State of Punjab Vs Jasbir Singh (Supreme Court)
Summary: The Supreme Court of India, through a three-Judge Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Vikram Nath, answered a reference concerning the procedural requirements under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The reference arose from a criminal appeal involving allegations of forgery connected with civil proceedings. The High Court had granted relief to the respondent on the reasoning that an FIR had been registered without complying with what it considered mandatory requirements under Sections 340 and 195 CrPC, namely conducting a preliminary inquiry and affording an opportunity of hearing to the proposed accused.
The Supreme Court examined the decisions in Pritish v. State of Maharashtra, Sharad Pawar v. Jagmohan Dalmiya and the Constitution Bench judgment in Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah. It held that the Constitution Bench decision governed the legal position and was consistent with the ruling in Pritish. A preliminary inquiry under Section 340 is discretionary rather than mandatory, and its purpose is to assess whether initiating proceedings is expedient in the interests of justice, not to determine guilt. The Court further clarified that a proposed accused need not be afforded a hearing before a complaint is made. It distinguished the observations in Sharad Pawar as arising from the circumstances of that particular order rather than laying down a contrary general principle. Accordingly, the first referred question was answered in the negative, while the second was resolved by applying the Constitution Bench ruling in Iqbal Singh Marwah. The matter was directed to be placed before the regular Bench for consideration on merits.
Cases Discussed
- Pritish Vs State of Maharashtra & Ors. — (2002) 1 SCC 253 (Supreme Court, Three-Judge Bench) — Followed regarding the discretionary nature and purpose of preliminary inquiry under Section 340 CrPC.
- Sharad Pawar Vs Jagmohan Dalmiya & Ors. — (2010) 15 SCC 290 (Supreme Court) — Considered and distinguished; the observations concerning inquiry and hearing arose in the circumstances of that order.
- Iqbal Singh Marwah Vs Meenakshi Marwah — (2005) 4 SCC 370 (Supreme Court, Constitution Bench) — Followed as the controlling authority on expediency and the scope of preliminary inquiry under Section 340 CrPC.
FULL TEXT OF THE SUPREME COURT ORDER
The matter has been placed before a three Judges Bench arising from a reference made vide order dated 26.02.2020 seeking the following questions to be answered:
“(i) Whether Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 mandates a preliminary inquiry and an opportunity of hearing to the would-be accused before a complaint is made under Section 195 of the Code by a Court?
(ii) what is the scope and ambit of such preliminary inquiry?”
The impugned judgment of the High Court granting relief to the respondent while dealing with an aspect of forgery in a civil case is predicated on a reasoning that the FIR which was registered against the respondent-accused did not comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 340 read with Section 195 of the Cr.P.C.
The FIR had given rise to the provisions since it had been filed without any inquiry and without giving any opportunity to the respondent to be heard.
The two Judges Bench of this Court noticing the aforesaid aspect, in order dated 26.02.2020 referred to two judgments of this Court both of three Judges Bench as also to a Constitution Bench of this Court.
To put the aspect in the right perspective and in sequence, we may note that the first judgment of three Judges Bench was Pritish vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors.1 which noticed that the purpose of a preliminary inquiry under Section 340(1), Cr.P.C. was not to find whether a person is guilty or not but only to decide whether it was expedient in the interest of justice to inquire into the offence. It was thus observed that the Court is not obliged to make a preliminary inquiry on a complaint but if the Court decides to do so, it should make a final set of the facts which is expedient in the interest of justice that offence should be further probed into.
The reference order is a conflicting view in Sharad Pawar vs. Jagmohan Dalmiya & Ors.2 to the extent that in para 7 while noticing the submissions of the counsels it was observed that it was necessary to conduct a preliminary inquiry as contemplated under Section 340 Cr.P.C. and “also to afford an opportunity of being heard to the defendants, which was admittedly not done.“ The latter was stated to be contrary to the view in Pritish’s case (supra).
The reference order also simultaneously noted the observations in the Constitution Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah vs. Meenakshi Marwah3 which was post the judgment in Pritish’s case (supra) but prior to the judgment in Sharad Pawar’s case (supra). In this behalf the extracted portion in 23 of the judgment reads as under :
“In view of the language used in Section 340 Cr.P.C. the Court is not bound to make a complaint regarding commission of an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b), as the Section is conditioned by the words “Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice.” This shows that such a course will be adopted only if the interest of justice requires and not in every case. Before filing of the complaint, the Court may hold a preliminary enquiry and record a finding to the effect that it is expedient in the interests of justice that enquiry should be made into any of the offences referred to in Section 195(i)(b). This expediency will normally be judged by the Court by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected by such forgery or forged document, but having regard to the effect or impact, such commission of offence has upon administration of justice. It is possible that such forged document or forgery may cause a very serious or substantial injury to a person in the sense that it may deprive him of a very valuable property or status or the like, but such document may be just a piece of evidence produced or given in evidence in Court, where voluminous evidence may have been adduced and the effect of such piece of evidence on the broad concept of administration of justice may be minimal. In such circumstances, the Court may not consider it expedient in the interest of justice to make a complaint.
Emphasis supplied”
On having considered the matter, it is our view that the Constitution Bench’s view would naturally prevails that makes the legal position quite abundantly clear. Not only that, if we may notice, what is reported in Sharad Pawar’s case (supra) is only an order and not a judgment. An order is in the given factual scenario. The judgment lays down the principles of law. The scenario is that any order or judgment passed by this Court becomes a reportable exercise to create more volumes of reported cases! This thus has a possibility at times of causing some confusion on the legal principles prevalent. The observations in the quoted paragraph extracted aforesaid apparently came out of the flow of the order rather than pronouncing any principles of law and that is why the Bench itself categorized what is observed as an order i.e, in the given factual scenario.
We have little doubt that there is no question of opportunity of hearing in a scenario of this nature and we say nothing else but that a law as enunciated by the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah’s case (supra) is in line with what was observed in Pritish ’case (supra).
Interestingly both the judgments in Pritish’s case and the Constitution Bench judgment in Iqbal Singh Marwah’s case (supra) have not been noted in order passed in Sharad Pawar’s Case (supra). The answer thus to the first question raised would be in the negative.
Insofar as the second question is concerned, the scope and ambit of such a preliminary inquiry, also stands resolved in terms of the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in the Iqbal Singh Marwah’s case (supra) as referred to aforesaid.
The reference is answered accordingly.
The matter be placed before the regular Bench for consideration on merits.
The reference is answered in terms of the signed order.
The matter be placed before the regular Bench for consideration on merits, in terms of the signed order.
Notes:-
1 (2002) 1 SCC 253
2 (2010) 15 SCC 290
3 (2005) 4 SCC 370
