Beyond the Statutory Period under Section 107 of the CGST Act: Has the Supreme Court Reopened the Constitutional Debate?
Summary: The article examines whether the Supreme Court’s decisions in The Deputy Commissioner & Special Land Acquisition Officer v. M/s. S.V. Global Mill Ltd. (2026 INSC 138) and Jittu Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh (2026 INSC 657) have revived the constitutional debate on limitation in the context of appeals under Section 107 of the CGST Act, 2017. It explains that Section 107 permits appeals within three months with condonation of delay for only one additional month, after which the Appellate Authority becomes functus officio. The article reviews earlier Supreme Court decisions holding that statutory authorities cannot condone delay beyond the prescribed period under special statutes, while distinguishing them from the recent judgments, which discuss the application of Section 29(2) read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. According to the article, the recent decisions do not enlarge the jurisdiction of the GST Appellate Authority but reaffirm that exclusion of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act must be established from the language, scheme and object of the special statute. The article further discusses the distinction between statutory appellate jurisdiction and the constitutional jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 226, and suggests that the judgments may provide renewed jurisprudential support for constitutional remedies in deserving cases involving exceptional circumstances.
Introduction
The law of limitation has always occupied a delicate position in the administration of justice. It represents the Legislature’s endeavour to strike a fine balance between two competing public interests—the need for certainty in legal proceedings and the imperative of ensuring that justice is not defeated by technicalities. While limitation statutes undoubtedly promote finality, they were never intended to convert procedural discipline into an instrument for extinguishing substantive rights.
It is for this reason that courts have consistently observed that the law of limitation regulates the remedy; it does not ordinarily destroy the right itself. The philosophy underlying limitation jurisprudence has never been one of punishment but of orderly administration of justice. Consequently, whenever procedural rules appear to obstruct rather than advance justice, constitutional courts have been called upon to restore the equilibrium.
The Goods and Services Tax regime presents perhaps the most striking illustration of this continuing tension. Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 prescribes a period of three months for filing an appeal before the First Appellate Authority, with a further condonable period of one month. Once the combined statutory period of three months together with the further condonable period of one month expires, the Appellate Authority is consistently understood to become functus officio so far as the question of condonation of delay is concerned.
The consequence has often been severe. Numerous appeals involving substantial questions of law, jurisdictional errors and genuine disputes have been rejected without any examination on merits, solely because the prescribed period of limitation had expired. In many instances, the litigant is denied an appellate adjudication not because his case lacks legal merit but because he has failed to cross the procedural threshold within the stipulated time.
Against this backdrop, the recent judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in The Deputy Commissioner & Special Land Acquisition Officer v. M/s S.V. Global Mill Ltd. & Connected Appeals, 2026 INSC 138, decided on 09 February 2026, and Jittu Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others, 2026 INSC 657, decided on 27 May 2026, assume considerable jurisprudential significance. Although neither judgment arises under the GST enactments, both undertake an exhaustive examination of Section 29(2) read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and reiterate the fundamental principle that the exclusion of the beneficial provisions of the Limitation Act cannot readily be inferred.
The object of this article is not to suggest that these judgments have enlarged the statutory jurisdiction of the Appellate Authority under Section 107 of the CGST Act. They have not. Rather, the endeavour is to examine whether these decisions have revived the constitutional discourse on limitation and whether they provide renewed jurisprudential support for the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 in deserving cases.
The Rigours of Section 107 of the CGST Act
Section 107 of the CGST Act embodies the legislative policy governing the first appellate remedy under the GST framework. While prescribing a period of three months for filing an appeal, it authorises the Appellate Authority to condone delay only up to a further period of one month upon being satisfied that sufficient cause prevented the appellant from presenting the appeal within time.
The legislative intention to ensure expeditious disposal of tax disputes is understandable. Fiscal legislation necessarily demands certainty and finality in revenue administration. However, experience gained during the implementation of GST demonstrates that the rigidity of the provision has, in certain cases, produced consequences that appear disproportionate to the procedural default committed.
The formative years of GST witnessed unprecedented technological challenges, repeated changes in statutory procedures, evolving judicial interpretations and widespread uncertainty regarding compliance requirements. Added to these were cases involving defective service of orders, medical emergencies, natural calamities, bona fide legal misunderstandings and other circumstances beyond the control of taxpayers. Yet, irrespective of the cause or the merits of the dispute, the statutory consequence remained the same—the appellate remedy stood foreclosed once the outer period of limitation expired.
This rigid framework has inevitably generated a larger constitutional question. Should every procedural lapse, irrespective of its cause or consequence, permanently deprive a litigant of an opportunity to challenge an assessment order that may otherwise be contrary to law? Or does the Constitution preserve a broader judicial power to intervene where the denial of an appellate remedy would itself occasion manifest injustice?
These questions have acquired renewed relevance in the light of the recent decisions of the Supreme Court.
The Earlier Judicial Position
The jurisprudential foundation of the law relating to condonation of delay was laid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court nearly four decades ago in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Another v. Mst. Katiji & Others, (1987) 2 SCC 107, decided on 19 February 1987. The Court held that the expression “sufficient cause” occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act is sufficiently elastic to enable courts to do substantial justice and deserves a liberal construction. Emphasising that procedural rules are intended to advance justice rather than defeat it, the Court memorably observed that “when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred.” The Court further reminded that “judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice.” These principles have remained the beacon of limitation jurisprudence and continue to guide courts whenever the statutory framework permits a liberal approach.
Thereafter, however, while dealing with special statutes prescribing specific limitation periods, the Supreme Court also recognised that legislative intent must prevail where Parliament has expressly or by necessary implication excluded the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
In Union of India v. Popular Construction Co., (2001) 8 SCC 470, the Court held that where a special statute prescribes not only the period of limitation but also the maximum extent to which delay may be condoned, the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act stands excluded by necessary implication.
This principle was reaffirmed in Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise v. Hongo India (P) Ltd., (2009) 5 SCC 791, where the Court observed that where the statutory scheme itself manifests an intention to exclude the operation of Section 5, courts cannot enlarge the period of limitation by judicial interpretation.
The position attained greater significance in Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise, (2008) 3 SCC 70, wherein the Supreme Court categorically held that an appellate authority constituted under a fiscal statute cannot condone delay beyond the maximum period specifically prescribed by the Legislature. The authority derives its jurisdiction exclusively from the statute and cannot assume powers that the statute has consciously withheld.
The principle was carried further in Assistant Commissioner (CT), LTU, Kakinada v. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Ltd., (2020) 19 SCC 681, where the Supreme Court cautioned that the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 should ordinarily not be invoked merely to overcome the statutory bar of limitation where the assessee had failed to avail the prescribed appellate remedy within time.
“These decisions continue to govern the jurisdiction of the statutory Appellate Authority under Section 107 of the CGST Act. They underline the proposition that where Parliament has consciously prescribed an outer limit for condonation of delay, the statutory appellate authority cannot rewrite the legislative mandate by assuming a jurisdiction that the statute itself has withheld.”
Yet, these decisions do not exhaust the constitutional enquiry. They address the limits of statutory jurisdiction; they do not extinguish the broader constitutional principles governing access to justice. It is precisely at this intersection that the recent judgments in S.V. Global Mill and Jittu Yadav assume enduring significance.
The Jurisprudential Shift: S.V. Global Mill and the Revival of Section 29(2)
The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in The Deputy Commissioner & Special Land Acquisition Officer v. M/s. S.V. Global Mill Ltd. & Connected Appeals, 2026 INSC 138, decided on 09 February 2026, deserves to be regarded as one of the most significant pronouncements on limitation jurisprudence in recent years. Although rendered in the context of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, the Court undertook an exhaustive examination of the relationship between Section 29(2) and Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
The Supreme Court reiterated that the Limitation Act is not automatically displaced merely because a special statute prescribes its own period of limitation. By virtue of Section 29(2), the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act continue to apply unless their application is excluded either expressly or by necessary implication. Such exclusion cannot be inferred lightly. It must emerge from the statutory language, the legislative scheme and the unmistakable intention of Parliament.
What elevates the judgment beyond its immediate statutory context is the Court’s reaffirmation of a larger constitutional philosophy. The Court observed that where two interpretations are reasonably possible, courts should prefer the interpretation that enables adjudication on merits rather than one which permanently forecloses a statutory remedy. It cautioned against adopting an interpretation that destroys valuable rights of appeal unless the Legislature has spoken in language that admits of no other conclusion.
These observations are of enduring significance because they shift the focus of limitation jurisprudence from mechanical computation of time to the underlying legislative intent. They remind courts that the law of limitation is ultimately an instrument of orderly justice and not an end in itself.
Jittu Yadav: Reaffirming the Constitutional Ethos
Barely a few months later, the Supreme Court, in Jittu Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others, 2026 INSC 657, decided on 27 May 2026, reiterated the same jurisprudential approach. Once again, the Court emphasized that the mere existence of a special limitation period does not, by itself, exclude the beneficial operation of the Limitation Act. Unless exclusion is clearly discernible from the statute, the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 continue to operate through the legislative bridge created by Section 29(2).
The significance of Jittu Yadav lies not merely in repeating an established principle but in reinforcing the constitutional preference for adjudication on merits. Read together, S.V. Global Mill and Jittu Yadav send a consistent message—that procedural prescriptions should ordinarily facilitate justice and not become instruments for its frustration.
The Fine Distinction Between Statutory Jurisdiction and Constitutional Jurisdiction
It is at this stage that a crucial distinction must be appreciated. Much of the debate surrounding these judgments has unfortunately overlooked the difference between the jurisdiction of a statutory appellate authority and the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Courts.
A statutory appellate authority is a creature of the statute. It possesses no inherent powers. Its authority begins where the statute confers jurisdiction and ends where the statute withdraws it. Consequently, where Section 107 of the CGST Act authorises condonation only up to a further period of one month, the Appellate Authority cannot travel beyond that limit, however compelling the equities of a particular case may be.
The constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court stands on an altogether different footing.
The power under Article 226 does not emanate from the CGST Act. It emanates directly from the Constitution of India. While the exercise of that jurisdiction is governed by well-settled principles of judicial restraint, it cannot be equated with or confined by the jurisdictional limitations imposed upon statutory authorities.
It is this distinction that, in my respectful opinion, gives the recent judgments their lasting importance. They do not enlarge the jurisdiction of the Appellate Authority. What they do is reinforce the constitutional philosophy that access to justice should not be denied unless the Legislature has unmistakably commanded such exclusion. In appropriate cases, therefore, these decisions may legitimately strengthen the exercise of constitutional review under Article 226 where refusal to entertain a delayed challenge would result in manifest injustice.
Reconciling the Earlier Authorities
Some commentators have suggested that S.V. Global Mill and Jittu Yadav dilute the ratio of Popular Construction, Hongo India, Singh Enterprises and Glaxo Smith Kline. With respect, such a reading appears to be neither necessary nor correct.
Each of those earlier decisions was rendered within the framework of the particular statutory scheme under consideration. They establish that where Parliament has consciously prescribed an outer limit for condonation, the statutory authority cannot invoke Section 5 to enlarge its jurisdiction. That principle continues to govern the interpretation of those statutory schemes. The recent judgments approach the issue from a broader interpretative perspective. They emphasise that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act itself embodies the legislative mandate that the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 ordinarily apply even to special or local laws prescribing their own periods of limitation. The inquiry, therefore, is not whether those provisions should be imported into the special statute, but whether the special statute, on a true construction of its language, scheme and object, excludes their application either expressly or by necessary implication. The emphasis in the recent decisions is thus on reaffirming the correct statutory methodology for determining exclusion under Section 29(2), rather than on diluting the doctrine of implied exclusion itself.
The two lines of authority therefore operate in different fields. One defines the limits of statutory jurisdiction; the other illuminates the constitutional philosophy governing interpretation of limitation statutes.
Read harmoniously, they enrich rather than contradict each other.
The Constitutional Dimension
The Constitution of India is not merely an instrument for distribution of governmental powers. It is a charter intended to secure justice—social, economic and political. Article 226 embodies one of the most significant constitutional safeguards for ensuring that administrative and quasi-judicial decisions remain subject to judicial scrutiny where circumstances so warrant.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly observed that the existence of an alternative statutory remedy ordinarily persuades the High Court to decline interference. However, this self-imposed restraint has never been treated as an inflexible rule. Where an order is passed without jurisdiction, in breach of natural justice, in violation of fundamental procedural safeguards, or where refusal to intervene would perpetuate manifest injustice, constitutional courts have never considered themselves powerless.
The recent judgments breathe renewed vitality into this constitutional discourse. They remind us that limitation provisions should not be interpreted in isolation from the larger constitutional commitment to fairness and effective access to justice.
Implications for GST Litigation
For the GST practitioner, these judgments demand both optimism and restraint.
They do not justify complacency in matters of limitation. Every endeavour must continue to be made to institute statutory appeals within the period prescribed under Section 107 of the CGST Act, 2017.
Equally, practitioners should avoid the equally erroneous assumption that expiry of the statutory period necessarily extinguishes every available remedy. Exceptional situations require exceptional constitutional scrutiny. Cases involving non-service of orders, violation of natural justice, fraud, patent lack of jurisdiction, impossibility of compliance, or circumstances genuinely beyond the control of the litigant may still warrant the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction.
What these judgments provide is not a licence to disregard limitation, but a stronger jurisprudential foundation for invoking constitutional remedies in deserving cases.
A Case for Legislative Reconsideration
The experience of the GST regime over the last eight years suggests that the present limitation framework deserves careful legislative reconsideration.
No modern tax administration can function without certainty. Equally, no tax system commands lasting public confidence if genuine disputes are denied adjudication solely on account of procedural defaults that neither prejudice the Revenue nor undermine the integrity of the assessment process.
A carefully structured legislative amendment empowering the Appellate Authority to condone delay in exceptional circumstances, subject to appropriate safeguards and recording of reasons, would better harmonise procedural certainty with substantive justice. Such a reform would not weaken tax administration; it would strengthen public confidence in its fairness.
Conclusion
In my respectful view, the judgments in The Deputy Commissioner & Special Land Acquisition Officer v. M/s. S.V. Global Mill Ltd. & Connected Appeals and Jittu Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others cannot be read as overruling the earlier authorities, including Popular Construction, Hongo India, Singh Enterprises and Glaxo Smith Kline. Rather, they explain the interpretative framework within which questions relating to the exclusion of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act under Section 29(2) are to be examined. Their contribution lies in reaffirming the statutory methodology for determining express or implied exclusion, while leaving undisturbed the conclusions reached in the earlier decisions on the respective statutes under consideration.
Their enduring significance lies not in displacing the earlier authorities but in reaffirming the correct interpretative framework embodied in Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. The judgments emphasise that the applicability of Sections 4 to 24 is the legislative norm and that exclusion under a special statute must emerge from the language, scheme and object of that statute, either by express provision or by necessary implication. The earlier decisions continue to govern those enactments in which such exclusion has already been judicially recognised. The recent judgments therefore do not dilute the doctrine of implied exclusion; rather, they reaffirm that such exclusion must be established through a careful examination of the particular statutory framework under consideration.
For the GST fraternity, these judgments are not a charter for circumventing limitation. They are, however, a timely reminder that procedure is intended to facilitate justice, not to frustrate it. While statutory authorities remain bound by the limits imposed by Parliament, constitutional courts continue to preserve a higher obligation—to ensure that technical rules do not, in exceptional cases, eclipse the cause of justice itself.
The true legacy of these decisions may therefore not lie in extending periods of limitation. Their greater contribution lies in restoring the constitutional balance between finality and fairness, discipline and justice, procedure and principle. In the evolution of tax jurisprudence, that balance is not merely desirable—it is indispensable.
