Commission of India (Combinations) Regulations, 2024, provides a proportionate jurisdictional threshold. The main argument is of structural drafting error. A platform with Indian user base of 25 million (5% of global) escapes mandatory notification, while a platform with 6 million Indian users (12% of global) triggers review, despite the former having four times the absolute Indian user base and greater capacity to affect competition in India. The 2023 amendment was designed to capture transactions such as: user-rich, revenue-poor, GMV-poor digital platforms. The analysis proceeds in three levels. First, it highlights the critique on how the test violates the constitutional principle of non-arbitrariness by imposing insignificant compliance burdens while failing to consider transactions with genuine competitive significance. Second, mathematical analysis reveals the false negative and false positive outcomes arising because of 10% threshold. Third, comparative study of Germany’s qualitative nexus approach (Meta/Kustomer) and Austria’s parallel framework, which eschew percentage-based thresholds in favour of flexible qualitative assessments. The record confirms the DVT framework to be operational but reveals a significant transparency gap: due to CCI’s non-disclosure of which SBOI trigger was reported or absolute user counts, prevents empirical verification of the percent paradox. The paper proposes four reforms and concludes that the DVT framework is a necessary reform, but the 10% user test’s drafting error produces false negatives, false positives, and asymmetric compliance incentives. The proposed reforms would restore proportionality, enhance transparency, and align India’s merger control regime with both its own legislative proposals and international best practice.

Keywords: Competition law, merger control, Deal Value Threshold, substantial business operations, digital markets, percent paradox, Competition Commission of India, 2023 Amendment.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The rapid rise of data driven digital markets and these digital markets have unsettled the traditional architecture of merger control. Under the pre- 2023 Indian merger control regime, notification to the Competition Commission Of India (CCI) was triggered solely by turnover or asset threshold under section 5(a) and 5(b) of the Competition Act,2002.1 This traditional method was proved to be flawed for the digital economy as in these markets competitive strength is not built through factories, inventory or immediate turnover but through data, user attention, network effects and the ability to monetise scale over time.2 Here high value acquisition often targets revenue based companies rather user rich start-ups. This amendment added a new clause to Section 5, (d) which establishes a Deal Value Threshold.3 Under Section 5(d), a transaction requires mandatory CCI notification when two cumulative conditions are met: the “value of the transaction” exceeds INR 2,000 crore (approximately USD 245 million); and second, the target enterprise has “substantial business operation in India” (SBOI).4 The Competition Commission of India (Combinations) Regulations, 2024 then operationalized the SBOI concept for digital services if the following criteria are met: In a business it‟s users or end users for digital services in India is 10% or more of the total global number of such users. The same regulation also recognizes if gross merchandise value (GVM) in India constitutes 10% or more of global GVM; or turnover in India constitutes 10% or more of global turnover.5 Compliance with any of the following criteria will establish SBOI.6

This paper primarily deals with the central research question: Does the 10% user-based substantial business operations test provide a doctrinally coherent and proportionate jurisdictional threshold for user-rich, revenue-poor digital platforms the very category the 2023 Amendment was designed to capture?

Note: It is important to clarify the scope& limitation of this critique. The percent paradox – whereby a platform with 25 million Indian users escapes review while a platform with 6 million Indian users triggers notification only arises where the user prong is the sole jurisdictional hook. If a platform with 25 million Indian users has Indian turnover exceeding INR 500 crore or Indian GMV exceeding 10% of global GMV, it would trigger notification via another prong regardless of the user percentage. The critique therefore applies to a specific category of transactions: user-rich, revenue-poor, GMV-poor digital platforms precisely the category that the 2023 Amendment was designed to capture but which the percentage-based user test fails to reach. This category is not marginal to the DVT’s legislative purpose; it is central to it.

This paper is therefore directed towards as a policy (metric) critique rather than an empirical study. It challenges a structural drafting error in the 10% user test and argues that it undermines the legislative intent of the 2023 Amendment. The analysis is grounded in legal doctrine, mathematical logic, and comparative jurisprudence not in empirical verification.

1.1 The Percent Paradox

The Percent paradox: an essential drafting error where relative proportions get prioritized over absolute competitive significance. The Deal Value Threshold (DVT) was introduced to capture high-value acquisitions of digital firms that the old asset-and-turnover regime systematically missed. For instance: A global platform has 500 million users worldwide. Twenty-five million of them are in India that is 5% of its global base. A smaller competitor has 50 million users worldwide. Six million of them are in India that is 12%. Under the Competition Commission of India’s (CCI) newly introduced 10% ‘substantial business operations’ test for digital mergers, the smaller platform triggers mandatory notification although the larger platform, despite having over four times as many Indian users, escapes notification. This is the inherent flaw to analyse.

The 2024 Combination Regulations operationalized this reform but introduced a flawed jurisdictional hook i.e., a 10% user-based threshold that produces arbitrary, perverse outcomes. Before the 2023 Amendment, Section 5(a) and 5(b) of the Competition Act required CCI notification based on assets and turnover thresholds, which needed to be jointly

crossed by the target and acquirer. An acquisition became notifiable if combined assets exceeded INR 1,000 crore or combined turnover exceeded INR 3,000 crore in India, or if global assets exceeded USD 500 million with Indian assets above INR 500 crore, or global turnover exceeded USD 1,500 million with Indian turnover above INR 500 crore. Similar rules applied to mergers and control acquisitions. This framework assumed balance sheets would reflect competitive significance reasonable for conventional industries but fundamentally flawed for digital markets. Many digital startups have minimal assets and revenue yet command substantial market value, making them attractive acquisition targets for established tech companies. Such deals easily escaped CCI scrutiny since asset and turnover thresholds weren’t met.7

1.2 The WhatsApp- Facebook Case as a catalyst

In year 2014, Facebook acquired WhatsApp for approximately USD 19 billion, one of the major tech acquisitions in history.8 This transactions fits as a definitive case study for this regulatory lacuna. This transaction had meaningful Indian nexus noting both services had substantial Indian user bases. It was reported in the Economic Times, that Facebook had around 93 million Indian users while WhatsApp had around 40 million users in India. Avirup Bose in his article argued that the massive user base of Facebook and WhatsApp in India, there would be an overwhelming public rationale to suggest that the deal could ordinarily cause anti- competition harm in the Indian market and the CCI should scrutinize the deal.9 Also, that this transaction could affect approximately 130 million Indian customers and therefore deserved antitrust scrutiny.10 The problem also highlighted the concern that Indian merger control had no reliable jurisdiction hook to look after transactions which affected huge number of users, data and future monetization instead of the current turnover.11 Hence, this transaction highlighted the major flaw in the law as it showed how a high value, digital market acquisition could easily avoid CCI review despite its strategic relevance.12

1.3 The Competition Law Review Committee Recommendations

The Competition Law Review Committee (CLRC) came into force on October 1, 2018, to review competition law framework and address emerging challenges of the economy.13 CLRC in its 2019 report made the most significant recommendation “enabling provisions to prescribe necessary thresholds, notably, deal value threshold for merger notifications”.14 The report questioned whether the existing asset and turnover thresholds were sufficient for a changing economy and concluded that there could be certain transactions in digital markets which could possibly escape review despite having competition implications.

The Committee also mentioned that a deal value threshold could not operate alone, it needed a domestic nexus to avoid reviewing a very high value foreign transaction.15 So the logic was simple, the source of value should lie in assets such as network effects, future market, technology rather than traditional assets and turnovers.16

1.4 The 2023 Amendment and 2024 Regulations

The Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023 brought a new statutory law by adding Section 5(d) into the Competition Act,2002.17 Section 5(d) states that any transaction involving merger, acquisition, or amalgamation may form a combination if transactional value exceeds INR 2,000 crore and the target or the enterprise being merged, taken control of, acquired or amalgamated has SBOI.18

After extensive consultation, on September 10, 2024, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs informed the Competition Commission of India (Combinations) Regulations, 2024 bringing the DVT into full force. New definitions of control, expedited timelines (reduction of days from 210 to 150), increased filing fees and green channel fast track clearance routes. The

Regulation most importantly define how the transactional value will be calculated and when SBOI is established.19

CHAPTER 2: ANATOMY OF DVT

Having flagged the 10% user test as the regulatory centerpiece in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 disassembles the DVT architecture, beginning with the value prong, then turning to the SBOI nexus. To trigger mandatory notification DVT laid down a twin test structure that must satisfy both conditions to trigger mandatory notification. It added a further jurisdictional trigger for transactions where value may not be reflected in conventional financial metrics. First is the Value Test, it says that the “value of the transaction” must exceed INR 2,000 crore (approximately USD 240 million).20

2.1 “Value Of Transaction” Definitions and Inclusions

The “value of transaction” includes every valuable consideration, direct, indirect or deferred or cash or any other for any merger, acquisition or amalgamation.21 The 2024 Combination Regulations adopted a broad approach to prevent parties from narrowing transaction value through contractual drafting. Regulation 4(1) encompass any transaction in any form featuring a valuable consideration comes under the ambit of value of transaction.22 Regulation 4(2) talks about consideration separately agreed for covenants, undertakings, obligations or restrictions along with non- compete fees,23 including series of interconnected transactions where intended effect is achieved. In cases where agreed arrangements are treated as part of, or incidental to, the transactions involving payments within two years of the transaction coming into effect, including technology assistance, IP licensing, supply arrangements, branding and marketing arrangements.24

2.2 The-Three-Pronged Framework

Section 5(d) talks about substantial business operations in India. The specification about the existence of SBOI is mentioned under Regulation 4(2) of the 2024 Combination Regulations.25 Any enterprise dealing with digital services is deemed to have SBOI if it meets any of the three criteria.

First, 10% or more of its global users are base in India, calculated as an average over the 365 days preceding the relevant date.26 The second is the GVM threshold it expands to, the gross merchandise value for 12 months preceding the relevant date in India id 10% or more of its total global GVM.27 Third deals with the turnover threshold which requires the turnover during the preceding financial year in India is 10% of more if its global turnover.28

For non-digital cases, the GVM and turnover prongs needs the Indian figure to exceed INR 500 crore, however the Regulations clearly states that this INR 500 crore floor does not apply to digital services.29 This is a legally significant distinction. The reasons for the absence of this floor for digital services reflects the recognition that user attention itself constitutes a competitive asset apart from current monetization levels. Digital service is broadly defined in the Regulations covering provisions of a service, digital content, or any other activity through the internet to end users or business users.30 Digital services are treated differently as their competitive significances is reflected before monetization, since users constitute a competition relevant asset, so considering this the Regulations removed the INR 500 crore floor accepting a 10% user threshold.31

CHAPTER 3: THE 10% USER TEST- APPROPRIATENESS ANALYSIS.

For the past couple of years the Competition Commission of India (CCI) relied on asset and turnover-based thresholds to determine whether it deems fit to be notified.32 This framework

proved to act inherently incapable of capturing high-value acquisitions in digital markets.33 The example mentioned in section (1.2).34 The major stakeholders who were going to directly be impacted due to this were the competing industries of the Indian landscape.35

The threshold safeguards nascent platforms that could be potentially dangerous to big competitive firms which are commonly termed as “killer deals”.36 The initial structure proved structurally incapable of reviewing such acquisitions in digital markets.37 The old regime consistently missed high-value acquisitions in digital sectors where emerging firms possess strategic value despite minimal monetisation.38

3.1 User Attention as a Competitive Asset.

In digital markets, services are generally free, so competition centres on acquiring user bases rather than immediate monetary gains. Platforms capture user data, customize services, and monetize by selling behavioural profiles to advertisers a dynamic the CCI termed the “attention economy” in 2021. Traditional competition law relies on price and output metrics, which prove inadequate for free digital services. The CCI’s 2024 rule changes acknowledge this reality by treating user count alone as sufficient grounds for deal scrutiny. Revenue reflects past transactions, while user numbers signal future competitive potential. A loss- making platform with 50 million Indian users holds valuable data for targeted advertising and, as the CCI has noted, can accelerate buyer power in unrelated markets.

In the payment sector, over 80% of UPI transactions are divided between two apps,39 with NPCI’s 30% market cap deadline repeatedly postponed.40 Under pre-2023 asset/turnover rules, a loss-making UPI app with 50 million users would escape review. Yet its acquisition raises significant concerns: the buyer could leverage spending data for targeted ads or credit assessments, cross-sell its own services to millions, or lock out rivals by integrating the app exclusively within its ecosystem eliminating future competitors before they emerge in adjacent markets.

3.2 Empirical Evidence

Data Sources Used in Chapter 3

Dataset; (n=X) Identifier + What it measures Used for + Timeline
DS-A; 162 (12.36% ≈ 20 DVT-triggered) CCI Aggregate; Total combination notifications approved; aggregate DVT share Headline claim of DVT’s operational footprint FY 2024-25 (April 2024 – March 2025)
DS-B; 124 CCI Combination Orders; Filings by Form I / Green Channel / Form II among combination orders published in this 10-month window Filing-type distribution among all combination orders during the DVT-era window, not a count of DVT-triggered filings; July 2024 – May 2025 (compilation from CCI website)
DS-C; approx. 10 Author-Flagged DVT References; Subset of DS-B whose public order text explicitly references the DVT framework Establishing that DVT reasoning appears in published orders; July 2024 – May 2025 (Author hand-coding of CCI orders referencing DVT framework)

Note on relationships of the datasets:

1. DS-B ⊇ DS-C (every order in DS-C appears in DS-B; DS-C is a manually-coded subset)

2. DS-A and DS-B share no fully-overlapping window and use different counting units (approved notifications vs. published orders); they are complementary, not comparable.

3. Only DS-C is a defensible count of DVT-specific filings. The headline 12.36% derives from DS-A.

The 2023 Amendment’s effect on filing behaviour can only be assessed through the data the CCI has placed in the public domain. Two datasets are relied on in this chapter, both drawn from primary CCI sources but constructed on different counting units. Their relationship, and the limits of what each supports, is set out at the head of the chapter in Table 0.

The first dataset is the CCI’s aggregate statistic reported in its Annual Report 2024-25: across FY 2024-25, the CCI approved 162 combination notifications, of which approximately 12.36% equivalent to ≈20 transactions were notified under the DVT framework.41

Two implications follow. First, the DVT framework is, in volume terms, a meaningful but minority trigger: roughly one in eight notified combinations in the year of its operationalization reached the CCI through the data-driven route. Second, the headline disposal rate for combination cases – 98.42% as of 31 March 202542 confirms that the DVT’s incremental load has been absorbed into standard CCI workflow rather than overwhelming it. The second dataset is the author’s independent compilation of all CCI combination orders published on the CCI website between July 2024 and May 2025, totalling 124 entries. This compilation asks a different question from DS-A: not what proportion of all notifications are DVT-triggered, but what filing-type distribution characterises combination orders being published during the DVT-era window.

Table 1 reports the breakdown.

Filing Type Number Percentage
Form I 90 72.6%
Green Channel 21 16.9%
Form II 13 10.5%
Total 124 100%

Two observations are derived from Table 1. The Form I share of 72.6% indicates that the vast majority of combination orders issued during this window proceed via the short-form route a finding consistent with the 2023 Amendment’s stated intent of proportionality.43 Conversely, the 10.5% Form II share shows that a non-trivial minority of combinations warranted detailed Phase II scrutiny, which suggests the DVT framework is, in some cases, capturing transactions that raise genuine competition concerns a reading consonant with the legislative intent of the 2023 Amendment44. This rebuts any assumption that the DVT is uniformly over- or under-inclusive; the empirical record indicates heterogeneity on both sides of that question.

Crucially, neither DS-A nor DS-B resolves the question on which this paper’s central paradox turns: of the 124 orders in DS-B, only a hand-coded subset (DS-C, ≈10 orders) explicitly reference the DVT framework in public order text. The CCI does not disclose, in any published combination order, which specific trigger user threshold, GVM, or turnover was reported; nor does it disclose the absolute user count for user-triggered filings.45 The 10-order figure in DS-C, and its relationship to the larger payout of approval categories, is therefore the most that can be said on empirical grounds.

The data supports three claims. (i) The DVT framework has produced a measurable share of the CCI’s combination-load namely the 12.36% reported in DS-A.(ii) The filing-type distribution among all combination orders in the DVT-era window is dominated by Form I and Green Channel filings. (iii) A small but documented set of combination orders in the DVT-era window openly invoke the DVT framework.

The data does not support the claim on which the doctrinal critique in Chapter 5 ultimately rests: whether any of those 124 orders, or any of the ≈20 DVT-triggered orders in DS-A, was a transaction that should have been notified but was not because the 10% user threshold was not met. This would require transaction-level DVT-trigger disclosure, which the CCI does not provide. As stated in Section 1.4, the argument developed in this paper is therefore doctrinal and mathematical rather than empirical.[fwd ref §1.4] The empirical record establishes that the DVT is in use; it does not establish that it is failing though it has the structural features that, as Chapter 5 demonstrates, would allow it to fail.

The empirical record is deployed in this paper to ground the doctrinal critique in real-world stakes rather than to prove the existence of false negatives at a transaction-by-transaction level. Where the paper references the ≈20-via-DVT figure, it does so only to support the qualitative claim that the DVT is being used in practice, sufficient to make its jurisdictional perimeter a live legal-policy question. Where the paper references Table 1, it does so to support a comparative claim about filing complexity during the DVT-era window a claim that is methodologically distinct from any claim about DVT-trigger outcomes

3.3 Research Limitations and the Transparency Gap.

The empirical data has certain problems since the CCI is not transparent with its approach. The CCI does not disclose which specific transactions were particularly borne under the DVT approach or which trigger was reported (user threshold, GVM or turnover), the absolute user counts of the platform involved in DVT- triggered filings.

The research is also limited due to lack of any Intel regarding whether any transaction was unsuccessful or rejected due to DVT concerns, or any transaction with absolute threshold has escaped the reviewing process. This leads to manifestation of situations like the whatsapp- facebook acquisition that leads to bigger corporations taking over smaller companies to avoid competition.46 Why This Matters for Research? Without this information, the percent paradox identified in Chapter 2 cannot be empirically verified.

This paper therefore makes a doctrinal argument based on legal and mathematical analysis, not an empirical one. The critique is grounded in: Legal doctrine47, Mathematical logic & Legislative intent – the purpose of the 2023 Amendment was to capture transactions with significant Indian impact.48 The empirical data demonstrates that the DVT is operational, but it does not and cannot prove or disprove the percent paradox without greater CCI transparency.49

3.3.1 Framing the Data Gap as a Policy Problem

The lack of transparency in CCI’s disclosure of DVT-triggered transactions is itself a policy problem without knowing which transactions were triggered by the 10% user threshold, researchers, practitioners, and policymakers cannot assess whether the test is achieving its intended purpose. As observed, the SBOI test specifically the 10 per cent user threshold is ‘porous’ as it allows ‘many problematic deals’ to escape scrutiny50. However, without transaction-level data, this critique cannot be empirically verified.

The absence of data also means that the effectiveness of the 10% user threshold cannot be evaluated, the proportionality of the compliance burden cannot be assessed; and the need for reform cannot be empirically justified.51

This is not merely an academic concern. It undermines the accountability and evidence-based policy-making that the CCI’s regulatory framework should support.

3.4 Interim Conclusion

This threshold ultimately fulfils the criteria of necessary and proportionate response to the jurisdictional gaps exposed by the pre-2023 merger control regime. It captures high-value acquisitions of user-rich, revenue-poor digital platforms, that were systematically invisible to the CCI. The threshold aligns with the legislative intent of the 2023 Amendment and finds conceptual support in economic theories of platform competition, where user attention and data serve as competitive assets distinct from revenue.52

The empirical data demonstrates that the DVT is operational and captures a meaningful number of transactions. However, the available data does not directly prove or disprove the percent paradox. The predominance of Form I filings suggests potential over‑inclusiveness, but the absence of transaction‑level data prevents definitive conclusions.53

The transparency gap is the biggest policy critique that requires extensive data analysis. Without inherent CCI transparency, researchers and policymakers cannot overall evaluate the effectiveness of this implemented account. Without any empirical data the core objective cannot be aligned with the reform and no metric howsoever can be correctly evaluated.54

CHAPTER 4: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

India’s 10% user-threshold prioritises relative proportions over absolute competitive significance. Because the user-percentage is unique to India (Section 3.3.2), the next chapter traces how two European jurisdictions have refused to adopt the percentage-based formulation and have instead relied on qualitative nexus. This chapter examines three comparator regimes: Germany (ARC §35(1a)), Austria (KartG §9), and the proposed Indian Digital Competition Bill, 2024.55

4.1 The Draft Digital competition Bill 2024 (DCB)

India‟s proposed Digital Competition Bill 2024 marks a significant shift toward ex-ante regulation of digital markets. The Bill contains “Systemically Significant Digital Enterprises” (SSDEs) based on dual quantitative thresholds: 10 million end users or 10,000 business users in India.56 The Bill adopts a mixed approach: primary quantitative thresholds (financial and user counts) with supplementary qualitative criteria allowing the Competition Commission of India to designate SSDEs based on market power, network effects, and other factors. This reflects a legislative intent to focus on absolute numbers for legal certainty, while retaining flexibility57.

The 10 million end-user threshold constitutes approximately 0.7 % of India‟s population, notably lower than the EU Digital Markets Act‟s 45 million monthly active users requirement, indicating India‟s intention to cast a wider regulatory net.58 No other major jurisdiction uses a percentage-based user threshold; the Indian model instead opts for absolute numbers.59

4.2 The German DVT model

Under Section 35(1a) of the German Act against Restraints of Competition (ARC), a concentration is notifiable when the transaction value exceeds €400 million and the target has “substantial domestic operations” in Germany.60 The following test uses strict turnover-based rules and calculates whether a deal has a substantial influence on the market and could impact or trigger competition, ensuring that relevant transactions are reviewed. The second element is satisfied by qualitative assessment of the target’s economic presence within Germany including, following the Bundeskartellamt’s Meta/Kustomer decision, the processing of personal data of German end-users by a target without any German corporate presence61. The doctrinal impact of this is that they reviewed the transaction and was successful in capturing it but India would have failed because Indian-style percentage thresholds would have failed to capture it. Kustomer had no German turnover, no German assets, no German office. Under any user-percentage or turnover-percentage test, Kustomer would have escaped jurisdiction. The qualitative approach is, among other things, the regulatory answer to the digital-market problem the 2023 Amendment was designed to address in India.62

4.3 The Austria’s DVT model

Austria‟s parallel provision under Section 9(4) of the KartG adopts a fairly influenced structure but at a lower threshold of €200 million.63 The distinction lies in the definition of “substantial domestic activity” where German Federal Cartel office classifies market-related activities, including user data processing as confirmed in the landmark precedent Meta/Kustomer case. Kustomer had no physical presence in Germany and negligible local turnover. However, it processed data of German end-users. The Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) upheld the Federal Cartel Office’s jurisdiction, holding that ‘substantial domestic activity’ is determined by economic reality, not corporate form. The processing of German user data was deemed sufficient to constitute a domestic nexus. This approach prioritises the substance of the operations engagement, data flows, and market impact over a formalistic percentage formula.64

As Clifford Chance observed, the German approach ensures that ‘the test captures acquisitions of targets that generate significant economic activity in Germany even where they have minimal local turnover’.65 The Federal Cartel Office has applied this reasoning consistently, using metrics such as monthly active users, website visits, and data processing volumes as indicators of substantial domestic operations.66 The Austrian competition authority generally gives more importance to whether the company has a physical presence in Austria, such as an office, facility, or subsidiary. However, this is not a strict requirement and depends on the specific circumstances of each case.67

The Supreme Court of Austria has held that ‘significant domestic activities’ require more than mere online accessibility; however, a combination of factors including targeted advertising, local language content, and user engagement can suffice in the absence of physical presence.68 As CMS noted in its analysis of the Austrian framework, the flexibility of the qualitative test allows the authority to ‘adapt the jurisdictional assessment to the specific characteristics of the digital economy’ without relying on arbitrary percentage thresholds.69 The above-mentioned jurisdiction uses a flexible approach in contrast to a strict threshold as stated in Indian jurisdiction the qualitative nexus approach uses metrics such as monthly active users or visitors as indicators. The format prioritizes economic presence over any formal laws to adhere to.70

4.4 Key Insights:

The key insights that emerge from this comparative analysis.

1. The 10% threshold is unique to Indian jurisdiction, India‟s DCB employs absolute user thresholds (10 million end users), not a percentage-based test. The “10%” figure often mentioned in discussions about India’s digital competition laws does not refer to any existing threshold for identifying major digital companies. Instead, it usually refers either to (i) penalties that can be as high as 10% of a company’s global turnover for violations, or (ii) suggestions by startup groups that gatekeeper companies should be defined based on reaching 10% of India’s population. However, neither of these ideas‟ forms part of the current law.71

2. Second, Germany and Austria highlight that qualitative nexus tests work effectively without percentage thresholds. Their models have successfully captured high-value digital acquisitions (e.g., Meta/Kustomer) while maintaining legal flexibility.72

CHAPTER 5: TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS – THE MATH BEHIND THE PARADOX

The above chapter dealt with the framework which remains functional in countries like Austria and Germany, this chapter tests the 10% threshold against real-world transaction archetypes. The critique is not theoretical speculation; it is derived from simple mathematics applied to plausible market scenarios.73 The central contention of this paper is that the 10% user test produces arbitrary outcomes that fail to serve the legislative intent of the 2023 Amendment. The 10% threshold intricate drafting issues, therefore the following critique targets the test‟s formulation, not the underlying economic insight. The lessons from Germany and Austria are negative-form (qualitative, not percentage). Chapter 5 now internalises the objection and builds a positive-form critique using transaction archetypes.74

5.1 The False Negative & False Positive Problem:

The following table models three categories of platforms, demonstrating how the percentage- based test systematically misidentifies genuine competition concerns:75 This hypothetical is not just academic however senior competition law practitioners have independently identified the structural flaw. The critique is doctrinal: the text of Regulation 4(2)(a) permits this outcome. Whether it actually occurs in any specific transaction is unknown due to the transparency gap (Section 3.3). The paper’s argument is that a jurisdictional test that can produce such outcomes and that systematically favours relative proportions over absolute competitive significance is structurally flawed regardless of whether the flaw has been observed in a specific case.

PLATFORM + GLOBAL USERS INDIAN USERS (NUMERICAL + % IN INDIA) 10% TEST RESULT COMPETITION CONCERN (SUBSTANCE) OUTCOME
PLATFORM A (GLOBAL GIANT) + 500Mil. 25Million; 5% No Review High. Data-rich user base, massive network effects, potential to dominate Indian digital advertising / payments. False Negative
Platform B (Niche Global) + 50 Million 6 Million; 12% Review Required Low. Small absolute user count. Limited immediate market impact despite high percentage. False Positive
Platform C (Focused Indian) 10 Million 8 Million; 80% Review Required High. Dominant market position within a specific Indian sub-sector (e.g., regional edtech). True Positive

Substantial business operations in India are established if any one of the three prongs is satisfied. A platform with 25 million Indian users and substantial monetisation would typically satisfy the turnover prong irrespective of whether its user-percentage remains below 10%.

The critique is therefore directed at the specific category of transactions where the user prong is the only available trigger that is the user-rich, revenue-poor digital platform with sub- threshold Indian monetisation. For those targets, the 10% test is the sole jurisdictional hook. Platform A (25M Indian users, 5% global, low monetisation) is a representative case where the user prong is the regulatory gateway and the gateway fails. Platform B (6M Indian users, 12% global) is a representative case where the user prong is the regulatory gateway and the gateway fires inappropriately. The hypothetical’s conditions that are user-rich, revenue- poor, GMV-poor are precisely the category of digital platforms that the CLRC Report 2019 identified as requiring new jurisdictional hooks. The critique is therefore not marginal; it targets the core problem the DVT was designed to address

5.2: Over-Inclusiveness Risk.

The CBFL NLU Delhi analysis acknowledges that the Combination Regulations fall short of addressing digital market challenges, noting a shift toward regulation with the Draft Digital Competition Law Bill already formulated. The authors observe that narrower exemptions for minority acquisitions will increase notifications to the CCI, burdening both the regulator and complicating ease of doing business..76 The SBOI test, particularly the 10% user threshold, is described as “porous,” allowing “many problematic deals” to escape scrutiny, which undermines the DVT’s fundamental purpose.77

AMS Shardul’s commentary similarly notes that de minimis target-based exemptions are unavailable for DVT transactions, preventing targets with minimal Indian presence from claiming exemption based on asset/turnover thresholds. While this addresses under- inclusiveness, it exacerbates over-inclusiveness by imposing unnecessary compliance burdens, making deals more complex and time-consuming. This asymmetry violates the constitutional principle of non-arbitrariness, requiring regulatory burdens proportionate to the objective. Filing fees INR 30 lakhs for Form I plus legal costs may be disproportionate for targets with negligible Indian competitive significance. The absence of a de minimis floor for the user prong permits the 10% test to capture transactions with minimal Indian impact while failing to capture those with massive but diluted user bases the “percent paradox” in its purest regulatory form.

5.3 The “Reasonable Certainty” Presumption & Compliance Burden

The Regulation 4(3) creates a presumption that when a transactions exact value cannot be established with “reasonable certainty” it is considered to exceed the INR 2,000 crore threshold. The subject “reasonable certainty” remains undefined, leading to lack of clarity that encourages aware parties to file even when falling below the threshold, increasing the regulatory burdens and lead to delay. This broad test may capture targets with negligible Indian assets or turnover.

The compliance cost rises exponentially that leads to increase which was seen in filing fees from INR 20 lakhs to 30 lakhs and INR 65 lakhs to 90 lakhs. Timelines for phase II investigations compressed from 210 to 150 days and gun jumping penalties mentioned under Section 6(2A) with Section 43A expose parties to liabilities upto 1% of turnover, assets or transaction value. For a platform B style target with 6 million Indian users, professional costs and filing fees may exceed any genuine competitive concern. Rational acquirers are presented with two choices either to file and absorb disproportionate costs, or structure deals to sidestep India , both outcomes undermining the DVT‟s effectiveness.

5.4 Interim Conclusion

The 10% threshold test entails drafting error requiring correction before it distorts the M&A landscape of the country resulting into ineffectiveness. The above critique highlights three regulatory failures: false negatives, false positive and over-inclusive filing burdens under asymmetric compliance incentives under while simultaneously expanding jurisdictional reach through mechanisms that were not explicitly debated in the legislative process. The defect lies in the chosen metric. Objecting to the 10% test is not an objection to the DVT framework, and the reform proposals developed in Chapter 6 proceed on this basis. What the critique does establish is the inadequacy of a percentage-only framework, the institutional cost of the existing transparency deficit, and the structural incentives the current regime creates for carve-out drafting. Chapter 6 translates each of these findings into specific reform proposals.

CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS, IMPLEMENTATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS.

The above chapters have established a nuanced defect by analysing the doctrinal, mathematical and comparative case against the 10% user based SBOI. The following chapter would convert these finds into actionable measures to fix the issues highlighted. The recommendations are structured across four dimensions ahead:

6.1 Recommendation 1: Replace the Percentage-Based User Test with an Absolute User Threshold

The Platform A/B/C hypothetical in Section 5.1 sheds light on a drafting era that was mentioned in1.1. This can be fixed by amending Regulations 4(2)(a) to replace 10% test with an absolute threshold of 10 million end users or business users in India.78

The explanation to this is simple: 25 million Indian users constitute materially greater capacity to affect competition than 6 million, irrespective of global footprint. The Draft Digital Competition Bill, 2024 designates SSDEs based on 10 million end users, reflecting legislative recognition that competitive significance turns on absolute Indian presence, solving the internal contradiction between ex-ante and ex-post thresholds.79 The amendment should be effected through Section 64 notification, with a guidance note clarifying the 10 million threshold applies to active users (engaged within preceding 90 days) to prevent inactive account inflation.80

6.2 Recommendation 2: Mandate Ex-Post Disclosure of SBOI Trigger in CCI Combination Orders

The research gap identified in Chapter 3 (Sections 3.3–3.3.2) is not simply a hindrance to academic developments but even poses a hint towards regulatory failure that prevents evidence-based evaluation of the DVT framework. The proposed amendment would take into account the amendment of Regulation 9 of the 2024 Combination Regulations to require that every combination order or summary published on the CCI website shall explicitly state:81

1. Which SBOI prong (user threshold, GVM threshold, or turnover threshold) triggered the notification obligation;

2. The absolute user count in India at the time of notification (for user-triggered filings);

3. The percentage of global users represented by the Indian user count (for user- triggered filings); and

4. The monetisation data (turnover or GVM in India) for the target enterprise.

Without disclosure researchers, practitioners, and policymakers cannot assess whether the 10% user threshold achieves its purpose or produce arbitrary outcomes. identified in. Transparency is a fundamental principle of administrative law.82 The CCI, as a statutory regulator exercising significant powers over commercial transactions, owes accountability to the public and to Parliament. Meaningful parliamentary oversight of the DVT framework‟s effectiveness requires full transparency. Even the implementation would cost a little effort to CCI body, since they already possess these information they‟re simply required to determine which prong is satisfied before accepting a filing.83 The proposed reform merely requires the CCI to publish what it already knows.

6.3 Recommendation 3: Introduce a De Minimis Floor for the User Prong

The concept introduced in chapter 5.3 pushes the notion that the user prong is uniquely asymmetric: the GVM and turnover prongs are both subject to an absolute floor of INR 500 crore, but the user prong contains no such floor.84 This asymmetry violates the constitutional principle of non-arbitrariness, which requires that regulatory burdens be proportionate to the object sought to be achieved.85 This can be tackled by simply instilling a clause “de minimis floor” for the user prong, requiring that the Indian user count not only constitute 10% of global users but also exceed an absolute minimum threshold proposed at 1 million active users in India.

benefit. The amendment should be effected through a notification under Section 64 of the Competition Act, 2002, amending Regulation 4(2)(a) to read: “10% or more of its global business users or end users are in India, provided that the number of such users in India exceeds 1 million.”86

6.4 Recommendation 4: Clarify the “Reasonable Certainty” Presumption

The presumption in section 5.4 encourages parties to file even when they fall below the threshold, increasing unnecessary regulatory burden and delay which can be tackled through amending Regulation 4(3) to replace the “reasonable certainty” presumption with a good- faith estimation requirement,87 accompanied by a safe harbour for transactions where the estimated value falls below INR 2,000 crore and the estimation is made in good faith based on available information. A good-faith estimation requirement with a safe harbour would restore proportionality. Parties would be required to make a reasonable, good-faith estimate of transaction value based on available information. If the estimate falls below INR 2,000 crore, and the estimation is made in good faith, the parties would be protected from gun- jumping liability unless the CCI can demonstrate that the estimate was manifestly unreasonable.88

6.5 Conclusion

The 2023 Amendment and the 2024 Combination Regulations represent a landmark reform of India‟s merger control regime. The introduction of the Deal Value Threshold was a necessary and proportionate response to the jurisdictional gaps exposed by the pre-2023 regime, which systematically failed to capture high-value acquisitions of user-rich, revenue-poor digital platforms.

The percent paradox established produces false negatives (missing problematic deals), false positives (capturing non-problematic deals), and asymmetric compliance incentives that sophisticated acquirers can exploit through jurisdiction-selecting contractual drafting. The transparency gap identified in Section 3.3.2 is itself a policy problem that the proposed reforms seek to address within this. Future research should examine empirical verification of the percent paradox, Sectoral distribution of DVT-triggered filings, Compliance cost & Comparative effectiveness.

These four recommendations align with the drafting error while ensuring that the DVT’s core purpose restoring every metric and aligns India’s regime with its legislative proposals and international best practice. The DVT can then capture high-value digital acquisitions with genuine Indian impact, avoiding arbitrary outcomes from the current percentage-based formulation.

Notes:

1 Competition Act , No 12 of 2002, s 5(a) and 5(b).

2 Chambers and Partners, ‘M&A impact due to changes in India‟s competition law’ (21 April 2023) <https://chambers.com/articles/m-a-impact-due-to-changes-in-india-s-competition-law-5> accessed 10 June 2026.

3 Competition Act, No 12 of 2002, s 5(d) (as inserted by the Competition Act, No 14 of 2023); „Competition Laws – Introduction of Deal Value Threshold and Exemption of Certain Combinations‟ (Chambers and Partners, 6 December 2024) https://chambers.com/articles/competition-laws-introduction-of-deal-value- threshold-and-exemption-of-certain-combinations accessed 10 June 2026.

4 Competition Act, No 12 of 2002, s 5(d) (as inserted by the Competition Act, No 14 of 2023); „Competition law in India – Deal Value Threshold and other changes notified‟ (Lexology, 12 September 2024) <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1079e4cb-1349-42c9-87b2-d00453b78f7b> accessed 10 June 2026.

5 Competition Commission of India (Combinations) Regulations 2024, reg 4. „India‟s Competition Law Update: The Deal Value Threshold and its Implications for M&A‟ (Lexology, 6 December 2024) <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1079e4cb-1349-42c9-87b2-d00453b78f7b> accessed 10 June 2026.

6 Competition Commission of India (Combinations) Regulations 2024, reg 4.

7 „India‟s Competition Law Update‟ (n 5).

8 Alexei Oreskovic, „Facebook says WhatsApp deal cleared by FTC‟ (Reuters, 10 April 2014) https://www.reuters.com/article/technology/facebook-says-whatsapp-deal-cleared-by-ftc-idUSBREA391VA/ accessed 10 June 2026.

9 Avirup Bose, „Why India’s antitrust body should scrutinise the WhatsApp buy,‟ Business Standard (2 March 2014) <https://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/avirup-bose-why-india-s-antitrust-body-should- scrutinise-the-whatsapp-buy-114030200719_1.html > accessed 10 June 2026.

10 ibid.

11 SS Rana & Co, „Digital Competition Law: India‟ (16 February 2023) https://ssrana.in/articles/digital- competition-law-india/ accessed 10 June 2026.

12 Ibid.

13 Competition Law Review Committee, Report of the Competition Law Review Committee para 1.1; ‘Report of the Competition Law Review Committee submitted to Union Finance and Corporate Affairs Minister’ (Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 14 August 2019) <https://www.pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1581956®=48&lang=2> accessed 10 June 2026.

14 Ibid.

15 CLRC Report (n 13).

16 ‘CCI: We Will Frame Regulations Very Carefully’ (BRICS Competition, 8 December 2022) <https://www.bricscompetition.org/news/cci-we-will-frame-regulations-very-carefully > accessed 10 June 2026.

17 Competition Act, No 12 of 2002, s 5(d) (as inserted by the Competition Act, No 14 of 2023); „Competition Laws – Introduction of Deal Value Threshold and Exemption of Certain Combinations‟ (Chambers and Partners, 6 December 2024) <https://chambers.com/articles/competition-laws-introduction-of-deal-value- threshold-and-exemption-of-certain-combinations > accessed 10 June 2026.

18 ibid; „India‟s Competition Law Update‟ (n 5).

19 Competition Commission of India (Combinations) Regulations 2024, reg 4(1) „CCI revised deal value threshold regulations explained‟ (Shardul Amarchand Mangaldas & Co, 7 November 2024) <https://www.amsshardul.com/insight/cci-revised-deal-value-threshold-regulations-explained/> accessed 10 June 2026.

20 „Competition Laws – Introduction of Deal Value Threshold and Exemption of Certain Combinations‟ (Chambers and Partners, 6 December 2024) <https://chambers.com/articles/competition-laws-introduction-of- deal-value-threshold-and-exemption-of-certain-combinations> accessed 10 June 2026.

21 „Tailoring to Deal Value Thresholds: Paradigm Shifts In Mergers & Acquisitions‟ (CCL NLUO, 14 October 2024) <https://ccl.nluo.ac.in/post/tailoring-to-deal-value-thresholds-paradigm-shifts-in-mergers-acquisitions > accessed 10 June 2026.

22 Competition Commission of India (Combinations) Regulations, 2024, reg 4(1); Luthra and Luthra Law Offices India, „Competition Law Alert – Special Edition‟ (October 2024) <https://luthra.com/wp- content/uploads/2024/10/Competition-Law-News-Special-Edition-24.pdf > accessed 10 June 2026.

23 Competition Commission of India (Combinations) Regulations, 2024, reg 4(2); (n 21)

24 Competition Commission of India (Combinations) Regulations, 2024, reg 4(2).

25 Competition Act (n 21) s 5(d); Competition Commission of India (Combinations) Regulations 2024, reg 4(2).

26 Competition Commission of India Regulations 2024, reg 4(2)(a); Luthra and Luthra (n 22).

27 Competition Commission of India (Combinations) Regulations 2024, reg 4(2)(b); „India‟s Competition Law Update‟ (n 5).

28 Competition Commission of India (Combinations) Regulations 2024, reg 4(2)(c); „Tailoring To Deal Value Thresholds‟ (n 21).

29 Competition Commission of India (Combinations) Regulations 2024, reg 4(2), proviso.

30 Competition Commission of India (Combinations) Regulations 2024, reg 2(1)(h); „Tailoring To Deal Value Thresholds‟ (n 21).

31 „India‟s Competition Law Update‟ (n 5).

32 Competition Act, No 12 of 2002, s 5(a) and (b) (pre-amendment).

33 Competition Law Review Committee, (n 13) para 6.4.

34 Avirup Bose, ‘Why India’s antitrust body should scrutinise the WhatsApp buy’ (Business Standard, 2 March 2014) <https://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/avirup-bose-why-india-s-antitrust-body-should- scrutinise-the-whatsapp-buy-114030200719_1.html> accessed 10 June 2026; Alexei Oreskovic, ‘Facebook says WhatsApp deal cleared by FTC’ (Reuters, 10 April 2014) < https://www.reuters.com/article/technology/facebook-says-whatsapp-deal-cleared-by-ftc-idUSBREA391VA/> accessed 10 June 2026.

35 Competition Law Review Committee report (n 13) para 6.2.

36 „India‟s Competition Law Update‟ (n 5).

37 Rahul Bajaj,„[Vidhispeaks] Making India‟s combinations regime fit for digital age‟ (Bar and Bench, 24 February 2022) <https://www.barandbench.com/columns/vidhispeaks-making-indias-combinations-regime-fit- for-digital-age> accessed 10 June 2026.

38 Competition Law Review Committee (n 13) para 6.5.

39 UPI crosses 20 billion transactions in August, records ₹24.85 lakh crore value‟ (The Economic Times, 1 September 2025)https://widget.economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/banking/finance/banking/upi-crosses- 20-billion-transactions-in-august-records-24-85-lakh-crore-value/printarticle/123633627.cms accessed 10 June 2026.

40 NPCI extends market cap deadline for UPI apps for another two years till 2026‟ (The Hindu BusinessLine, 1 January 2025)< https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/money-and-banking/npci-extends-market-cap-deadline- for-upi-apps-for-another-two-years-till-2026/article69049981.ece> accessed 10 June 2026.

41 „A Review of Key Developments in India‟s Merger Control Regime: 2024-2025‟ (Legal Era, 17 February 2026) https://www.legaleraonline.com/amp/competition-law/a-review-of-key-developments-in-indias-merger- control-regime-2024-2025-980152 accessed 25 June 2026; Shubhang Kapoor, Strengthening Merger Oversight In India (King Stubb & Kasiva, Mondaq, 8 May 2026) https://webiis08.mondaq.com/india/corporate- governance/1784472/ accessed 25 June 2026; Khushi Gupta, Reverse Acquihires and the Limits of India‟s Merger Control: When Hiring Becomes Acquisition (Centre for Competition Law & Economics, NLSIU, 7 May 2026) https://www.ccr.nls.ac.in/post/reverse-acquihires-and-the-limits-of-india-s-merger-control-when-hiring- becomes-acquisition accessed 25 June 2026.

42 Competition Commission of India, Annual Report 2024-25.

43 Competition Commission of India (Combinations) Regulations 2024, reg 9, sch I.

44 Competition Commission of India (Combinations) Regulations 2024, reg 9, sch II.

45 Competition Commission of India (Combinations) Regulations 2024; Competition Commission of India, „Combination Orders‟ (CCI website) https://cci.gov.in/combination/orders-section31 accessed 25 June 2026.

46 Competition Commission of India (Combinations) Regulations, 2024, reg 4.

47 Competition Commission of India (Combinations) Regulations, 2024, reg 4; ‘India’s Competition Law Update’ (n 5).

48 Competition Law Review Committee, Report of the Competition Law Review Committee (Ministry of Corporate Affairs, 2019) [4.12]-[4.15].

49 Ibid.

50 Shardul Amarchand Mangaldas & Co (n 19) (DVT framework observation: SBOI test as ‘porous’).

51 ibid

52 Competition Law Review Committee, Report of the Competition Law Review Committee (Ministry of Corporate Affairs, 2019) [4.8]-[4.12].

53 ibid

54 Shardul Amarchand Mangaldas (n 19).

55 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (ARC) § 35(1a) (Germany); Kartellgesetz 2005 (KartG) § 9(4) (Austria); Digital Competition Bill, 2024 (India).

56 Digital Competition Bill, 2024 (India) cl 2(1)(m).

57 ibid cl 3-5.

58 Regulation 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector OJ L265/1, art 2 (45 million monthly active end-user threshold).

59 CMS, ‘Austrian Merger Control – Supreme Court Rules on “Significant Domestic Activities” Requirement under the Transaction Value Test’ (CMS Law-Now, 22 April 2025) < https://cms.law/en/aut/legal- updates/austrian-merger-control-supreme-court-rules-on-significant-domestic-activities-requirement-under-the- transaction-value-test> accessed 22 June 2026.

60 GWB § 35(1a) (Germany).

61 Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice), Decision of 17 June 2025, KVR 77/22, reversing OLG Düsseldorf, Decision of 23 November 2022, Kart 11/21(V).

62 Perkins Coie, ‘German Court Clarifies Scope of “Substantial Domestic Operations” for Asserting Jurisdiction Under Transaction Value Threshold’ (Mondaq, 4 September 2025) https://webiis08.mondaq.com/germany/antitrust-eu-competition/1673986/ accessed 22 June 2026.

63 KartG § 9(4) (Austria).

64 Bundesgerichtshof, Meta/Kustomer (n 61).

65 Clifford Chance, ‘German Federal Court of Justice Broadens “Substantial Operations in Germany” Test for Merger Control’ (2025) https://www.cliffordchance.com/insights/resources/blogs/antitrust-fdi- insights/2025/09/german-federal-court-of-justice-broadens-substantial-operations-in-germany-test-for-merger- control.html accessed 22 June 2026.

66 Bundeskartellamt, Guidance on Transaction Value Threshold (2021) [12]-[18]. https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Leitfaden/Guidance_Transaction_Value_Thresho lds.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4 last accessed 22 June 2026.

67 Ibid.

68 Oberster Gerichtshof (Austrian Supreme Court), judgment of 22 April 2025, 16 Ok 2/25t.

69 CMS (n 59).

70 Bundeskartellamt (n 61).

71 Digital Competition Bill [Bill No 14 of 2024] cl 2(m); Competition Act, No 12 of 2002, s 43A.

72 Bundesgerichtshof, Meta/Kustomer (n 61); Perkins Coie (n 62).

73 See Chapter 4.

74 Competition (Amendment) Act 2023 s 5(d); Competition Commission of India (Combinations) Regulations 2024 (India) reg 4(2); Competition Law Review Committee, Report of the Competition Law Review Committee (Ministry of Corporate Affairs, 2019) [4.8]–[4.15].

75 Competition Commission of India (Combinations) Regulations 2024 (India) reg4(2).

76 Centre for Business and Financial Laws, National Law University Delhi, Analysis of the Draft Digital Competition Bill, 2024 (2024).

77 Ibid.

78 Competition Commission of India (Combinations) Regulations 2024 (No 07 of 2024) reg 4(2)(a).

79 India, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Draft Digital Competition Bill 2024 (2024).

80 Competition Act 2002 (No 12 of 2003) s 64

81 Competition Commission of India (Combinations) Regulations 2024 (No 07 of 2024) reg 9 (proposed amendment).

82 Tata Cellular v Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651.

83 Competition Commission of India (Combinations) Regulations 2024 (No 07 of 2024) reg 5 (Form I/II notice requirements).

84 Competition Commission of India (Combinations) Regulations 2024 (No 07 of 2024) reg 4(2)(b)(ii) and (c)(ii).

85 Constitution of India art 14.

86 Competition Commission of India (Combinations) Regulations 2024 (No 07 of 2024) reg 4(2)(a) (proposed amendment).

87 Competition Commission of India (Combinations) Regulations 2024 (No 07 of 2024) reg 4(1).

88 Competition Act 2002( No 12 of 2003) s 6(2)

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Sapna
Name: Sapna
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Location: Patna, Bihar
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