Advertisement
Advertisement
Skip to content
Follow Us on
Advertisement
TOP STORIES
Income Tax

99-Year Land Lease Premium Allowed as Revenue Expenditure: ITAT Ahmedabad

Case Law Details

TaxGuru Citation
2026 taxguru.in 19078
Case Name
Torrent Power Limited Vs DCIT (ITAT Ahmedabad)
Appeal Number
Premium Access
Date of Judgement/Order
Premium Access
Related Assessment Year
2006-07
Subscribe to download.

Already Upgraded? Log in.

Advertisement

Torrent Power Limited Vs DCIT (ITAT Ahmedabad)

Detailed Summary: The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench “B”, comprising Shri Rajpal Yadav, Vice President, and Shri Waseem Ahmed, Accountant Member, delivered a consolidated order on 9 December 2021 in eight appeals and one cross-objection involving Torrent Power Limited and the Income Tax Department. The appeals related to Assessment Years 2006-07, 2008-09, 2009-10, 2010-11 and 2011-12 and arose from assessments under Section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The disputes covered several interconnected questions concerning the computation of taxable business income of an electricity generation and distribution company. These included the deductibility of upfront lease premium paid for land acquired under 99-year lease arrangements, the alternative claim for depreciation on leasehold rights under Section 32, disallowance of expenditure relating to exempt income under Section 14A read with Rule 8D, eligibility of ancillary business receipts for deduction under Section 80-IA, treatment of scrap sales and capital assets, computation of book profit under Section 115JB, and the admissibility of additional claims raised during appellate proceedings. Since several grounds were common to successive assessment years, the Tribunal considered the principal issues in detail and applied its findings to the corresponding grounds in the connected appeals. The resulting order is significant for its examination of the commercial substance of long-term lease arrangements and the statutory nexus required between income and an eligible electricity undertaking.

The first major controversy arose in Assessment Year 2006-07 and concerned land obtained on lease by Torrent Power AEC and Torrent Power SEC, two companies that subsequently amalgamated into Torrent Power Limited. The land had been obtained from Surat Municipal Corporation and Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority for a period of 99 years on payment of an initial premium of approximately Rs. 2,000 per square metre, together with annual lease rent of Rs. 1 per square metre. The land was required for setting up power receiving stations and supporting the distribution of electricity to consumers. The erstwhile companies treated the initial payments as consideration for acquiring commercial rights and capitalised the amounts as intangible assets, claiming depreciation at 25 per cent under Section 32. Following amalgamation, Torrent Power continued the depreciation claim. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim on the ground that the substantial initial premium, nominal annual rent and exceptionally long lease period conferred an enduring benefit comparable to ownership of land. According to the Assessing Officer, the payment represented capital expenditure incurred for acquiring rights in land, which was not a depreciable asset. The Assessing Officer also observed that the relevant lease deeds had not been executed and the initial premium had not been paid during the assessment year under consideration. The assessee disputed this approach and argued that the transaction had to be evaluated by examining the legal rights actually acquired and the business purpose served by the land.

The dispute had already passed through an earlier round of appellate proceedings. The Commissioner (Appeals) had initially upheld the disallowance, observing that the Tribunal had decided similar claims against the erstwhile companies for Assessment Year 2002-03. The Commissioner (Appeals) also relied upon the fact that the assessee had not claimed the entire lease premium as revenue expenditure in its return but had instead treated the amount as an intangible asset and claimed depreciation. In the earlier appeal, the Tribunal restored the issue to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration in the light of the Gujarat High Court judgment in DCIT Vs Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd., reported in 329 ITR 479. Despite that direction, the Assessing Officer maintained the disallowance during the remand proceedings, distinguishing the lease arrangements of Torrent Power from those considered in Sun Pharmaceutical Industries. The Commissioner (Appeals) again sustained the assessment, referring to differences in the identity of the lessor, the quantum of annual rent and the circumstances in which the land was used. Torrent Power challenged the fresh appellate order on the ground that the binding jurisdictional precedent had not been properly applied and that the Assessing Officer had exceeded the limited scope of the remand.

Before the Tribunal, the assessee relied upon the Supreme Court decisions in Empire Jute Co. Ltd. Vs CIT, reported in 124 ITR 1, and CIT Vs Madras Auto Service (P.) Ltd., reported in 233 ITR 468, to contend that the existence of an enduring advantage does not automatically convert expenditure into capital expenditure. The assessee submitted that the lease premium had been incurred to obtain facilities necessary for carrying on its existing electricity distribution business and had not resulted in acquisition of ownership of the land. It argued that the Gujarat High Court had already examined a 99-year lease in Sun Pharmaceutical Industries and had accepted that a substantial initial payment could constitute revenue expenditure where the ownership of the property remained with the lessor and the payment facilitated business operations. The assessee further contended that differences in annual rent or the identity of the leasing authority did not alter the essential legal character of the transaction. Alternatively, it sought depreciation on the leasehold rights as intangible assets or proportionate deduction over the lease period, referring to Madras Industrial Investment Corporation Ltd. Vs CIT, reported in 225 ITR 802. The Revenue, on the other hand, maintained that the lease premium was capital expenditure because the rights obtained were substantial, long-lasting and necessary for establishing the electricity infrastructure.

The Tribunal first considered the procedural consequences of the earlier remand. Referring to S.P. Kochhar Vs ITO, reported in 145 ITR 255, it explained that when an appellate authority restores a matter with specific directions, the Assessing Officer must decide the remanded issue within the limits of those directions. The Tribunal examined the Gujarat High Court judgment in Sun Pharmaceutical Industries and observed that the material features of the lease arrangements were substantially comparable. Both cases involved long-term leases, payment of a substantial amount at the commencement of the lease, nominal recurring rent and use of the leased property for business purposes without transfer of ownership. The Tribunal considered that the difference in the amount of annual rent did not justify disregarding the governing legal principle. It also rejected the proposition that the assessee’s original accounting treatment conclusively established the character of the payment. Relying upon Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Vs CIT, reported in 82 ITR 363, the Tribunal reiterated that the legal entitlement to a deduction must be determined under the Income-tax Act and cannot be defeated merely because an assessee has made a different entry in its books of account or initially advanced a different tax treatment.

The Tribunal also examined the Revenue’s reliance on decisions involving mining and quarrying rights. In Enterprising Enterprises Vs DCIT and Aditya Minerals (P.) Ltd. Vs CIT, the payments in question were connected with acquiring rights to extract minerals or granite from land. The Tribunal distinguished those decisions because Torrent Power had not obtained the land for extracting any mineral or acquiring a wasting asset. Its purpose was to establish power receiving stations and facilitate electricity distribution. Referring to Pingle Industries Ltd. Vs CIT, reported in 40 ITR 67, the Tribunal emphasised that there is no universally conclusive test for classifying a lease-related payment as capital or revenue expenditure and that the character of the rights acquired must be examined in the factual context. It also relied upon CIT Vs H.M.T. Ltd., reported in 203 ITR 820, where the Karnataka High Court had allowed deduction of an upfront payment under a 95-year lease carrying nominal annual rent. The Tribunal considered that the commercial substance of Torrent Power’s payment was sufficiently comparable to the arrangements examined in these authorities and that the expenditure was incurred for obtaining business facilities rather than ownership of land.

The Revenue additionally objected that the initial lease premium had been paid in earlier years and that the assessee had not deducted tax at source under Section 194-I. The Tribunal considered the timing objection with reference to CIT Vs Nagri Mills Co. Ltd., reported in 33 ITR 681, which discouraged unnecessary disputes over the year of deduction where the applicable tax rates were the same and no material revenue consequence arose. On the tax deduction issue, the Tribunal examined the second proviso to Section 40(a)(ia), introduced by the Finance Act, 2012, together with the first proviso to Section 201(1). It observed that the statutory mechanism provides relief in specified circumstances where the resident recipient has furnished its return of income, included the relevant amount in computing income, paid the applicable tax and the payer furnishes the prescribed accountant’s certificate in Form 26A. The Tribunal considered that the disallowance could not be sustained without examining the applicable statutory provisions. Taking the facts and precedents together, it held that the impugned lease premium was allowable as revenue expenditure in computing business income, reversed the orders of the lower authorities and directed the Assessing Officer to delete the disallowance. Consequently, the assessee’s appeal for Assessment Year 2006-07, ITA No. 1577/Ahd/2015, was allowed.

For Assessment Year 2008-09, the Tribunal considered a separate dispute concerning disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D. Torrent Power had earned exempt income of Rs. 1,74,63,194, comprising dividend income of Rs. 1,72,09,084 and tax-free bond interest of Rs. 2,54,110. The assessee had not made any disallowance in its return, contending that the relevant investments were financed from interest-free funds and that no specific administrative expenditure had been incurred for earning the exempt income. The Assessing Officer rejected these submissions, reasoning that investments reduced the liquidity available to the company and that management and administrative resources were necessarily involved in investment decisions. Applying Rule 8D, the Assessing Officer computed interest disallowance of Rs. 20,37,001 and administrative expenditure disallowance of Rs. 17,81,570, aggregating Rs. 38,18,571. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the disallowance on the ground that the assessee had mixed borrowed funds and owned funds and had not maintained separate accounts for expenditure relating to exempt income. The assessee challenged the computation before the Tribunal, particularly the attribution of interest expenditure to investments that could be fully financed from its own funds.

The Tribunal examined the financial position of the assessee and recorded that its net owned funds amounted to Rs. 2,889.76 crore, whereas its investments in securities amounted to only Rs. 61.88 crore. On these facts, the Tribunal held that a presumption arose that the investments had been made from the assessee’s interest-free funds. It relied upon CIT Vs Reliance Utilities and Power Ltd., reported in 313 ITR 340, CIT Vs India Gelatine & Chemicals Pvt. Ltd., reported in 376 ITR 553, and the Gujarat High Court decision concerning UTI Bank Ltd., reported in 32 taxmann.com 370. These authorities supported the principle that where sufficient interest-free funds are available to cover the investments, interest expenditure cannot automatically be disallowed merely because the assessee also has borrowed funds. Accordingly, the Tribunal directed deletion of the interest component of the disallowance. However, it did not accept the assessee’s contention that no administrative expenditure could be attributable to the investments. It observed that investment and disinvestment decisions ordinarily require involvement of senior management and supporting administrative staff. Consequently, the assessee’s claim had to be examined separately in relation to administrative expenditure. The Tribunal thus distinguished between interest expenditure, for which the availability of sufficient owned funds was decisive, and administrative expenditure, which required an independent examination of the resources utilised for investment activities.

Another important issue for Assessment Year 2008-09 concerned the deduction claimed under Section 80-IA in respect of various receipts associated with the electricity generation and distribution business. The assessee disputed the exclusion of insurance receipts of Rs. 3,40,16,353, street-light maintenance income of Rs. 1,44,61,003, recovery of bad debts of Rs. 5,32,51,168, interest on fixed deposits of Rs. 26,76,505, rent recovered from staff members occupying residential quarters of Rs. 3,10,990, and miscellaneous receipts of Rs. 11,57,69,618, which included substantial scrap sale proceeds. The assessee argued that these receipts had arisen from the conduct of the electricity business and should be included in eligible profits. The Revenue maintained that Section 80-IA did not permit deduction merely because a receipt appeared in the accounts of an eligible undertaking. The Tribunal examined the source and character of each receipt, distinguishing income arising directly from eligible business operations from income having a more remote or independent source. The dispute therefore required consideration of the statutory expression concerning profits derived from the eligible business and the factual connection between each receipt and the undertaking’s activities.

In relation to receipts arising from delayed payments and contractual commitments, the Tribunal examined the commercial relationship between the charges recovered and the assessee’s electricity business. The Revenue had challenged the inclusion of delayed payment interest, unfulfilled commitment charges and related receipts in eligible profits under Section 80-IA. The Tribunal relied upon Nirma Industries Ltd. Vs DCIT, reported in 283 ITR 402, where the Gujarat High Court had held that additional amounts received from trade debtors because of delayed payment could represent an extension of sale consideration rather than income arising from an independent lending transaction. Applying that principle, the Tribunal considered that the substance of the receipt was more important than the accounting description attached to it. Where an amount was recovered as an incident of the underlying business transaction, it could retain the necessary connection with the eligible undertaking. The Tribunal accordingly accepted the eligibility of unfulfilled commitment charges and rejected the Revenue’s objection to the corresponding relief granted by the Commissioner (Appeals). In the connected appeal for Assessment Year 2009-10, the Tribunal also accepted that income from the sale of waste oil had a direct proximity to the eligible business, particularly because the corresponding expenditure had been treated as expenditure of that business.

The treatment of scrap sale proceeds required a separate analysis because the assessee had credited Rs. 11,57,69,618 as scrap sales in its profit and loss account. It argued that the scrap had arisen in the course of carrying on electricity distribution activities and should therefore qualify for deduction under Section 80-IA. Alternatively, the assessee contended that Rs. 10,04,30,079 represented sale proceeds of items classified as fixed assets and that those proceeds should be adjusted against the written-down value of the relevant blocks of assets rather than treated as independent taxable income. The Commissioner (Appeals) accepted the principle of adjustment against the respective asset blocks, while the assessee continued to dispute the denial of Section 80-IA deduction and the Revenue challenged the adjustment directed by the appellate authority. The Tribunal held that the scrap sale receipts themselves were not derived from the distribution of electricity and therefore did not qualify for deduction under Section 80-IA. Nevertheless, it accepted the alternative treatment of Rs. 10,04,30,079 relating to fixed assets, holding that the proceeds should be adjusted against the relevant depreciable blocks. The balance of Rs. 1,53,39,539 was to be treated as scrap sale income not eligible for deduction under Section 80-IA. Both the assessee’s and the Revenue’s grounds on this issue were dismissed. This distinction was material because it separated the computation of business income and depreciation from the narrower determination of profits eligible for an undertaking-specific deduction.

The appeals for Assessment Years 2009-10 and 2010-11 involved several issues substantially similar to those examined for Assessment Year 2008-09. These included disallowance under Section 14A, depreciation on leasehold rights, deduction under Section 80-IA in respect of ancillary receipts, treatment of scrap sales, and adjustments to book profit under Section 115JB. The Tribunal applied its earlier findings where the parties agreed that the facts and legal issues were identical. For Assessment Year 2009-10, the assessee challenged disallowance of interest expenditure of Rs. 29,74,843 and administrative expenditure of Rs. 38,20,843 under Section 14A. The Tribunal followed its conclusions for Assessment Year 2008-09 and partly allowed the relevant grounds. Similarly, the dispute concerning depreciation at 25 per cent on leasehold rights was considered in the light of the Tribunal’s earlier decision allowing the underlying lease premium as revenue expenditure. The Tribunal also examined the treatment of income from street-light maintenance, bad debt recovery, interest receipts, rent from employees, reversal of provisions and miscellaneous receipts under Section 80-IA, applying the relevant conclusions reached on corresponding issues in the preceding assessment year.

The consolidated proceedings also included disputes concerning the computation of book profit under Section 115JB. The assessee challenged adjustments relating to the write-back of provisions for doubtful debts, while the Revenue disputed the exclusion of amounts disallowed under Section 14A from the computation of book profit. The assessee’s grounds referred to a credit of approximately Rs. 75 lakh representing the reversal of a provision for doubtful debts that was no longer required. It contended that the amount was eligible for reduction in computing book profit in view of the relevant provisions of Explanation 1 to Section 115JB(2). The Revenue questioned the appellate treatment of these adjustments and also raised objections concerning the powers of the Commissioner (Appeals) to restore matters to the Assessing Officer. These issues required the Tribunal to distinguish the computation of income under the normal provisions of the Act from the statutory adjustments specifically permitted for determining book profit under the minimum alternate tax framework. The Tribunal dealt with the relevant grounds in the individual appeals rather than treating the adjustments made under the normal provisions as automatically applicable to book profit.

The assessee also raised additional grounds seeking deduction of education cess and secondary and higher education cess under Section 37(1). For Assessment Year 2008-09, the additional claim amounted to Rs. 1,23,32,471. Similar claims were raised in subsequent assessment years, including claims concerning education cess on income tax and dividend distribution tax. These grounds had not been raised before the lower authorities. The Revenue opposed their admission on the ground that they had not formed part of the original assessment proceedings. The Tribunal considered the Supreme Court decision in National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. Vs CIT, reported in 229 ITR 383, which recognised the wide appellate powers of the Tribunal under Section 254 to consider a legal question arising from facts already available on record. The Tribunal accepted that a legal claim should not be excluded merely because it was raised for the first time at the appellate stage. However, admission of a legal ground was distinct from determining its substantive eligibility. Since the lower authorities had not examined the claims under the applicable statutory provisions, the Tribunal restored the relevant matters for fresh examination by the Assessing Officer after providing the assessee an opportunity of being heard.

For Assessment Year 2011-12, the proceedings included the Revenue’s appeal in ITA No. 3178/Ahd/2016 and the assessee’s Cross-Objection No. 25/Ahd/2017. The issues included the computation of deduction under Section 80-IA, allocation of expenses and contributions between generation and distribution units, adjustment of brought-forward losses of an eligible undertaking, deductions under Sections 80G and 80GGB, credit for tax deducted at source, and additional legal claims raised by the assessee. The assessee contended that contributions allocated between its Ahmedabad and Surat generation and distribution units had affected the computation of eligible profits. It also challenged the treatment of brought-forward losses relating to the Surat Distribution Unit and sought consequential adjustment of the Section 80-IA deduction. In addition, the assessee raised claims concerning deductions that had allegedly been allowed in earlier years and tax credit that had not been fully granted. The Tribunal considered the respective grounds in the context of the findings recorded in the connected appeals and the need for factual verification wherever the original assessment record had not been examined on a particular claim.

The Tribunal specifically considered the additional legal grounds raised in the cross-objection for Assessment Year 2011-12. It reiterated that the powers of the Tribunal under Section 254 are sufficiently wide to permit consideration of a question of law where the relevant facts are already available on record. The Tribunal rejected an unduly restrictive interpretation under which only matters expressly considered by the Commissioner (Appeals) could be examined. At the same time, it recognised that an appellate claim could require verification of the conditions prescribed by the Act, particularly where the assessee had not claimed the expenditure before the Assessing Officer or the Commissioner (Appeals). Accordingly, the Tribunal restored the additional ground to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication and directed that the assessee be given an opportunity of being heard. The cross-objection was consequently partly allowed for statistical purposes. The distinction between admission of a new legal ground and allowance of the underlying deduction is important because the Tribunal’s decision to entertain a claim does not necessarily establish that the claim satisfies the substantive requirements of the Act.

In the final result, the Tribunal allowed Torrent Power Limited’s appeal in ITA No. 1577/Ahd/2015 for Assessment Year 2006-07. The assessee’s appeals in ITA Nos. 776/Ahd/2012, 1581/Ahd/2012 and 1977/Ahd/2013 for Assessment Years 2008-09, 2009-10 and 2010-11 were partly allowed for statistical purposes. The Revenue’s appeals in ITA Nos. 738/Ahd/2012, 1669/Ahd/2012 and 2025/Ahd/2013 for the corresponding assessment years were partly allowed. The Revenue’s appeal in ITA No. 3178/Ahd/2016 for Assessment Year 2011-12 was dismissed, while the assessee’s Cross-Objection No. 25/Ahd/2017 was partly allowed for statistical purposes. The consolidated decision illustrates the importance of examining the true nature of a business expenditure, the availability of owned funds when applying Section 14A, the direct connection required between ancillary receipts and eligible profits under Section 80-IA, and the statutory distinction between normal income computation and book profit computation. It also reinforces the principle that an appellate authority may admit a genuine legal claim while restoring its substantive examination to the Assessing Officer where necessary. The decision must be read in the context of the statutory provisions and assessment years considered in the order, particularly in relation to subsequent legislative changes affecting the deductibility of education cess.

Cases Discussed

  • DCIT Vs Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. — 329 ITR 479 (Gujarat High Court). The principal jurisdictional precedent on long-term lease payments. The Tribunal applied its reasoning to hold that the lease premium paid for land used in the electricity business was allowable as revenue expenditure.
  • Empire Jute Co. Ltd. Vs CIT — 124 ITR 1 (Supreme Court). Cited in connection with the distinction between capital and revenue expenditure and the proposition that an enduring business advantage does not invariably establish capital expenditure.
  • CIT Vs Madras Auto Service (P.) Ltd. — 233 ITR 468 (Supreme Court). Cited concerning expenditure incurred to obtain business facilities without acquiring ownership of the underlying property.
  • Madras Industrial Investment Corporation Ltd. Vs CIT — 225 ITR 802 (Supreme Court). Relied upon by the assessee in support of its alternative claim concerning deduction of expenditure over the period to which it related.
  • S.P. Kochhar Vs ITO — 145 ITR 255 (Allahabad High Court). Applied to explain that the Assessing Officer’s jurisdiction in proceedings remanded by the Tribunal is confined to the subject matter and directions of the remand.
  • Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Vs CIT — 82 ITR 363 (Supreme Court). Applied for the principle that accounting entries are not conclusive in determining entitlement to a deduction under income-tax law.
  • CIT Vs Nagri Mills Co. Ltd. — 33 ITR 681 (Bombay High Court). Relied upon in considering disputes over the year of deduction where the applicable tax rates were unchanged.
  • GAIL (India) Ltd. Vs JCIT — 27 taxmann.com 97 (Delhi High Court). Considered in the dispute over whether upfront lease premium constituted capital expenditure.
  • Enterprising Enterprises Vs DCIT — 268 ITR 95 (Madras High Court); 293 ITR 437 (Supreme Court). Relied upon by the Revenue concerning capital expenditure on lease rights. Distinguished by the Tribunal because the case concerned quarrying rights.
  • Aditya Minerals (P.) Ltd. Vs CIT — 239 ITR 817 (Supreme Court). Considered in distinguishing payments for acquiring mineral extraction rights from payments for land used in electricity distribution.
  • Pingle Industries Ltd. Vs CIT — 40 ITR 67 (Supreme Court). Referred to for the principle that the capital or revenue character of a lease-related payment depends upon its particular facts and circumstances.
  • CIT Vs H.M.T. Ltd. — 203 ITR 820 (Karnataka High Court). Relied upon concerning the deductibility of upfront lease premium representing advance rent under a long-term lease.
  • CIT Vs Reliance Utilities and Power Ltd. — 313 ITR 340 (Bombay High Court). Applied in the Section 14A dispute for the presumption that investments are made from available interest-free funds where such funds are sufficient.
  • CIT Vs India Gelatine & Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. — 376 ITR 553 (Gujarat High Court). Relied upon concerning disallowance of interest expenditure under Section 14A where sufficient interest-free funds were available.
  • UTI Bank Ltd. — 32 taxmann.com 370 (Gujarat High Court). Relied upon concerning the presumption that investments are made from interest-free funds where those funds exceed the relevant investments.
  • Nirma Industries Ltd. Vs DCIT — 283 ITR 402 (Gujarat High Court). Applied to determine whether delayed payment and contractual commitment charges were sufficiently connected with the eligible business to qualify for deduction under Section 80-IA.
  • National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. Vs CIT — 229 ITR 383 (Supreme Court). Relied upon for the Tribunal’s power to admit an additional legal ground where the relevant facts are already on record.
  • Bharat Machinery and Hardware Mart — 136 ITR 875 (Gujarat High Court). Cited by the assessee in its challenge to the levy of interest under the Income-tax Act.
  • Haryana Warehousing Corporation Vs DCIT — 252 ITR (AT) 34 (ITAT Delhi). Cited by the assessee concerning the levy of statutory interest.

Advertisement

Author Info

CA Sandeep Kanoi
Qualification: Graduate, CA in Job / Business, DD
Company: Taxguru Consultancy
Location: Mumbai, Maharashtra
Articles Published: 24,733

Join TaxGuru's Network for the latest updates on Income Tax, GST, Company Law, Corporate Laws and other related subjects.