Summary: GST demands on royalty paid by brick kiln operators in Uttar Pradesh raise an important question concerning the distinction between Sections 73 and 74 of the CGST and U.P. GST Acts. In several cases, the Department initiated proceedings under Section 73 for FY 2017-18, 2018-19 and 2020-21, but invoked Section 74 for FY 2019-20 after the ordinary limitation period had expired, alleging deliberate non-payment of GST under reverse charge. This article examines whether delayed receipt of information from the mining department or payment of tax in subsequent years can establish fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts with intent to evade tax. It analyses the statutory limitation periods, CBIC Circular No. 258/04/2026-GST and important Supreme Court judgments, including G.R. Infra Projects, Tata Steel, Uniworth Textiles, Nizam Sugar Factory and Armour Security. The article also considers the requirement that allegations supporting extended limitation must appear in the show cause notice itself, the implications of Section 75(2), and a separate limitation issue affecting composition taxpayers filing annual GSTR-4 returns. Its central argument is that Section 74 cannot be invoked merely to overcome the expiry of limitation under Section 73 without independent evidence establishing the statutory ingredients of fraud or suppression.
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Two Provisions for Two Different Kinds of Case
- 3. How FY 2019-20 Fell into the Gap
- 4. The Reasons the Department Gives
- 5. Late Knowledge of the Department Is Not Fraud by the Dealer
- 6. Payment in Other Years Does Not Prove Intent in This Year
- 7. Royalty Paid to the State Cannot Be Suppressed from the State
- 8. The Notice Must Carry the Charge
- 9. Section 75(2) Does Not Revive What Section 73(10) Has Extinguished
- 10. A Further Point for Composition Dealers: Which Annual Return?
- 11. Conclusion
1. Introduction
A curious pattern has appeared in GST proceedings against the brick kilns of western Uttar Pradesh. A kiln pays royalty, described in the challans as regulating fee, to the State for the brick earth it digs. The department says that tax is payable on that royalty under reverse charge. For FY 2017-18, FY 2018-19 and FY 2020-21 the demand is raised under Section 73 of the U.P. GST Act, 2017. For FY 2019-20, and for that year alone, the very same demand on the very same royalty arrives under Section 74, with the charge that the dealer did not pay the tax knowingly and with the object of evading it.
Nothing in the dealer’s conduct changes from one year to the next. The royalty is paid in the same way, to the same office, and the returns are filed in the same way. What changes is the calendar. This article examines why FY 2019-20 has been singled out, what the department offers in support of Section 74, and why the law does not permit Section 74 to be used as a second clock once the clock under Section 73 has stopped.
2. Two Provisions for Two Different Kinds of Case
Section 73(1) applies where tax has not been paid or has been short paid “for any reason, other than the reason of fraud or any wilful-misstatement or suppression of facts to evade tax”. Section 74(1) applies where tax has not been paid or has been short paid “by reason of fraud, or any wilful-misstatement or suppression of facts to evade tax”. The language of exclusion in Section 73 and the language of causation in Section 74 make the two provisions mutually exclusive. A given non-payment falls under one or the other according to the reason for it, and the reason lies in the conduct of the taxpayer.
The consequences follow the charge. Under Section 73(10) the order must be passed within three years from the due date of the annual return, and the penalty is modest. Under Section 74(10) the period is five years and the penalty equals the tax. The longer period is the consequence of a grave charge proved against the taxpayer. It is not a facility given to the proper officer to finish work that he could not finish within the ordinary period. For the years from FY 2024-25 onwards Section 74A has unified the period of limitation, but it keeps the same distinction for penalty between clause (i) and clause (ii) of Section 74A(5). For the years discussed here, the old scheme of Sections 73 and 74 governs.
3. How FY 2019-20 Fell into the Gap
Section 73(2) requires the notice to be issued at least three months before the time limit for the order under Section 73(10). By notifications under Section 168A, namely Notification No. 13/2022, No. 09/2023 and No. 56/2023 Central Tax, with corresponding State notifications, the time for orders under Section 73 was extended. The result, year by year, is as follows:
| Financial Year | Last date for order under Section 73 | Last date for notice under Section 73 |
|---|---|---|
| 2017-18 | 31.12.2023 | 30.09.2023 |
| 2018-19 | 30.04.2024 | 31.01.2024 |
| 2019-20 | 31.08.2024 | 31.05.2024 |
| 2020-21 | 28.02.2025 | 30.11.2024 |
In the brick kiln matters, the notices on royalty for FY 2017-18, FY 2018-19 and FY 2020-21 were issued in 2023, while the period for each of those years was open. FY 2019-20 was not taken up. When the District Mining Officer later forwarded the royalty data, in September 2025, the period under Section 73 for FY 2019-20 had closed more than a year earlier. The only provision with time left in it was Section 74. In one such notice the statement of facts reads, in its entirety, “Tax on Royalty is not deposited”, and on limitation the notice records that a notice could be issued up to 30.09.2025, and hence the notice was being issued within time. The notice thus states its own reason for choosing Section 74, and that reason is limitation, not fraud.
The validity of Notification No. 56/2023 has itself been questioned, and the Gauhati High Court struck it down in September 2024. That question does not arise for FY 2019-20 in these cases, because even on the extended date the period under Section 73 had expired long before the notice.
4. The Reasons the Department Gives
Where the dealer objects that Section 74 has been invoked only because the period under Section 73 has run out, the orders in these matters give two reasons. The first is that the information about the royalty reached the sector office from the mining office only on a particular date in 2025, after which the notice under Section 74 was issued. The second is that the dealer paid tax on royalty for other years, and so knew of the liability, and therefore its non-payment for FY 2019-20 must be deliberate. Neither reason survives examination.
5. Late Knowledge of the Department Is Not Fraud by the Dealer
Section 74 turns on the conduct of the taxpayer: fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts with intent to evade tax. It does not turn on the date on which the proper officer comes to know of a fact. Limitation under Section 74(10), like limitation under Section 73(10), runs from the due date of the annual return and not from the date of the department’s knowledge. The Act contains no rule by which late discovery converts a Section 73 case into a Section 74 case. If it did, every demand discovered after the period under Section 73 would become a case of fraud, and Section 73(10) would be a dead letter.
The royalty in these cases was paid to the State itself. The mining office and the sector office of the State Tax department are offices of the same Government. A delay by one office in informing another is a lapse within the State; it is not suppression by the dealer. Suppression requires something positive on the part of the assessee, a conscious withholding of information. Mere inaction is not enough, as the Supreme Court held in Collector of Central Excise v. Chemphar Drugs and Liniments, (1989) 2 SCC 127, and the inaction of the department is no substitute for it.
An order which says that information was received on a certain date and thereafter the notice under Section 74 was issued does not identify any act of the dealer at all. It identifies the date of a letter. That is an admission that the extended period was used to escape the bar under Section 73, which is the one purpose for which it cannot be used.
6. Payment in Other Years Does Not Prove Intent in This Year
The second reason looks stronger at first sight, but it proves the opposite of what it is offered for. In these matters the dealers paid tax on royalty for FY 2017-18, 2018-19 and 2020-21 only after the department raised the issue by notices under Section 73 in 2023. For FY 2019-20 the royalty was paid in 2019 and the return for the year was filed in 2020, well before any of those notices. Intent to evade must exist when the tax falls due. Knowledge first gained in 2023 cannot be carried back to 2019 and 2020 to create an intent that did not then exist.
There is a further difficulty. For the very years relied upon to prove intent, the department itself proceeded under Section 73, that is, on the footing that there was no fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression. The same conduct cannot be innocent in FY 2017-18, FY 2018-19 and FY 2020-21 and fraudulent in FY 2019-20. A dealer who pays whenever the department asks is not an evader.
At its highest, the reasoning amounts to this: the dealer knew tax was payable and did not pay it. That is non-payment and nothing more. The Supreme Court has held that the extended period requires a deliberate act of suppression with intent to evade, and not mere failure to pay: Uniworth Textiles Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Raipur, (2013) 9 SCC 753 (para 12); Continental Foundation Joint Venture v. Commissioner of Central Excise, (2007) 10 SCC 337 (paras 9 to 11). The CBIC said the same in para 3.3 of Instruction No. 05/2023-GST dated 13.12.2023, which the Allahabad High Court applied to State authorities in Khurja Scrap Trading Company v. State of U.P., Writ Tax No. 743 of 2023, 2025:AHC:151783. Circular No. 258/04/2026-GST dated 26.10.2026 repeats it in para 5.3:
“… section 74(1) or section 74A(5)(ii) of the CGST Act cannot be invoked merely on the ground of non-payment of GST without specific evidence of fraud or wilful-misstatement or suppression of facts with intent to evade tax.”
7. Royalty Paid to the State Cannot Be Suppressed from the State
A fact already in the records of the Government cannot be suppressed from the Government. Para 5.2 of Circular No. 258/04/2026-GST puts it plainly:
“When the facts are known to both parties, an omission by one party does not constitute suppression.”
The department had also issued notices on the same royalty for the neighbouring years in 2023, so it knew that the dealer paid royalty every year. In Nizam Sugar Factory v. Collector of Central Excise, (2006) 11 SCC 573 (para 9), the Supreme Court held that facts already known to the department cannot be alleged as suppressed in a later notice.
The state of the law points the same way. Until July 2024 the dealer had before it the view that royalty is itself a tax. The nine-judge Bench in Mineral Area Development Authority v. Steel Authority of India, 2024 INSC 554 held that royalty is not a tax, but the levy of GST on royalty remains under challenge, and the Allahabad High Court, in M/s A.D. Agro Foods Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, Writ Tax No. 475 of 2021 and connected matters, has granted interim protection against payment of GST on mining lease and royalty. Where the law is unsettled, non-payment cannot be suppression: Pushpam Pharmaceuticals Co. v. Collector of Central Excise, 1995 Supp (3) SCC 462 (para 3). Where two views are plausible, the extended period is not available, and a bona fide belief does not become mala fide because it is later held to be wrong: Commissioner of Central Excise v. Reliance Industries Ltd., 2023 INSC 591 (para 23).
8. The Notice Must Carry the Charge
The two reasons discussed above share one more defect: neither appears in the notice. They appear for the first time in the adjudication order. The Supreme Court in G.R. Infra Projects Limited v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Civil Appeal No. 11277 of 2026, decided on 19.08.2026, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 852 dealt with a notice under Section 74 issued after the period under Section 73 had expired. It refused to look at the State’s counter affidavit, holding in para 5 that the requirements to make a notice valid must be contained in the notice itself. In para 10 it held:
“What is required for the extended time to be applied are the allegations, which lead to the inference of a fraud or the concealment as attempted by the assessee resulting in suppression of facts, should emanate from the notice itself. It cannot be a mechanical use of the words ‘fraud, willful misstatement or suppression of facts’ without listing out the aspects which persuades the assessing officer to conclude that there has been employed either of these surreptitious devices by the assessee.”
The notice was set aside. In Tata Steel Limited v. Union of India, 2026 INSC 920, decided on 25.08.2026, the Court held that Section 74 cannot be used for a protective assessment to save limitation (para 10), that the officer must be satisfied of fraud or suppression before he issues the notice (para 11), and that the foundational facts must be evident from the notice and not mechanically recited (paras 13 and 14).
If the validity of a Section 74 notice cannot be supplied by a counter affidavit in court, it cannot be supplied by the adjudicating officer in his order either. Section 75(7) forbids confirming a demand on grounds not specified in the notice. Paras 4.4 and 11.6 of Circular No. 258/04/2026-GST say that a deficiency in the notice cannot later be cured, and that findings must be limited to the allegations and grounds in the notice. The Supreme Court in Armour Security (India) Ltd. v. Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East, 2025 INSC 982 (paras 84 and 85) held that the foundation of the case must be laid in the notice and the revenue cannot later make out a case not made in it. A notice whose only fact is that tax on royalty was not deposited, with one formula sentence about intent, is exactly the mechanical recital that G.R. Infra condemns.
9. Section 75(2) Does Not Revive What Section 73(10) Has Extinguished
Section 75(2) provides that where the appellate authority, the Tribunal or a court concludes that the notice under Section 74 is not sustainable for want of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression, the tax shall be determined as if the notice had been issued under Section 73. Para 13 of Circular No. 258/04/2026-GST similarly directs that where the invocation of Section 74 is not justified, the demand should be confined to Section 73. The provision converts the notice; it does not extend time. A notice deemed to be under Section 73 can operate only within the limits of Section 73(10). Where that period had already expired when the notice was issued, there is nothing left to determine, and the demand falls with the invocation.
10. A Further Point for Composition Dealers: Which Annual Return?
Many brick kilns paid tax under the composition scheme of Section 10 in FY 2019-20. For them the computation of limitation itself differs. Notification No. 20/2019 Central Tax dated 23.04.2019 substituted Rule 62, and Rule 62(1)(ii) requires a composition dealer to furnish a return for every financial year in FORM GSTR-4. Notification No. 21/2019 Central Tax of the same date provides the same under Section 148. The due date of FORM GSTR-4 for FY 2019-20 was extended by Notification No. 34/2020, No. 59/2020 and finally No. 64/2020 Central Tax to 31.10.2020. GSTN’s Press Release dated 21.07.2020 recorded that FORM GSTR-9A applied only up to FY 2018-19, and that from FY 2019-20 the annual return of a composition taxpayer is FORM GSTR-4.
Section 74(10) counts five years from the due date for furnishing the annual return. For a composition dealer for FY 2019-20, that due date is 31.10.2020. The five years therefore ended on 31.10.2025, and under Section 74(2) the notice had to be issued by 30.04.2025. The department, counting from 31.03.2021, the due date of FORM GSTR-9 and GSTR-9A, treats the notice as in time up to 30.09.2025 and the order as in time up to 31.03.2026. The department’s reading rests on Section 44 and the proviso to Rule 80, but for FY 2019-20 the portal provided no FORM GSTR-9A for composition dealers and no notice or late fee was ever raised for its non-filing. On the composition dealer’s reading, a notice issued in September 2025 is out of time even under Section 74, and an order passed in 2026 is beyond Section 74(10).
11. Conclusion
The royalty cases for FY 2019-20 illustrate a simple error. The department had the same facts for four years. For three of them it proceeded under Section 73. For the fourth it missed the period under Section 73 and then turned to Section 74, supplying the charge of intent afterwards from the date on which its own office received information and from the dealer’s payment of tax in years that it had itself treated as free of fraud. The law does not permit this. Sections 73 and 74 are separated by the reason for non-payment, not by the date of the notice. The charge of fraud or suppression must be found in the notice, must rest on the conduct of the taxpayer, and must exist when the tax fell due. Section 74 is a provision for grave cases; it is not a second clock that starts when the first one stops.






