Mehak Asri Vs Union of India And Ors. (Delhi High Court)
Summary: The Delhi High Court, in Mehak Asri Vs Union of India and Ors., set aside an ex parte appellate order passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) under Section 250 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, holding that deciding an appeal before the expiry of the time granted for filing written submissions constituted a clear violation of the principles of natural justice. The petitioner had challenged the CIT(A)’s order dated 25 June 2026, which rejected her appeal even though the last hearing notice, issued on 23 June 2026, had permitted written submissions until 30 June 2026. The Court found that the appellate authority had committed a procedural error apparent from the record by disposing of the appeal without waiting for the prescribed deadline.
The dispute originated from an assessment order dated 31 December 2019, passed under Section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the CIT(A) on 24 January 2020. During the appellate proceedings, several hearing notices were issued, with the final notice dated 23 June 2026 requiring the petitioner to furnish written submissions by 30 June 2026. However, the CIT(A) passed the impugned order on 25 June 2026, five days before the deadline. The petitioner contended that this premature disposal deprived her of a meaningful opportunity to present arguments, submit supporting documents and rely upon an order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal involving a similarly situated assessee whose appeal had been allowed.
Before the High Court, the respondents raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petition. They argued that the petitioner should have pursued the statutory appellate remedy before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal rather than directly invoking the High Court’s writ jurisdiction. The Court acknowledged that, under ordinary circumstances, an assessee aggrieved by an order of the CIT(A) should approach the Tribunal through the prescribed appellate mechanism. Nevertheless, it distinguished the present case because the challenge concerned a fundamental procedural defect and denial of an opportunity of hearing, rather than merely dissatisfaction with the merits of the appellate decision.
Examining the notice dated 23 June 2026, the Division Bench comprising Justice Dinesh Mehta and Justice Aditi Choudhary observed that the CIT(A) had expressly allowed the petitioner until 30 June 2026 to furnish written submissions. Despite granting that opportunity, the authority proceeded to decide the appeal on 25 June 2026 without awaiting either the specified date or the petitioner’s response. The Court held that such conduct violated the principles of natural justice. It further observed that the procedural irregularity was apparent on the face of the record and justified the exercise of writ jurisdiction notwithstanding the availability of an alternative statutory remedy.
Accordingly, the High Court quashed and set aside the CIT(A)’s order dated 25 June 2026 and restored the appeal for fresh adjudication in accordance with law. The Court directed that, upon production of a certified copy of its judgment, the CIT(A) must fix a fresh hearing date and provide the petitioner with an opportunity to participate through video conferencing if requested. The writ petition and pending applications were disposed of. The judgment reinforces the requirement that appellate authorities must honour the hearing opportunities and submission deadlines communicated to taxpayers. It also illustrates that the existence of an alternative appellate remedy does not invariably prevent writ intervention where an order suffers from an evident violation of natural justice.
FULL TEXT OF THE JUDGMENT/ORDER OF DELHI HIGH COURT
1. By way of the present writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 25.06.2026 passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) (CIT(A)) under Section 250 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1961’), whereby petitioner’s appeal was decided ex-parte.
2. Briefly narrating the facts, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner had preferred an appeal against the assessment order dated 31.12.2019 passed under Section 143(3) of the Act of 1961. While informing that the appeal was instituted on 24.01.2020, learned counsel submitted that the petitioner had received a number of notices of hearing, out of which last notice was dated 23.06.2026, whereby the petitioner was asked to furnish written submissions on or before 30.06.2026 (Annexure P7). He submitted that before the petitioner could furnish the written submissions or even said date (30.06.2026) cold arrive, the impugned order came to be passed on 25.06.2026 and petitioner’s appeal was rejected in absentia.
3. Learned counsel submitted that the impugned order passed by CIT(A) is contrary to the settled procedure and the principles of nature justice inasmuch as the appeal was decided prior to the date fixed of hearing or the date by which the appellant was supposed to file written submissions.
4. Learned counsel further submitted that had the Appellate Authority given due opportunity to the petitioner, he would have convinced him on merits of his case and also placed before the Appellate Authority copy of the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred as ‘the Tribunal’) passed in similar circumstances, whereby, appeal of the similarly situated assessee had been allowed.
5. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand argued that the petitioner has wrongly invoked writ jurisdiction of this Court against an order passed by the CIT(A), by passing the remedy of appeal before the Tribunal provided under the Act of 1961.
6. In other words his contention was that the petitioner is required to file an appeal before the Tribunal against the order dated 25.06.2026.
7. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
8. While observing that in normal circumstances the preliminary objection raised by learned counsel for the respondents would have sustained, as it is correct that an assessee cannot normally approach this Court against an order passed by CIT(A); and he should first avail the remedy of appeal before the Tribunal. However, having regard to the peculiar facts of the present case, wherein the CIT(A) has committed a procedural error apparent on the face of record, we are inclined to entertain the present writ petition, as the petitioner is only seeking a right of audience before the CIT(A), who has not provided an opportunity of hearing to him.
9. On perusal of the notice dated 23.06.2026 (Annexure P7), it is apparent that the appellate authority had issued a notice to the petitioner requiring him to file written submissions by 30.06.2026. However, before such date could arrive, the impugned order came to be passed by the CIT(A), without even waiting for the date so fixed let alone the written submissions. The impugned order, therefore, suffers from violation of principles of natural justice.
10. The impugned order dated 25.06.2026 is thus quashed and set aside and the appeal is restored to the dockets of CIT(A) to be decided afresh in accordance with law.
11. On placing a certified copy of the instant order, the CIT(A) shall fix a date of hearing and if requested by the petitioner a through Video Conferencing shall be provided to the petitioner and the appeal shall be decided in accordance with law.
12. Writ petition stands disposed of alongwith the pending applications.
