A Critical Analysis of How “Convenience Appraisals” Distort Real Estate Markets, Facilitate Financial Misconduct and Weaponize Professional Lifecycle
The article argues that although the RBI mandates independent third-party valuation for secured lending, commercial banks exercise significant administrative control over valuers through empanelment, work allocation, report review, renewal and delisting processes, which, according to the article, compromises valuation independence. It states that this environment encourages “convenience valuations,” contributing to inflated property values, developer subsidisation, market distortion and financial irregularities, while placing the cost of mandatory valuations on borrowers. The article describes examples involving differences between registered transaction values and bank valuations, as well as project approvals based on higher benchmark values than registered sale values. It also discusses the absence of continuous peer review and the occurrence of substantial haircuts during SARFAESI recoveries. As a reform measure, the article proposes an independent central clearinghouse for blind allocation of valuation assignments, tamper-proof reporting, independent technical review, statutory protection for valuers, a Valuers Act, mandatory full-time practice, standard examinations, qualified technical reviewers, and cross-linking of property values across statutory frameworks. The article concludes by urging RBI and the Government of India to introduce policy reforms to strengthen valuation independence.
Every secured loan transaction rests on a foundational promise: that the collateral backing the loan is worth exactly what the bank claims it is. To ensure this promise holds true, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has long mandated independent, third-party valuations. The logic is simple: protect public deposits and prevent the buildup of Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) by keeping the asset appraiser entirely separate from the loan applicant and the loan creator.
Yet, a look behind the scenes reveals a deeply concerning reality. In practice, the structural firewall between credit targets and asset risk has quietly dissolved. Through an “All-in-One” control model, commercial banks now hold absolute administrative sway over every major milestone of an external valuer’s career. When an institution controls a professional’s livelihood, true independence quickly becomes a myth.
Because individual valuation firms operate in an unforgiving commercial landscape, a culture of absolute silence has taken root. Professionals rarely voice these systemic flaws out of a very real, very practical fear of losing their business volume.
- A Lifecycle Under Pressure: The Five Stages of Control
- The Harsh Reality: Financial Crimes and the Market Distortion Machine
- Two Structural Anomalies: The Real-World Mechanics
- The Mathematical Contradiction of "Haircuts" and the Black Money Fallacy
- The Professional Crisis: Casual Practice and Blind Reviews
- Sharing the Blame: A Systemic Issue
- The Path Forward: Decoupling Risk from Reward
- The Ultimate Paradox: A Useless Burden on the Borrower
- Conclusion: A Call for Urgent Policy Intervention
A Lifecycle Under Pressure: The Five Stages of Control
The compromise of valuation objectivity does not happen through overt coercion. Instead, it happens systematically across the five routine administrative stages that dictate a valuer’s relationship with a bank:
1. Empanelment: Getting onto a bank’s panel should be a transparent test of engineering qualifications and professional Instead, entry criteria are often applied with wide administrative discretion, creating pressure to align with bank expectations before the first file is even assigned.
2. Work Allocation: This stage functions as a silent volume dial. When a truly independent professional turns in a conservative, realistic valuation that exposes a property’s true market flaws—subsequently stalling a massive loan deal—the bank rarely files a formal technical Instead, the valuer’s case assignments simply dry up. Volume is quietly routed to “cooperative” entities that regularly deliver numbers matching the bank’s internal credit benchmarks.
3. The Review Process: A significant operational contradiction occurs during internal report Technical engineering data, local market adjustments, and structural calculations are frequently reviewed by credit officers or branch managers who lack specialized valuation or engineering qualifications. The technical review shifts into a form of financial censorship, where numbers are pushed and pulled to fit pre-determined Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratios rather than on-the-ground reality.
4. Renewal Cycles: The periodic administrative renewal process serves as an unwritten test of flexibility. Reports that successfully protect a bank from bad asset exposure but delay monthly credit disbursement targets can cause a valuer’s next renewal application to be indefinitely delayed or shelved without a single word of technical
5. Delisting and Blacklisting: Delisting protocols are legally meant to penalize proven professional However, without independent oversight panels, the mere threat of sudden, unverified delisting acts as the ultimate compliance lever, effectively discouraging any pushback against aggressive asset pricing.
The Harsh Reality: Financial Crimes and the Market Distortion Machine
When business generation becomes a bank’s sole metric of success, the system naturally begins promoting “convenience valuations.” Driven by hearsay and structured entirely without evidence-based valuation principles, these reports have been reduced to an expensive eyewash. They do not serve their true purpose of securing the advance; instead, they are treated merely as compliance shields to protect bank officials from future audits.
Far worse than mere corporate compliance, this reliance on non-evidence-based appraisals transforms the valuation mechanism into a vehicle for broader financial misconduct. By decoupling property values from ground reality, both institutional processes inadvertently become parties to money laundering, tax evasion, and severe market distortion.
This institutional blind spot manifests in three distinct, toxic ways:
- Artificially Inflating Property Rates: By establishing arbitrary, elevated benchmarks based on unverified market hearsay rather than hard transaction data, convenience valuations systematically pump air into real estate bubbles, making housing unaffordable for genuine buyers.
- Subsidizing Developer Speculation: Through aggressive “project approvals,” banks actively assist builders and developers in marketing inventory at artificially high prices, creating a false floor for the local micro-market.
- Inability to Withstand Market Volatility: Because these reports are tailored to fit predetermined corporate targets rather than fundamental market data, they fail entirely when exposed to economic downturns, regulatory updates, or real estate market corrections.
Two Structural Anomalies: The Real-World Mechanics
To understand how deeply embedded this distortion is, one only needs to examine two common transactional paradoxes that routinely bypass standard banking compliance filters. In both scenarios, the system originally designed to prevent a property price bubble is turned upside down, actively helping to create one:
Example 1: The Dual Valuation Discrepancy (The Illusion of a Safe Margin) In a typical retail property purchase, a bank receives a formal registered purchase agreement declaring a transaction value of ₹10 Lakhs. However, based on hearsay in the market and data provided by the developer or real estate agent, both the valuer and the banker believe that ₹30 Lakhs is the real price without examining any actual evidence. The valuer signs off on this inflated number, and the banker eagerly accepts it.
Remarkably, the credit department never pauses to question this massive ₹20 Lakh variance, nor do they ask the valuer to technically justify why the buyer is somehow securing the asset at one-third of its apparent worth. By operating under this shared misunderstanding, both the valuer and the banker directly facilitate tax evasion and money laundering. They treat a red flag as a compromised, over-inflated cushion, using a completely unverified price gap to inject unaccounted cash into the transaction.
Example 2: The Project Approval Illusion (Developer Subsidization & Artificial Rates) A similar blind spot occurs during blanket project approvals for new residential townships or commercial units. A bank formally approves the benchmark value of an individual flat at ₹1 Crore, clearing the path for maximum loan distribution and high-exposure developer funding. Meanwhile, in the real world, the builder is executing the vast majority of official government registries for those identical flats at a mere ₹40 Lakhs.
Instead of recognizing that a ₹60 Lakh gap indicates an artificially manipulated market, the valuer provides the target figure, and the banker accepts it without demanding an explanation for the baseline discrepancy. This lack of understanding directly subsidizes the developer’s aggressive pricing strategy. The bank’s approved valuation operates completely outside the legal registry framework, serving no real risk-mitigation purpose. Instead, it legitimizes hyper-inflated asset values, directly fueling the very property bubble it was mandated to prevent.
- Financial Burden on Borrowers: Since the borrower ultimately bears the cost of these mandatory appraisals, forcing them to pay for a report that lacks objective risk value represents a complete waste of their financial resources.
- The Absence of Continuous Peer Review: There is no intermediate peer review mechanism to verify report quality during the life of a loan. The actual accuracy of the collateral value is checked only years later when a loan goes bad—typically at the time of SARFAESI enforcement or liquidation proceedings.
The Mathematical Contradiction of “Haircuts” and the Black Money Fallacy
The failure of convenience valuations becomes undeniable when looking at the massive 30% to 60% haircuts routinely witnessed during asset recovery under SARFAESI auctions.
When these steep, devastating discounts occur, both the valuer and the banker frequently resort to a convenient defense. They claim: “The property actually holds our high original value, but the auction fetched a lower price simply because a public banking sale requires the entire amount to be paid cleanly via cheque/white money, missing out on the cash premium.”
This excuse exposes a shocking lack of basic professional knowledge. When both parties know from day one that a distressed banking recovery must legally be conducted entirely through transparent cheque transactions, why do they consciously choose to factor unrecorded black money components into the initial financing valuation?
By factoring cash-market premiums into formal loan approvals, banks are directly enabling money laundering and the conversion of black money. Claiming ignorance of the law or standard procedures will not shield them forever; both bankers and valuers are increasingly bound to face severe heat from the Enforcement Directorate (ED), CBI, and court inquiries. From a risk perspective, a massive haircut means the asset was aggressively over-valued at the start simply to justify an unsafe loan amount.
The Professional Crisis: Casual Practice and Blind Reviews
While it is difficult to fathom why bankers fail to grasp the gravity of this structural risk, the systemic rot on the valuer’s side is clear. Far too many valuers treat the profession as a casual, part-time occupation.
Because they treat it casually, they rarely take the pains to upgrade their skills, study advanced valuation sciences, or keep pace with global methodologies. Worse yet, the steady, uncritical flow of work assigned by volume-driven branches gives these part-time practitioners a false sense of security and expertise. They mistakenly believe they understand valuation deeply, when in reality, they are merely filling out compliance checklists.
This illusion goes unchecked because commercial bankers—who possess zero engineering or technical risk training—are completely unequipped to critique or review the scientific accuracy of a valuer’s report. The blind are effectively leading the blind.
Sharing the Blame: A Systemic Issue
This erosion of independence is not the fault of any single stakeholder. The institutional responsibility is widely shared:
- Bank Executive Boards: By tieing internal corporate promotions and employee performance metrics strictly to volume-driven loan generation rather than the long-term health of the asset portfolio, management creates the intense top-down pressure that distorts risk assessment.
- Professional Fragmentation: The valuation field in India is split across a high number of separate professional associations operating under various voluntary guidelines. This lack of a single, unified statutory body leaves individual professionals It allows commercial lending teams to “shop around” for lenient terms, selecting entities with the most favorable criteria and undermining the collective strength of the profession. Valuation institutions must move past voluntary, fragmented compliance frameworks and actively lobby the government for a singular, statutory Council of Valuers—similar to the ICAI for chartered accountants—to give professionals the legal teeth required to resist institutional pressure.
The Path Forward: Decoupling Risk from Reward
To protect the financial ecosystem without breaking existing laws, we must change how valuations are handled. The solution lies in completely severing the link between the valuer’s livelihood and the commercial credit teams.
This can be achieved by establishing an Independent Central Clearinghouse, operating under a statutory authority like the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI) or a centralized banking regulator. This is not an experimental concept; the automated, blind assignment framework has already been successfully implemented under the IBBI for insolvency professionals, proving that administrative decoupling is both legally viable and operationally efficient.
- Blind Allocation: Commercial banks would no longer maintain internal panels or hand-pick their preferred valuers. Instead, when a bank needs an appraisal, they submit the request to a centralized An automated, blind algorithm matches the case to a registered professional based strictly on geographic proximity, asset complexity, and available capacity.
- Tamper-Proof Reporting: The final report is uploaded directly back through the secure portal. Internal bank reviews are restricted to checking basic regulatory compliance. Any actual technical or structural disputes must be referred to an independent technical cell, preventing credit officers from demanding arbitrary changes to the figures.
The Ultimate Paradox: A Useless Burden on the Borrower
If banks refuse to yield administrative control and continue to mandate “convenience valuations” that completely disintegrate under market stress, a provocative but logical question arises: Why mandate independent valuation reports at all?
If a technical report is routinely overwritten by credit departments to meet predetermined lending figures, it ceases to be an instrument of risk management. Instead, it degenerates into a useless administrative hurdle that serves no true commercial purpose. It acts merely as an expensive formality, extracting hard-earned money from the borrower to fund a document that the bank itself effectively rewrites through internal censorship.
If the banking system is unwilling to respect the objective, scientific independence of registered valuers, it would be far more transparent to waive the condition for independent valuation opinions entirely. Let the banks explicitly bear the full weight of their own credit decisions based entirely on their internal business targets. It is unjust to force the borrower to shoulder the financial burden of an engineering appraisal when the ultimate loan figure is derived not from technical structural realities, but from pure financial convenience.
Conclusion: A Call for Urgent Policy Intervention
Adjusting asset valuations to match aggressive credit goals creates an unaddressed, silent risk within our financial sector. True structural stability cannot be built on inflated numbers.
Is this current situation not a gross violation of the RBI’s explicit intent for independent valuation? The harsh reality is that no one in the executive banking framework is taking the pains to ensure its proper implementation. It is high time that the RBI and the Government of India take direct initiative to resolve this dangerous ambiguity.
The state must intervene by introducing long-awaited, comprehensive policy reforms, chief among them the enactment of the statutory Valuers Act. To save the nation from a catastrophic real estate bubble burst, the government must:
- Establish strong legal protection for independent valuers to ensure their commercial survival without fear of bank retaliation.
- Mandate valuation as a strict, full-time professional practice rather than a casual
- Introduce compulsory, rigorous standard examinations for all practicing valuers.
- Set up a dedicated, qualified tier of technical reviewers independent of bank credit
Addressing these serious concerns in a timely manner will safeguard the economy, stop widespread financial irregularities, and elevate the valuation profession with deep public trust. Furthermore, to eliminate the manipulation of facts entirely, the property values declared across different statutory frameworks—whether for government registration, income tax, wealth declaration, or bank loans—must be centrally cross-linked. Financial integrity requires a clean break from convenience valuations, restoring truth to risk assessment or making banks fully accountable for the risks they generate on their own.







A well-written article highlighting an important issue in the valuation ecosystem. Independence of valuers is fundamental to sound credit decisions and financial stability. The article raises several important questions that deserve serious discussion by regulators, banks, and valuation professionals. Constructive debate on these reforms is certainly the need of the hour.
Only a genuine valuer can reveal the reality, and it takes courage to speak about the shortcomings within the valuation profession. Everything stated in the article is true; the government and banks should take note of the suggestions provided therein, as it is in the best interest of the country.🇮🇳
The establishment of a VALUERS ACT 🇮🇳&National Valuation University 🇮🇳is absolutely essential.
The government cannot achieve its economic goals unless work is done on the valuation process and the valuation department.
Sunil Pandey
Registered Valuer
The article “Convenience Appraisals: How They Distort Real Estate Markets & Enable Financial Misconduct” argues that the independence of property valuers in bank lending is often compromised by the way banks control their empanelment, work allocation, reviews, and renewals.
After going through the article thoroughly my observations as as under:
1- Presently valuation report creates incentives for valuers to produce valuations that support loan targets rather than reflect true market value.
2-The most important takeaways are:
Independence of valuers is at risk: When banks control a valuer’s assignments and continuation on the panel, there can be pressure to align valuations with lending objectives rather than objective market evidence.
3-Inflated valuations increase financial risk: If properties are consistently overvalued, banks may lend more than the actual security value, increasing the possibility of NPAs and larger losses during recovery.
4-Mismatch between registered value and bank valuation: The article questions situations where the registered sale price is much lower than the valuation accepted by the bank without sufficient technical justification, arguing that such gaps deserve closer scrutiny.
5-Borrowers pay for a valuation that may not be fully independent: It is observed that if technical opinions are overridden by commercial considerations, the borrower bears the cost of a report that may not serve its intended risk-management purpose.
6-The article sujjest structural reforms, and recommends an independent centralized system for allocating valuation assignments, stronger legal protection for valuers, technical peer review, and greater standardization of the profession to reduce conflicts of interest.
It raises concerns and proposes reforms, but many of its conclusions reflect the author’s analysis rather than established regulatory findings. The underlying principle—that valuation independence is important for prudent lending—is widely recognized, while the specific allegations and proposed solutions should be viewed as recommendations for discussion rather than settled policy.
The article is well thought narrating the problem and simultaneously sujjesting solutions as well.
I must congratulate the auther Sh Sanjay Dungerwal for hard work done and courage to highlight the facts and hazards of the profession.
A big change needs to happen, and through these insightful articles, foster the transformation.
very informative and useful article.
[20/07, 18:50] Anand Saxena: डूंगरवाल जी धन्यवाद ,सही विषय को उठाने के लिये। रिजर्व बॆंक ने दिशा निर्देश स्वतंत्र मूल्यांकन कर्ता हेतु दिये पर जब स्वयं उसी बॆंक द्वारा उनकी सूची बनाई जायेगी, जिसके लिये मूल्यांकन करना हॆ तथा उस समिति द्वारा बनाई जायेगी जिसमे कोई भी मूल्यांकन कर्ता समिति या हमारे किसी मूल्यांकन कर्ता संगठन की भागीदारी नही होगी तो वह कॆसे तृतीय पक्ष स्वतंत्र चयन कार्य प्रणाली कही जायेगी? बॆंक द्वारा ऎसा करना, निश्चित ही मूल्यांकन कर्ता को अपने प्रभाव अंतर्गत रखना ऒर कुछ मामलो मे अपने अनुसार रिपोर्ट देने को बाध्य करने का कारण भी बन सकता हे।,यही नवीनीकरण प्रणाली कोभी प्रभावित करता हे।कार्य का वितरण भी मुल्यांकन कर्ताओ मे समानुपात मे ना करना भी इसी दोषपूर्ण प्रणाली को ही इंगित करता हे। हमारे द्वारा दी ग ई रिपोर्ट उस व्यक्ति द्वारा सही ( या गलत) ठहराई जाती हे जिसकी योग्यता ही इस हेतु नही।आपने लेख मे बहुत अच्छा सुझाव दिया हे👇.
१. चयन प्रक्रिया भारतीय रिजर्व बॆंक द्वारा की जाये, उसी के द्वारा विभिन्न बॆंक को सूची दी जाये तथा इस चयन प्रक्रिया मे मूल्यांकन कर्ता संगठन की समिति भी शामिलहो। सभी बॆंक मे मूल्यांकन की फीस समान हो
२. बॆक कोई भी कार्रवाई जो हमसे संबंधित हो बगॆर उस समिति की जानकारी के ,ना कर सके । 👇अगर ऎसा होता हे तो सुविधाजनक मूल्यांकन, खराब ऋण खाता,पेशेवर कदाचार,बॆंक की आपस की प्रतिस्पर्धा ( जो गलत तरीको से व्यवसाय बढाने हेतु हॊती हे) आदि समाप्त हो जायेंगी । आपको बहुत बहुत धन्यवाद क्योंकि आप हमेशा नियमानुसार हमारे व्यवसाय हित के विषय उठाते हे। कुछ सुझाव मेरी तरफ से रख रहा हू यह कितने सही हे या कारगर होगे यह तो भविष्य मे निहित हे। मेरे सुझाव👇
[20/07, 18:51] Anand Saxena: १. बॆंक द्वारा ली जाने वाली प्रत्येक मूल्यांकन रिपोर्ट्स की भी एक मूल्कांकन समिति द्वारा मासकि/त्रिमासिक अंकेषण (Audit) होनी चाहिये।( जॆसे सी ए द्वारा बॆंक की वार्षिक लेखा परीक्षा होती हे।) अगर ऎसा होता हॆ तो हमारे लिये यह एक ऒर आय का स्तोत्त होगा।
२. प्रत्येक बॆंक मे कार्य वितरण समान हो इस हेतु स्थानीय समिति का गठन होना चाहिये जो इसे उचित रूप से संचालित करवाने मे सहयोगी बने ,तथा यह समिति हमारी केन्द्रीय समिति के मार्ग दर्शन मे कार्य करे।
३. उपरोक्त सभी सुझाव के लिये प्रत्येक स्तर ( रिजर्व बॆंक,मंत्रालय आदि) पर प्रयास किये जाये।
४. मूल्यांकन कर्ता बिल को पास करने हेतु सरकार को पत्र लिखा जाये। संभव हो तो अन्य लोकतांत्रिक प्रयास भी किये जा सकते हे। @ आनन्द सक्सेना, अधिकृत मूल्य निर्धारक ( भूमि एवं भवन)
१. बॆंक द्वारा ली जाने वाली प्रत्येक मूल्यांकन रिपोर्ट्स की भी एक मूल्कांकन समिति द्वारा मासकि/त्रिमासिक अंकेषण (Audit) होनी चाहिये।( जॆसे सी ए द्वारा बॆंक की वार्षिक लेखा परीक्षा होती हे।) अगर ऎसा होता हॆ तो हमारे लिये यह एक ऒर आय का स्तोत्त होगा।
२. प्रत्येक बॆंक मे कार्य वितरण समान हो इस हेतु स्थानीय समिति का गठन होना चाहिये जो इसे उचित रूप से संचालित करवाने मे सहयोगी बने ,तथा यह समिति हमारी केन्द्रीय समिति के मार्ग दर्शन मे कार्य करे।
३. उपरोक्त सभी सुझाव के लिये प्रत्येक स्तर ( रिजर्व बॆंक,मंत्रालय आदि) पर प्रयास किये जाये।
४. मूल्यांकन कर्ता बिल को पास करने हेतु सरकार को पत्र लिखा जाये। संभव हो तो अन्य लोकतांत्रिक प्रयास भी किये जा सकते हे। :::::::::::::::::::;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;::::::;;;::: आनन्द सक्सेना, अधिकृत मूल्य निर्धारक ( भूमि एवं भवन)
Nice Write up — but where is a pragmatic Solutions & proposal how the Honest Valuers interest can be protected ???— Please suggest an user friendly road map for Reforms, else all are just a piece of well articulated write ups , with no end use— best of luck sir
Thank you for an incisive and timely article. You’ve articulated a paradox that I’ve noticed on the ground: mandating “independent” valuations while not respecting their independence effectively turns the valuation into a cosmetic checkbox rather than a risk-management tool.
A few practical points I’d like to add from experience:
• Valuation as paperwork: Many institutions now treat valuation reports primarily as documentation to satisfy loan-to-value rules, rather than as technical inputs informing credit decisions.
• Concentration and favoritism: A disproportionate amount of work is allocated to the same small pool of valuers. That creates perverse incentives — valuers feel pressure to produce “acceptable” numbers rather than objective assessments, since repeat business matters more than accuracy.
• Remote/outsider valuations: Valuers often work from 300–400 km away (or from other states) with limited ground knowledge. Property value depends on many local factors (accessibility, developer reputation, micro-market trends, upcoming infrastructure, local regulatory issues); generic, remote valuations miss these.
• Poor remuneration: Fees as low as ₹1,200–₹1,300 per valuation in some NBFC arrangements make it uneconomical for valuers to do robust site visits and thorough analysis, pushing them toward superficial, desk-based adjustments.
• Misaligned incentives: When banks overwrite or ignore technical reports to fit internal credit limits, the borrower unfairly pays for an appraisal that did not meaningfully inform the decision. Either banks should fully accept and respect independent valuations, or stop outsourcing the cost to borrowers.
Congratulations Sanjay,
I have read word to word this Article.
You have all the activities which are going in the Banks. The Bank officers dictates many Valuers to do Valuation of properties as fit to give Advance to Customer as per their wish. The Valuer also do the Valuation accordingly since Banks do not follow to give Valuation on Rotation Basis. When the Loan bacomes NPA, the burden comes on the Valuer in case the due amount is not recovered. The Bank depanenal the Valuer.
The Bank officers have no knowledge of Valuation Field.
You have recommended that before depanenaling the Valuation the case should be refferd to IBBI to investigate whether the Valuation done by Valuer is responsible or not.
I personally feel that IBBI should send the case to RVF for scrutiny and RVF should send the findings to IBBI.
Thanks
Valuer Guru Prasad Mathur
this is very useful post .
The concerned raised by author is really alarming and action in this regard has to be taken with you diligence. Bankers must be released from achieving unrealistic and unachievable business volumes. This will ease out the pressure from them and eventually it will also result into an interrupted and fair practice of independent valuers appointed by bankers. For economic strength and sustainable growth, transparency in operations is required and banks can’t compromise with it for short term gains.
I agree with the description written by mr Sanjay ji dungarwal with benefits of banker borrower and as well as valuer responsibility also
Transparency in banking is extremely required to maintain the faith and to avoid any financial downturn. All the valuation of property must be fair and without any influences or pressure. The problem addressed by the author here is really grave and alarming.
Bankers must not be forced to achieve any unrealistic or unachievable targets related to lending. This may ensure some ease of pressure and they may not direct valuers to inflate the valuation prices.
It is a good aricle written with appropriate examples. Presently one can get a loan of Rs 10 lakh easily from bank on property of manipulated worth of 30 lakhs . This an insightful and timely article that highlights a critical weakness in the current real estate valuation system. You convincingly explained how inconsistent and convenience-based appraisals could distort property markets, increase banking risks, and create opportunities for financial misconduct. The suggestions for greater transparency, independence, and regulatory oversight deserve serious consideration by policymakers, regulators, and financial institutions. A valuable contribution to the ongoing discussion on strengthening the integrity of India’s financial , real estate sectors and to prevent sanction of bad loans.
Congratulations for writing and publishing such good article.
Prof . P. C. Kanthaliya
Former Head and Chief Soil Scientist
It is a good aricle written with appropriate examples. Presently one can get a loan of Rs 10 lakh easily from bank on property of manipulated worth of 30 lakhs . This an insightful and timely article that highlights a critical weakness in the current real estate valuation system. You convincingly explained how inconsistent and convenience-based appraisals could distort property markets, increase banking risks, and create opportunities for financial misconduct. The suggestions for greater transparency, independence, and regulatory oversight deserve serious consideration by policymakers, regulators, and financial institutions.
Congratulations for writing and publishing such good article.
Pfof. P. C. Kanthaliya, Former Principal Soil Scientist
It is a good aricle written with appropriate examples. Presently one can get a loan of Rs 10 lakh easily from bank on property of manipulated worth of 30 lakhs . This an insightful and timely article that highlights a critical weakness in the current real estate valuation system. You convincingly explained how inconsistent and convenience-based appraisals could distort property markets, increase banking risks, and create opportunities for financial misconduct. The suggestions for greater transparency, independence, and regulatory oversight deserve serious consideration by policymakers, regulators, and financial institutions. A valuable contribution to the ongoing discussion on strengthening the integrity of India’s financial , real estate sectors and to prevent sanction of bad loans.
Congratulations for writing and publishing such good article.
Pfof. P. C. Kanthaliya, Former Principal Soil Scientist
A useful and overdue piece. The five-stage framing — empanelment, allocation, review, renewal, delisting — is the clearest statement I have read of why valuer independence is structurally fragile rather than occasionally compromised. Two observations deserve particular emphasis: that the punitive mechanism is invisible, so a valuer whose file flow attenuates after a conservative report has nothing in writing to appeal against; and that technical review of engineering content by officers holding no engineering or valuation qualification would not be tolerated in any other assurance function.
Three respectful qualifications, offered in support of the argument rather than against it.
A 30–60% haircut does not by itself establish over-valuation. Market Value and Forced Sale Value are distinct bases under IVS, and a discount between them is the definition doing its work. The sound objection is to values built from undocumented inputs — and that objection needs no haircut statistic.
An unexplained variance between registered consideration and assessed value is a duty to investigate, not proof of laundering. K.P. Varghese has held for four decades that a gap does not discharge the burden of establishing understatement. Framed as a supervisory gap, the point is actionable by a regulator; framed as an offence, it invites dismissal of the whole piece.
A full-time practice mandate would strip tier-3 and tier-4 districts of coverage and exclude practising engineers and architects who bring current field knowledge. CPD, periodic re-certification and mandatory peer review address competence without closing the profession.
One addition, and one concession. The strongest evidence for the author’s case sits in IBBI’s own orders: valuers are being suspended for failing to disclose comparables and rationale under Rule 8(3) — not for producing convenient numbers — while the institutional conduct that generated the pressure attracts no equivalent scrutiny. That asymmetry is documented and needs no hypotheticals.
Equally, it is a standard every one of us can meet on every file.
It is a good aricle written with appropriate examples. Presently one can get a loan of Rs 10 lakh easily from bank on property of manipulated worth of 30 lakhs . This an insightful and timely article that highlights a critical weakness in the current real estate valuation system. You convincingly explained how inconsistent and convenience-based appraisals could distort property markets, increase banking risks, and create opportunities for financial misconduct. The suggestions for greater transparency, independence, and regulatory oversight deserve serious consideration by policymakers, regulators, and financial institutions. A valuable contribution to the ongoing discussion on strengthening the integrity of India’s financial , real estate sectors and to prevent sanction of bad loans.
Congratulations for writing and publishing such good article.
Prof. P. C. Kanthaliya
Former Head (Department of Soil Science) and Chief Scientist
Maharana Pratap University of Agriculture and Technology, Udaipur, Rajasthan.
Very nice and informative article
Article is depicting long prevalent realities. Strict valuation standards and policies must be followed while making decisions of mortgage lending value irrespective of banker’s target to reduce the gap between original value and amount realised during recovery process.
Really well written and explained.