Mohammed Rafi Vs State of Kerala (Kerala High Court)
Summary: In Mohammed Rafi Vs State of Kerala and connected petitions, the Kerala High Court considered the application of the notification dated 07.04.2016 enhancing the additional court fee payable towards the Kerala Legal Benefit Fund from 0.5% to 1% of the amount in dispute. The petitioners were assessees under the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003 whose appeals or revisions attracted demands for the enhanced fee. They contended that the increased levy could not apply to assessment years preceding the notification and that imposing a more onerous appellate condition impaired their vested right of appeal.
The State contended that appeals and revisions filed after the notification attracted the enhanced rate, regardless of the assessment period. It also argued that the levy already existed and only its rate had increased. The petitioners relied on decisions including Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd., Procurator, R.G. Diocese, Calicut and Ismail, while the Government relied on K. Raveendranathan Nair. The Court traced the levy’s history, including the original 2002 notification, the decisions in Ismail and Chackolas Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd., and the subsequent decision in Cheeran Structurals.
Examining the Supreme Court authorities, the Court referred to Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Limited, Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. and the Constitution Bench decisions in Garikapati Veeraya, Vitthalbhai Naranbhai Patel and Hardeodas Jagannath. It noted that the approval in Vitthalbhai Naranbhai Patel of the principles in Hoosein Kasam Dada had not been noticed in Hardeodas Jagannath. Applying the approach explained in IVECO Magirus Brandschutztechnik GMBH, it held that the earlier Constitution Bench authority remained binding.
The Court held that the relevant event is commencement of the lis. In taxation matters, a dispute arises when the taxing authority, dissatisfied with the correctness of the return, calls for supporting materials or evidence. The appellate right, including the applicable court-fee obligation, vests at that stage. A later enactment cannot impair that right without express words or necessary intendment. The notification contained no such retrospective stipulation; consequently, the enhanced rate applies where the lis commenced after 01.04.2016, its effective date. The assessment year or subsequent filing of an appeal does not by itself determine liability.
Applying that test to the principal petition, W.P.(C) No.819/2017, the Court noted that the Section 67 notice was issued on 07.07.2016, followed by the penalty order dated 20.09.2016 for 2015-16. The petitioner was therefore liable to the enhanced fee. It reached the same result in W.P.(C) No.12501/2023: although the shop inspection occurred on 23.03.2015, the books were called for only on 20.08.2018, after the notification took effect.
Relief from the enhanced rate was granted in W.P.(C) Nos.1710/2017, 24297/2017, 24298/2017 and 24326/2017 because the relevant pre-assessment notice or assessment order predated the notification. For W.P.(C) No.16785/2017, the judgment records that the pre-assessment notice was issued on 26.10.2015 and the lis commenced before the notification, but its concluding sentence nevertheless states that the petitioner is liable to the enhanced fee.
In W.P.(C) Nos.28493/2017, 32515/2017, 33920/2017, 9667/2018 and 27634/2020, the pleadings or materials did not establish the relevant assessment-order or pre-assessment-notice dates. The Court left it to the respective appellate authority or Tribunal to identify when the lis commenced and determine whether the enhanced fee was payable. The writ petitions were disposed of on those individual terms.
Cases Discussed
- IVECO Magirus Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya and Another — (2024) 2 SCC 86 (Supreme Court). Applied for the approach to divergent precedents, including the continuing authority of an earlier decision not considered in a subsequent decision.
- K. Raveendranathan Nair and Another v. Commissioner of Income Tax and Others — (2017) 9 SCC 355 (Supreme Court). Relied upon by the Government on the date governing appellate court fees and examined alongside the Constitution Bench authorities.
- Kerala Legal Benefit Fund Trustee Committee v. Cheeran Structurals (M/s.) and Others — 2012 (1) KLT 430 (Kerala High Court). Considered in tracing the earlier litigation concerning the 2002 levy; the quoted passage ultimately records dismissal of the appeals.
- Chackolas Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. v. State of Kerala — 2006 (1) KLT 989 (Kerala High Court). Cited by the petitioners for prospective application of the levy and considered as part of the earlier Kerala decisions.
- Ismail v. State of Kerala — 2005 KHC 1169; (2006) 144 STC 476 (Kerala High Court). The judgment records that this decision upheld the provision and restricted the original levy to orders concerning assessment years from 2002-03 onwards.
- Procurator, R.G. Diocese, Calicut v. State of Kerala — 2003 (1) KLT 618 (Kerala High Court). Cited by the petitioners against impairment of their vested appellate rights; not separately analysed in the judgment.
- Hardeodas Jagannath v. State of Assam and Others — AIR 1970 SC 724 (Supreme Court). Considered in examining the apparent divergence among Supreme Court authorities; the Court noted that it had not considered the earlier approval in Vitthalbhai Naranbhai Patel.
- Vitthalbhai Naranbhai Patel v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh — AIR 1967 SC 344 (Supreme Court). Treated as the binding earlier Constitution Bench authority approving the principles in Hoosein Kasam Dada.
- State of Bombay v. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. and Another — AIR 1960 SC 980 (Supreme Court). Relied upon for the substantive nature of the appellate right and the rule against imposing more onerous conditions retrospectively without express words or necessary intendment.
- Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry and Others — AIR 1957 SC 540 (Supreme Court). Referred to as Constitution Bench authority supporting protection of vested appellate rights.
- Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Limited v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others — AIR 1953 SC 221 (Supreme Court). Applied to identify commencement of the lis and accrual of the right of appeal when proceedings involving a controversy begin.
FULL TEXT OF THE JUDGMENT OF KERALA HIGH COURT
The applicability of a notification dated 07.04.2016 issued by the Government, enhancing the levy of an additional court fee from 0.5% to 1% of the amount involved in the dispute, payable towards the Kerala Legal Benefit Fund, constituted under Section 76(2) of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 (for short ‘the Act’), is the issue required to be considered in these writ petitions.
2. The petitioners were all assessees under the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003 (for short ‘KVAT Act’). They are facing proceedings initiated under the said Act which were pending before the appellate authorities or revisional authorities at the time of filing these writ petitions. The petitioners have been directed to pay additional court fee at the enhanced rate in respect of the appeals or revision petitions filed by them after the notification was issued. Hence they have approached this Court raising the challenge mentioned above.
3. The main contention urged by petitioners in all these writ petitions is that the additional court fee enhanced from 0.5% to 1% of the amount involved in dispute cannot apply to the assessment years prior to the date of the impugned notification. The petitioners’ also assert that, this Court had in Chackolas Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. v. State of Kerala [2006 (1) KLT 989], observed that though the State was competent to levy additional court fee under Section 76(1) of the Act, the enhanced levy will not have any retrospective application and hence in the present instance also, the enhanced rate must apply only from the assessment year in which the notification was issued, i.e., 2016-17.
4. A counter affidavit has been filed by the first respondent in W.P.(C) No.1710 of 2017 contending that the additional court fee prescribed under section 76 of the Act has to be paid, even in respect of appeals preferred against the orders issued prior to the date of the notification. According to the respondent, the fee prescribed in section 76 of the Act is payable from the date of notification to all proceedings. Respondent has pleaded that the extended additional court fee will apply to appeals or revisions filed after the date of notification i.e., 07.04.2016. They have also contended that the amount collected as court fee is utilized for providing efficient legal services for the people of the State and for social security measures for the legal profession in the form of Advocates Welfare Fund and Advocates Clerk Welfare Fund and hence the levy ought not be interfered with.
5. Sri. A Kumar, the learned Senior Counsel, instructed by Smt. Mini, apart from Adv. Krishna, Adv. K .N Sreekumaran, Adv. S.Anil Kumar, Adv. N.Muraleedharan Nair and Adv. Rahul A., the learned counsel for the respective petitioners, submitted that the levy of enhanced court fee would amount to an impairment of the vested right of appeal of the petitioners. Relying upon the decisions in State of Bombay v. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. and Another [AIR 1960 SC 980], Procurator, R.G. Diocese, Calicut v. State of Kerala [2003 (1) KLT 618] as well as the judgment in Ismail v. State of Kerala [2005 KHC 1169], it was contended that the notification enhancing the fee cannot apply to the assessment periods before it was notified and can have application only from the assessment year when it was notified.
6. Adv. Harima Hariharan, the learned Government Pleader on the other hand, submitted that the enhanced court fee applies in all these cases, as the appeals or revision petitions were filed subsequent to the notification. Relying upon the decision in K.Raveendranathan Nair and Another v. Commissioner of Income Tax and Others [(2017) 9 SCC 355], it was contended that the relevant date for determining the court fee payable, would be the date on which the particular lis commenced. The learned Government Pleader argued that the order under challenge before the appellate or revisional authorities in relation to the petitioners were all issued after the date of notification and hence they are bound to pay the additional court at the enhanced rate. Even otherwise, it was contended that the levy was all along in existence and only the rates have been enhanced and therefore, the principle laid down in the decision in Ismail (supra) had no application.
7. The issue that requires to be considered is thus based on the notification dated 07.04.2016, which reads as below:
GOVERNMENT OF KERALA
Law (G) Department
NOTIFICATION
G. O. (P) No. 5/2016/Law.
Dated, Thiruvananthapuram, 7th April, 2016
25th Meenam, 1191.
“S.R.O. No. 315/2016.-In exercise of the powers conferred by sub- section (1) of section 76 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 (10 of 1960) and in supersession of the notification issued under G. O. (P) No. 116/2002/Law dated 5 th April, 2002 and published as S.R.O. No. 226/2002 in the Kerala Gazette Extraordinary No. 420 dated 5th April, 2002, the Government of Kerala hereby authorise the levy by the Civil Courts, the tribunals and appellate authorities constituted by or under any special or local law, an additional court fee in respect of each original suits, original petitions, original applications, appeals or revisions at the rate of 1% of the amount involved in the dispute, in cases where it is capable of valuation and in other cases at the rate of Rupees one hundred in each such case. The amount so collected shall be credited to the Kerala Legal Benefit Fund constituted under sub-section (2) of section 76 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959.
The notification shall be deemed to have come into force on and from the 1st day of April, 2016.
By order of the Governor,
(Name),
Law Secretary.
Explanatory Note
(This does not form part of the notification, but is intended to indicate its general purport.)
As per sub-section (1) of section 76 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 as amended by the Kerala Finance Bill, 2016 the Government is empowered to levy additional court fee in respect of original petitions, original applications, appeals or revisions to tribunals or appellate authorities and original suits in Civil Courts, at a rate not exceeding one per cent of the amount in the dispute in cases where it is capable of valuation and in other cases at the rate not exceeding one hundred rupees for each original suit, original petition, original application, appeal or revision. The Government have decided to levy an additional court fee at the rate of 1% in respect of each original suits, original petitions, original applications, appeals or revisions of the amount involved in the dispute, in cases where it is capable of valuation and in other cases at the rate of Rupees one hundred in each such case.
The notification is intended to achieve the above object.”
BACKGROUND.
8. Before referring to the legal issues raised, a brief reference to the background of the levy of additional court fee towards Legal Benefit Fund is necessary. From the year 1962, a provision for the constitution of a legal benefit fund by the Government has been in existence as per section 76 of the Act. The fund was intended to be collected through levy of additional court fee. Despite the existence of such a provision, the rules in that regard were framed by the Government under Section 76(4) of the Act only in the year 1991. Much later, in the year 2002, the Kerala Legal Benefit Fund Trust Committee was formed under Section 76(2) of the Act. Pursuant to its formation, a notification was issued directing collection of additional court fee at specified rates with effect from 05.04.2002. Thus every appeal, or revision, filed before the Tribunals or Appellate/Revisional Authorities, other than in civil courts and criminal courts in the State, had to carry a stamp for the value of the additional court fee as prescribed in the Government Order S.R.O. No.225/2002.
9. Initially, the aforementioned levy was fixed at 0.5% of the amount involved in the dispute wherever it was capable of valuation or otherwise Rs.50/-. Though the limit fixed by statute was 1% of the amount involved in the dispute or Rs.100/-, as the case may be, the Government initially fixed it as 0.5% of the value of the dispute and in other cases at Rs.50/-.
10. When the aforesaid levy was introduced through notifications issued by the Government in 2002, challenges were raised including the constitutional validity of Section 76 of the Act. However, a learned Single Judge of this Court had, in Ismail (supra) upheld the validity of the provision and declared that the additional court fee liability is payable only for appeals or revisions filed in respect of any orders issued from the assessment year in which the notification was issued, i.e., 2002-03 onwards. Though the State Government challenged the said judgment, a Division Bench of this Court affirmed it in Chackolas Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. (supra).
11. In the meantime, the Kerala Legal Benefit Fund Trust Committee filed a writ appeal after obtaining leave, questioning the finding regarding the levy of additional court fee only from the year 2002-03 onwards, and contended that the said issue had not been considered by the Division Bench in Chackolas Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. (supra). The Division Bench in Kerala Legal Benefit Fund Trustee Committee v. Cheeran Structurals (M/s.) and Others [2012 (1) KLT 430] considered the legal implication of the levy and held, that the additional court fee payable towards legal benefit fund is payable at the rate prescribed under the Government Order, to every appeal or revision filed on or after 05.04.2002, irrespective of the assessment year to which it relates. The following observations are relevant:
“…….. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the above judgments are not directly on the point raised by the appellants i.e. appellants’ entitlement to collect Legal Benefit Fund in the form of additional court – fee under S.76(1) read with the Notification issued by the government for any appeal or revision filed after 05/04/2002 (irrespective of) the assessment year to which the appeal or revision relates. We find force in the contention of the appellants because neither the Section nor the Government Orders provide for collection of Legal Benefit Fund by way of additional court-fee with reference to any assessment year. On the other hand, what is provided is levy and collection of Legal Benefit Fund for any appeal or revision filed before any statutory authority or Tribunal other than civil and Criminal Courts. Since levy is statutorily authorised, it is upto the Government while issuing the order to fix the effective date of levy and collection which in this case is the date of order i.e. 05/04/2002. So much so, going by the orders of the Government and the operative provisions of the statute, we feel every appeal or revision filed on or after 05/04/2002 irrespective of the assessment year to which it relates, Legal Benefit Fund in the form of additional court – fee is payable at the rates prescribed under the Government Orders. However, we notice that in the judgment of the Supreme Court cited above and relied on by the learned Single Judge which is in State of Bombay v. Supreme General Films Exchange it is held as follows:
“It is thus clear that in a long line of decisions approved by this Court and at least in one given by this Court, it has been held that an impairment of the right of appeal by putting a new restriction thereon or imposing a more onerous condition is not a matter of procedure only; it impairs or imperils a substantive right and an enactment which does so is not retrospective unless it says so expressly or by necessary intendment.”
Going by the above decision of the Supreme Court, we feel the judgment of the learned Single Judge cannot be said to be erroneous or unsustainable even though it has in effect taken away the benefit to the appellants from the effective date given by the Government Orders. We, therefore, dismiss all the appeals filed by the appellants.”
12. A similar issue, as was considered in the decisions in Ismail (supra), Chackolas Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. (supra) and Kerala Legal Benefit Fund Trustee Committee (supra) has arisen again. The Government has, by the notification dated 07.04.2016, enhanced the rate of additional court fee from 0.5% to 1% payable towards the Legal Benefit Fund. The question to be determined in the present batch of writ petitions is the date from which the enhanced rate of additional court fee becomes payable. Is it to be determined with reference to the assessment year in question or is it the date of the assessment order, or is it the date of coming into force of the notification? By the principles of judicial precedents, this Court could have followed the decisions of this Court mentioned in this paragraph. However, the very same principle of judicial precedent was canvassed by the learned Government Pleader by referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in K.Raveendranathan Nair (supra), to adopt a different view. Hence the following discussion is essential.
DISCUSSION.
13. In K.Raveendranathan Nair (supra), the issue arose after the amendment of section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and court fee became payable for appeals and revisions under the Income Tax Act as per section 52A of the Act, introduced with effect from 06.03.2003. After referring to the decisions in Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Limited v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others [AIR 1953 SC 221] and Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. (supra), it was held that appeal provisions applicable in a tax matter for assessees would be that existing as on the date of assessment and not that applicable during the assessment period, while for the revenue, it would be the one as on the date the disputed demand is negatived by the appellate authority. In coming to such a conclusion, the Court relied upon a Constitution Bench decision in Hardeodas Jagannath v. State of Assam and Others [AIR 1970 SC 724].
14. The earliest decision having a bearing is the Division Bench judgment in Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Limited (supra), which held that, when a lis commences, all rights get crystallised and no clog upon a likely appeal can be put, unless the law was made retrospective, either expressly or by clear implication. The aforesaid decision was followed by the three Bench decision in Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. (supra). In the said decision, the Supreme Court held, as noted earlier, that, an impairment of the right of appeal by putting a new restriction thereon or imposing a more onerous condition is not a matter of procedure, but it impairs or imperils a substantive right and an enactment which does so, is not retrospective, unless it says so expressly or by necessary intendment. The Constitution Bench decision in Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry and Others [AIR 1957 SC 540] was also relied upon for the above proposition. It is also appropriate to observe that in another Constitution Bench judgment in Vitthalbhai Naranbhai Patel v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1967 SC 344), the observations in Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Limited (supra) was referred to and approved, though on facts, the Court could not identify whether the lis commenced prior to the amendment or not.
15. Thus, this Court is left with the predicament of deciding this lis, in the background of a cleavage of opinion discernible from the different decisions of the Supreme Court. A reading of the above referred decisions reveal that, the approval by the Constitution Bench in Vitthalbhai Naranbhai Patel (supra) of the principles laid down in Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Limited (supra) was not noted by the subsequent Constitution Bench in Hardeodas Jagannath (supra).
16. While dealing with a situation where divergent views of Benches of co-equal strength are rendered by the Supreme Court, the options available with a High Court are: (i) if there are two irreconcilable decisions and the subsequent decision has not considered the earlier decision, the subsequent decision would be per incuriam, (ii) if the subsequent decision had noted, considered and explained the earlier decision, then the High Court must follow the subsequent decision, and (iii) if the earlier decision was noted in the subsequent decision but not explained, the High Court can reconcile the two conflicting decisions. In a recent decision in IVECO Magirus Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya and Another [(2024) 2 SCC 86], it has been observed as follows:
“…….In such a scenario, when there are decisions of this Court not expressing views in sync with each other, the first course to be adopted is to ascertain which is the decision that has been rendered by a larger Bench. Obviously, inter se decisions of this Court, a decision of a Constitution Bench would be binding on the Benches of lesser strength. None of the decisions that we have considered is rendered by a Constitution Bench. However, a sole judgment rendered by a Bench of 4 (four) Hon’ble Judges and 3 (three) decisions rendered by the Benches comprised of 3 (three) Hon’ble Judges are there, which call for deference. Ordinarily, the decision of a larger Bench has to be preferred unless of course a Bench of lesser strength doubts an earlier view, formulates the point for answer and refers the matter for further consideration by a larger Bench in accordance with law. If, however, the decisions taking divergent views are rendered by Benches of co-equal strength, the next course to be adopted is to attempt to reconcile the views that appear to be divergent and to explain those contrary decisions by assuming, to the extent possible, that they applied to different facts. The other course available is to look at whether the previous decision has been noticed, considered and explained in the subsequent decision; if not, the earlier decision continues to remain binding whereas if the answer is in the affirmative, the subsequent decision becomes the binding decision. We add a caveat that if the subsequent Bench, instead of deciding the matter before it finally upon consideration of the decision of the earlier Bench, formulates the point of difference and makes a reference for a decision by a larger Bench, it is the former decision that continues to govern the field so long the larger Bench does not decide the reference.”
(emphasis supplied).
17. In view of the above principle, it needs no reiteration that when a previous decision has not been noticed or considered, the earlier decision continues to remain binding. Hence, the prior Constitution Bench judgment in Vitthalbhai Naranbhai Patel (supra) approving the principles laid down in Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Limited (supra) remains binding. Viewed in the above perspective, the enhanced court fee is applicable only to the cases where lis commenced after the effective date of notification i.e. 01.04.2016.
18. The above conclusion leads to the question regarding when the lis commenced in each of these cases. To appreciate the said question, the following observations in Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Limited (supra) is relevant:
“32……………..Whenever there is a proposition by one party and an opposition to that proposition by another a “lis” arises. It may be conceded, though not deciding it, that when the assessee files his return a “lis” may not immediately arise, for under Section 11(1) the authority may accept the return as correct and complete. But if the authority is not satisfied as to the correctness of the return and calls for evidence, surely a controversy arises involving a proposition by the assessee and an opposition by the State. The circumstance that the authority who raises the dispute is himself the judge can make no difference for the authority raises the dispute in the interest of the State and in so acting only represents the State.
33. It will appear from the dates given above that in this case the “lis” in the sense explained above arose before the date of amendment of the session. Further, even if the “lis” is to be taken as arising only on the date of assessment, there was a possibility of such a “lis” arising as soon as proceedings started with the filing of the return or, at any rate, when the authority call for evidence and started the hearing and the right of appeal must be taken to have been in existence even at those dates. For the purposes of the accrual of the right of appeal the critical and relevant date is the date of initiation of proceedings and not the decision itself.”
(emphasis supplied)
19. Thus, the lis, in matters of taxation, commences when the taxing authority being not satisfied with the correctness of the return filed by the assessee, calls for materials or evidence to justify the claim of the assessee. If a notice has been issued by the assessing officer pursuant to the return filed by the assessee, a lis can be held to have commenced and the right of appeal, including the obligation to pay the court fee in the appeal, as existing on that date when the lis commenced, becomes vested right. Such a right can be taken away only by an express stipulation or by necessary intendment. A reading of the notification extracted in this judgement, does not indicate any retrospective stipulation either expressly or by necessary intendment and the notification came into effect from 01.04.2016. Hence for all appeals or revision petitions filed where the lis commenced after 01.04.2016, the enhanced rate of court fee is payable.
20. In view of the above legal propositions, each of the individual cases in this batch of writ petitions are dealt with, as below:
W.P.(C) No. 819/2017
The assessment relates to the year 2015-16. The petitioner has challenged an order of penalty dated 20.09.2016 before the Deputy Commissioner, Kottayam. The notice under section 67 of KVAT Act was issued on 07.07.2016. Hence the lis commenced after the notification and the petitioner is liable to pay the enhanced rate of court fee.
W.P.(C) No. 1710/2017
The petitioner has challenged Ext.P3 assessment order dated 20.05.2016, before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), Thiruvananthapuram. The assessment relates to the year 2013-14 and the pre-assessment notice was issued, as evident from Ext.P3 assessment order, on 12.11.2015. Hence the lis commenced before the notification, and the petitioner is not liable to pay the enhanced rate of court fee.
W.P.(C) No. 16785/2017
The petitioner has challenged Ext.P1 assessment order dated 29.11.2016, relating to the year 2012-13 by filing Ext.P2 appeal before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals). The pre-assessment notice was issued, as evident from Ext.P1 assessment order, on 26.10.2015. Hence the lis commenced before the notification and the petitioner is liable to pay the enhanced rate of court fee.
W.P.(C) No. 24297/2017
The petitioner has challenged Ext.P1 assessment order dated 02.05.2014 relating to the year 2010-11 by filing an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), Kollam. The Appellate Authority allowed the appeal in part. Aggrieved by the extent to which the appeal was rejected, the petitioner preferred a second appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. Since Ext.P1 assessment order was issued on 02.05.2014, the lis commenced before the notification, and the petitioner is not liable to pay the enhanced rate of court fee.
W.P.(C) No. 24298/2017
The petitioner has challenged an assessment order dated 16.07.2013 relating to the year 2010-11 by filing an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), Kollam. The Appellate Authority allowed the appeal in part. Aggrieved by the extent to which the appeal was rejected, the petitioner preferred a second appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. Since Ext.P1 assessment order was issued on 16.07.2013, the lis commenced before the notification and the petitioner is not liable to pay the enhanced rate of court fee.
W.P.(C) No. 24326/2017
The petitioner had challenged an assessment order dated 20-03-2014 relating to the year 2008-09 by filing an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), Kollam. The Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal. Challenging the dismissal of the appeal, petitioner preferred a second appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. Since Ext.P1 assessment order was issued on 20.03.2014, the lis commenced before the notification and hence the petitioner is not liable to pay the enhanced rate of court fee.
W.P.(C) No. 28493/2017
Though the issue pending before the Appellate Tribunal relates to the assessment year 2009-10 to 2013-14, nowhere in the writ petition is there any pleading to indicate the date of assessment order or the date of pre-assessment notice. In the absence of any material to indicate the date of commencement of lis, it is for the Appellate Tribunal before whom the appeals were filed, to identify such a date and also as to whether petitioner is required to pay the enhanced rate of court fee.
W.P.(C) No. 32515/2017
Though the issue pending before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), Palakkad relates to the assessment year 2009-10 to 2013-14, there is no pleading or any material to indicate the date of assessment order or the date of pre-assessment notice. In the absence of any material to indicate the date of commencement of lis, it is for the Appellate Authority before whom the appeal was filed, to identify such dates and also as to whether petitioner is required to pay the enhanced rate of court fee.
W.P.(C) No. 33920/2017
Though the issue pending before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), Palakkad relates to the assessment year 2012-13 to 2014-2015, there is no pleading or any material to indicate the date of assessment orders or the date of pre-assessment notices. In the absence of any material to indicate the date of commencement of lis, it is for the Appellate Authority before whom the appeals were filed, to identify such a date and also as to whether petitioner is required to pay the enhanced rate of court fee.
W.P.(C) No. 9667/2018
Though the issue relates to the assessment years 2009-10 to 2012-13, appeals were filed before the Appellate Tribunal. There is no pleading or any material to indicate the date of assessment orders or the date of pre-assessment notices. In the absence of any material to indicate the date of commencement of lis, it is for the Appellate Tribunal before whom the appeals were filed, to identify such a date and also as to whether petitioner is required to pay the enhanced rate of court fee.
W.P.(C) No. 27634/2020
The issue pending before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), Ernakulam relates to the assessment year 2012-13. However, there is no pleading or any material to indicate the date of assessment order or the date of pre-assessment notice. In the absence of any material to indicate the date of commencement of lis, it for the Appellate Authority before whom the appeal was filed, to identify such a date and also as to whether petitioner is required to pay the enhanced rate of court fee.
W.P.(C) No. 12501/2023
A penalty order relating to the assessment year 2014-15 is the subject matter of appeal before the Joint Commissioner (Appeals), Thrissur. Though a shop inspection was conducted on 23.03.2015, the books of account were called for only on 20.08.2018. Hence, the lis commenced after the date of notification and the petitioner is required to pay the enhanced rate of court fee.
Accordingly the writ petitions are disposed of as above.
