State of Telangana Vs Nalla Balu @ Durgam Shashidhar Goud & Anr. (Supreme Court of India)
Summary: The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petitions filed by the State of Telangana against the Telangana High Court judgment dated 10.09.2025 which had quashed criminal proceedings arising from three FIRs against Nalla Balu @ Durgam Shashidhar Goud over social-media posts. The State fairly stated before the Supreme Court that it had nothing to argue on the merits of the High Court’s decision. Its objection was confined to the broad operational guidelines issued by the High Court for police authorities and Judicial Magistrates while dealing with complaints and FIRs arising from social-media posts. The Telangana High Court had examined three criminal petitions concerning posts critical of the Congress Party, the Telangana Government and the Chief Minister.
Read HC Judgment in this case: Harsh Political Criticism Protected by Free Speech; Telangana HC Quashes FIRs
The FIRs invoked various provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, including Sections 192, 352, 353, 356 and 61(2), as well as Section 67 of the Information Technology Act. The High Court held that harsh, offensive or critical political expression does not by itself justify criminal prosecution unless the statutory ingredients of the alleged offences are satisfied. Political criticism remains protected by Article 19(1)(a), subject to the reasonable restrictions contemplated by Article 19(2). On examining the individual posts, the High Court found that the allegations did not disclose the ingredients necessary for offences relating to provocation to riot, intentional insult, public mischief or obscenity. It observed that Section 67 of the Information Technology Act was inapplicable because the allegedly abusive remarks were not obscene material of the kind contemplated by that provision. Even where the statements could potentially fall within defamation, criminal defamation is non-cognizable and proceedings must comply with the statutory requirement that the complaint be initiated by the person aggrieved and through the prescribed judicial process.
The High Court consequently issued eight operational guidelines. These require verification of the complainant’s locus standi; preliminary inquiry regarding the statutory ingredients of cognizable offences; a high threshold involving incitement to violence, hatred or public disorder for speech-related offences; protection against mechanical registration of cases concerning political criticism; observance of the special procedure applicable to non-cognizable defamation; compliance with the principles against mechanical arrests; prior legal scrutiny by the Public Prosecutor in sensitive political-speech matters; and closure of frivolous, vexatious or politically motivated complaints where sufficient grounds for investigation are absent. The High Court accordingly quashed proceedings in FIR Nos. 08, 13 and 146 of 2025. Before the Supreme Court, the State questioned the consistency of these guidelines rather than the merits of the quashing of the criminal proceedings.
After examining paragraph 29 of the High Court judgment “threadbare”, the Supreme Court expressly held that it would not interfere with the impugned judgment and order, including the guidelines issued by the High Court. The Special Leave Petitions were therefore dismissed. The result is that the quashing of the three FIR proceedings as well as the Telangana High Court’s operational safeguards governing police action in social-media speech cases were left undisturbed.
Cases Discussed
- Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 – Offensive speech distinguished from incitement to violence or disorder.
- Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 Supp (2) SCR 769 – Incitement to violence or public disorder threshold.
- Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273 – Mechanical arrests impermissible; proportionality required.
- R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994) – Considered in relation to defamation and criticism of government/public officials.
- Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) – Constitutional protection of expression.
- Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram (1989) – Protection of expression in a democracy.
- Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 221 – Criminal defamation and reputational injury.
- Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 – FIR registration and preliminary inquiry principles.
- State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 – Categories warranting quashing of criminal proceedings.
FULL TEXT OF THE SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT/ORDER
1. Delay condoned.
2. Exemption application is allowed.
3. These petitions at the instance of the State of Telangana are directed against the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Telangana dated 10.09.2025 by which the High Court disposed of a batch of criminal petitions, thereby, quashing the criminal proceedings instituted against the respondents herein for the offences enumerated in the FIRs in question.
4. The operative part of the order reads thus:-
“30. In light of the above directions, Criminal Petition Nos. 4905, 4903, and 8416 of 2025 are allowed. Consequently, the proceedings against the petitioner in (i) FIR No. 08 of 2025 registered at Police Station, CCPS Ramagundam, Telangana Cyber Security Bureau (TSCSB);(ii) FIR No. 13 of 2025 registered at Police Station, CCPS Karimnagar, TSCSB; and (iii) FIR No. 146 of 2025 registered at Police Station. GDK-I Town, Ramagundam, are hereby quashed.”
5. Mr. Sidharth Luthra, the learned senior counsel appearing for the State very fairly submitted that he has nothing to argue in so far as the merits of the matter is concerned.
6. However, the State has something to say as regards the broad guidelines laid down by the High Court as contained in para 29 of the impugned judgment is concerned. According to Mr. Luthra, the guidelines issued by the High Court are inconsistent with each other and in such circumstances he urged that this Court should look into the guidelines and rectify the inconsistencies. Para 29 reads thus:-
“29. Before parting with this judgment, this Court considers it necessary to make certain observations. Having regard to the factual and legal position discussed herein, and with a view to safeguarding fundamental rights as well as preventing the criminal process from being invoked mechanically or arbitrarily, it is appropriate to prescribe a set of operational guidelines for police authorities and Judicial Magistrates when dealing with proceedings initiated on the basis of social media posts. These directions are particularly relevant in cases where the registration of First Information Reports (FIRs) is sought in connection with such posts. Accordingly, the police authorities are directed to adhere to the following guidelines:
i. Verification of locus standi: Before registering any FIR for alleged defamation or similar offences, the police must verify whether the complainant qualifies as the “person aggrieved” in terms of law. Complaints by unrelated third parties lacking standing are not maintainable, except where the report concerns a cognizable offence.
ii. Preliminary inquiry in cognizable offences: Where a representation/complaint discloses a cognizable offence, the police shall, prior to registration of crime, conduct a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether the statutory ingredients of the alleged offence are, prima facie, made out.
iii. High threshold for media post/speech-related offences: No case alleging promotion of enmity, intentional insult, public mischief, threat to public order, or sedition shall he registered unless there exists prima facie material disclosing incitement to violence, hatred, or public disorder. This threshold must be applied in line with the principles laid down in Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 Supp (2) SCR 769, and Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1.
iv. Protection of political speech/post: The police shall not mechanically register cases concerning harsh, offensive, or critical political speech. Only when the speech amounts to incitement to violence or poses an imminent threat to public order may criminal law be invoked. Constitutional protections for free political criticism under Article 19(l)(a) of the Constitution must be scrupulously enforced.
v. Defamation as a non-cognizable offence: Since defamation is classified as a non-cognizable offence, the police cannot directly register an FIR or crime in such matters. The complainant must be directed to approach the jurisdictional Magistrate. Police action may follow only upon a specific order of the Magistrate under Section 174(2) of the BNSS. vi. Compliance with arrest guidelines: In all cases, the police shall strictly comply with the principles laid down in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273. Automatic or mechanical arrests are impermissible, and the principle of proportionality in the exercise of criminal process must be observed.
vii. Prior legal scrutiny in sensitive cases: In matters involving political speech/post or other sensitive forms of expression, the police shall obtain prior legal opinion from the Public Prosecutor before registering an FIR, to ensure that the proposed action is legally sustainable. viii. Frivolous or motivated complaints: Where a complaint is found to be frivolous, vexatious, or politically motivated, the police shall close the matter under Section 176(1) of the BNSS, citing absence of sufficient grounds for investigation.”
7. We have looked into para 29 threadbare. We are of the view that we should not interfere with the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court including the guidelines issued by the High Court.
8. With the aforesaid, the Special Leave Petitions stand dismissed.
9. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
