Prithviraj S. Singh Vs Secretary, School Education Department (Supreme Court of India)
Action Contrary to an Express Court Order Is a Nullity, Supreme Court Awards ₹10 Lakh Each for Wrongful Termination
Summary
The Supreme Court reaffirmed that an action or order wholly contrary to an express judicial order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction is a nullity. At the same time, it held that the Bombay High Court could not be faulted for failing to examine a ground that the employees had omitted from their writ petitions. Finding that the disciplinary charges lacked evidentiary support and that the final inquiry reports had never been furnished to the employees before termination, the Supreme Court exercised its power under Article 142 and awarded ₹10 lakh each as full and final compensation.
Ex Parte Inquiry and Termination of Two School Clerks
Prithviraj S. Singh, a senior clerk, and Shivadatta R. Singh, a head clerk, faced departmental proceedings along with the school’s in-charge headmaster on allegations of misappropriation of public money and allied misconduct. The school accepted the clerks’ objection to one member of the inquiry committee and replaced him. When their objection to the replacement was rejected, they stayed away from the inquiry. The committee proceeded ex parte, and the school ultimately terminated their services without furnishing the inquiry minutes or the final reports.
The clerks appealed to the School Tribunal, Mumbai, under Section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977. The Tribunal initially stayed the terminations. The school challenged the interim orders before the Bombay High Court, which substituted them with a consent order dated 17 March 2005. Among other things, the order gave the school liberty to apply to the Tribunal to lead evidence in support of the misconduct charges.
School Did Not Lead Evidence Before the Tribunal
The school did not apply to lead evidence, and the Tribunal did not require it to do so. The Tribunal nevertheless dismissed the appeals. It relied on the clerks’ deliberate absence from the inquiry and on material already on record, including service books showing stoppage of increments and cash-book entries reflecting delays in depositing money. It also recorded that the inquiry committee had returned no finding on the misappropriation charge because criminal proceedings were pending.
The Supreme Court found that the material before the Tribunal was insufficient to establish the charges. It also treated the failure to furnish the final inquiry reports before termination as a serious flaw in the disciplinary process. The clerks’ absence explained why the inquiry proceeded ex parte. The school still had to substantiate the charges, and the Tribunal had to examine whether the available material did so.
The Writ Petitions Missed the Strongest Ground
Before the Bombay High Court, the clerks principally sought parity with the in-charge headmaster, whose termination the Tribunal had converted into compulsory retirement. The High Court rejected that claim because the headmaster had served for about three and a half decades and was nearing retirement, whereas the clerks had served for only a few years when the alleged misconduct occurred.
Although the writ petitions sought quashing of the Tribunal’s orders and the disciplinary proceedings, they did not specifically plead the effect of the consent order, the school’s failure to lead evidence, or the Tribunal’s failure to consider what that omission meant for the terminations. The Supreme Court held that the arguments advanced before it on those issues went beyond the pleadings. A prayer to quash an order must be supported by the material facts and grounds on which the challenge rests.
Supreme Court Grants Compensation Under Article 142
The Supreme Court relied on Ram Saran Varshney v. State of U.P., (2016) 3 SCC 724, for the principle that an action wholly contrary to an express judicial order is a nullity. In that earlier case, an investigation proceeded despite a subsisting stay, and the resulting closure report was treated as a nullity. In the present case, the Court considered the effect of the consent order, the absence of sufficient evidence before the Tribunal and the failure to furnish the final inquiry reports.
By the time the appeals were decided, Prithviraj S. Singh had died. The Court directed the school to pay ₹10 lakh to his heirs or legal representatives and ₹10 lakh to Shivadatta R. Singh, in full and final settlement of their dues. Payment was to be made within three months of receipt of the order from the respective claimants or authorised representative, with interest at 12% per annum in case of default until payment.
Author’s Comments
The judgment carries a practical lesson for tax writ petitions. Where an assessment or adjudication order is challenged for disregarding an earlier stay, remand or binding direction, the petition should identify the precise operative direction, show how the authority departed from it and connect that departure to the relief sought. Where the earlier order granted liberty to take a particular step, the pleading should explain why the failure to take that step matters on the facts. Here, the school’s failure to use the opportunity to lead evidence mattered because the material already before the Tribunal was insufficient to establish the charges.
The Supreme Court itself observed that properly drafted petitions and arguments on the right points could have secured larger relief. The compensation ultimately granted flowed from the Supreme Court’s power under Article 142. For a litigant approaching the High Court under Article 226, the strongest ground belongs in the petition itself.
Cases Discussed
- Ram Saran Varshney v. State of U.P. — (2016) 3 SCC 724 — Cited for nullity of action contrary to an express judicial order.
- Adarsh Vidya Mandir Trust v. Awadesh Narayan Komal Singh — 2005 (1) Bom. C.R. 786 — Cited in the High Court consent order regarding permission to lead evidence before the School Tribunal.
- Ranjan Kumar Mitra v. Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. & Ors. — (1997) 10 SCC 386 — Relied upon by the School Tribunal in rejecting the employees’ challenge.
FULL TEXT OF THE JUDGMENT/ORDER OF SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
1. The present case illustrates how a meritorious cause was allowed to fail by reason of inept drafting of a writ petition, the substance having been eclipsed by form.
2. Appellant—Prithviraj S. Singh1 was a senior clerk, and appellant —Shivadatta R. Singh2 was a head clerk in the respondent no. 73. Both, along with the in-charge headmaster—Kamalkant S. Mishra of the school, were proceeded against departmentally for misappropriation of public money and allied charges. The school constituted an inquiry committee4 in terms of the provisions contained in the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 19815 [framed under the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 19776]. An objection was raised by the appellants to the inclusion of a member of the committee, namely Umesh Pratap Singh. Accepting such an objection, a new member, namely Chandra Kumar Singh, was inducted into the committee. Still, not satisfied, an exception was again taken to the inclusion of the new member. On this occasion, the objection bore no fruit and was rejected. As a mark of protest, the appellants abstained from attending the inquiry, resulting in the inquiry proceeding ex parte. Reports of inquiry dated 13th November 2004 (in respect of Prithviraj S. Singh) and 11th November 2004 (in respect of Shivadatta R. Singh) were prepared by the committee holding that the charges against the appellants stood established. Neither the minutes of proceedings of inquiry nor the final inquiry reports were furnished to the appellants. In due course, the appellants were removed (terminated) from service.
3. Termination of the appellants’ services triggered litigation at their end. The orders of termination were carried in appeals7 before the School Tribunal, Mumbai8, under Section 9 of the Act. Reinstatement in service upon quashing of the disciplinary proceedings, including the inquiry reports and the final orders of penalty, was sought by the appellants. Vide interim orders dated 10th March, 2005, the tribunal stayed the operation of the termination orders till disposal of the appeals and directed the school to allow the appellants to resume their service and pay 50% of their salary.
4. Aggrieved by the interim orders, the school invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay9 by presenting petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution10. With the consent of the parties, the petitions were disposed of by a Single Judge on 17th March, 2005. The brief consent order reads as follows:
At the stage of mentioning, the matter has been taken up on Board for admission by consent. Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners and for the First Respondent- employee are agreed that the following order may be passed by consent in substitution of the impugned order dated 10th March, 2005 of the Presiding Officer of the School Tribunal without any further reason being recorded:
(1) The First Respondent shall, without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties be paid an amount equivalent to the subsistence allowance in accordance with law, during the pendency of the appeal before the School Tribunal.
(2) In view of the judgment of a Learned Single Judge of this Court in Adarsh Vidya Mandir Trust vs. Awadesh Narayan Komal Singh, 2005(1) Bom. C.R. 786, it would be open to the Petitioners to apply before the School Tribunal for leading evidence to substantiate the charge of misconduct against the First Respondent. In the event that such an application is made, the School Tribunal shall deal with such application in accordance with law.
(3) The School Tribunal shall expedite the disposal of the main appeal and endeavour to do so on or before 31st July, 2005.
(4) In view of the aforesaid arrangement, the impugned order dated 10th March, 2005 is quashed and set aside.
(5) This order shall not be construed as amounting to any expression of opinion by the Court on the merits of the case and all the rights and contentions of the parties are kept open to be urged in appeal.
Both the Petitions are disposed of in the aforesaid terms. There shall be no order as to costs.
5. Despite the liberty granted to the school to file an application seeking permission to lead evidence in support of the charges, it chose not to do so. Curiously, the tribunal, too, did not insist upon the school leading evidence. Instead, based on whatever material was on record, the tribunal dismissed the appeals vide separate final orders dated 19th July, 2006 observing similarly that since the appellants had deliberately avoided participating in the inquiry proceedings and failed to nominate their nominee(s) on the committee, they could neither assail the termination on merits in view of the decision of this Court in Ranjan Kumar Mitra vs. Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. & Ors.11 nor complain of non-supply of documents under Rule 37(2)(a)(iii) of the Rules as the documents relied upon were school registers and receipt books of which they could have taken extracts had they participated. Also, it was observed that although the committee had not recorded any finding on the charge of misappropriation as the criminal proceeding was pending before the Metropolitan Magistrate and the school had not led the evidence of any witness, there was sufficient documentary evidence in the form of service books of six employees (showing stoppage of annual increments for the academic years 2002-03 and 2003-04) and cash book register entries (showing failure to deposit received money in the bank account immediately or within the prescribed time limit) to hold the appellants disentitled to any relief.
6. Crestfallen, the appellants then invoked the High Court’s extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution12. The prayer clauses of Writ Petition No. 2506 of 2006 read:
(a) That a Writ of Certiorari, Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction be issued calling for the records and proceedings of Appeal No. 1 of 2005 from the file of Ld. School Tribunal, Mumbai, and after examining the proprieties and legalities of the impugned Judgment and order dated 19.7.2006, be pleased to quash and set aside the same;
(b) That a Writ of Certiorari, Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction be issued calling for the records and proceedings of the so-called Enquiry Proceedings, and after examining the proprieties and legalities of the same, be pleased to quash and set aside the same;
(c) That a Writ of Certiorari, Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate Writ, order or direction be issued directing the Respondents jointly and severally to reinstate the Petitioner as Senior Clerk in Respondent No. 7 School with all the consequential benefits such as full back wages till the date of reinstatement;
(d) That a Writ of Certiorari, Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate Writ, Order or direction be issued directing the Respondents jointly and severally to extend all the consequential benefits to Petitioner which are available to a permanent employee as if the Petitioner’s services were not terminated;
(e) That pending the hearing and final disposal of the Petition, the Respondent Nos. 6&7, be ordered and directed to deposit the amount of Rs. 1,45,086.00 as per the High Court Orders, in this Hon’ble Court and the Petitioner be granted liberty to withdraw the aforesaid amount on the terms and conditions which may be specified by this Hon’ble High Court;
(f) That pending the hearing and final disposal of the Petition, the [sic, Respondents] jointly and severally be ordered and directed to allow the Petitioner to resume his duties as Senior Clerk in Respondent No. 7 School with a further direction to allow him to work and to pay regular monthly salaries;
(g) That ad-interim reliefs in terms of prayer (e) & (f) be granted;
(h) Cost of the Petition be kindly provided;
(i) Any other just and further relief, which this Hon’ble High Court, may deem fit to grant in the interest of justice.
7. Inexplicably, the appellants in their respective writ petitions neither alleged brazen violation of the consent order dated 17th March, 2005 of the High Court by the school in not leading evidence to support the charges of misappropriation and allied charges nor challenged the tribunal’s omission to consider, sans the evidence, that the earlier order of penalty of termination was unsustainable in law and hence of no effect. The principal foundation on which the writ petitions rested was this: the in-charge headmaster, who was proceeded against departmentally along with the appellants, had been similarly terminated from service and, having challenged such order, the tribunal converted the penalty of termination to compulsory retirement. Appellants, accordingly, claimed similar treatment.
8. The outcome of the appellants’ writ petitions, in the circumstances, was quite obvious. By a detailed common judgment and order dated 17th June, 201613, a Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the appellants’ writ petitions, holding, inter alia, that the in-charge headmaster and the appellants did not stand on the same footing. The in-charge headmaster was dealt with a bit leniently by the tribunal on account of his impending retirement after having served the school for about three and a half decades, whereas the appellants had completed only a few years by the time they committed the alleged misconduct.
9. We have heard Mr. B.H. Marlapalle, learned senior counsel for the appellants and Mr. Sudhanshu S. Choudhari, learned senior counsel for the school. Perusing the case pleaded in the writ petitions presented by the appellants before the High Court, and as rightly pointed out by Mr. Choudhary, the entire part of Mr. Marlapalle’s arguments touching upon the merits of the separate orders dated 19th July, 2006 of the tribunal dismissing the appellants’ appeals, is found to be beyond the pleadings. A party is under obligation to plead its case by making the requisite averments/assertions in support of the relief that it claims, whereas a court is under no obligation to entertain a plea if the same is not supported by the necessary averments/assertions in the petition. In light thereof, no exception to the impugned judgment can be taken by the appellants to the effect that the Single Judge did not deal with the aspect of the school’s omission/neglect in leading evidence before the tribunal to establish the charges afresh, as well as the tribunal’s failure to return findings against the school for such omission/neglect. We could have, thus, upheld the impugned judgment and dismissed the appeal by a short order.
10. However, what has engaged our attention and is a matter of serious concern is the circumstance arising from the High Court’s consent order dated 17th March, 2005. Why the terms thereof were not adhered to and/or complied with by the school is not forthcoming since Mr. Choudhary, in his usual fairness, did not seek to justify such omission.
11. What, therefore, emerges is that there was no evidence worth the name before the tribunal resting whereon the charges against the appellants could be held ‘established’. That apart, despite the appellants not having been furnished the final inquiry reports by the school prior to their services being terminated, which constituted a serious flaw in the process of taking disciplinary action against them, the tribunal proceeded to hold that there was no infirmity in the proceedings. Though law is well-settled that a high court cannot grant any relief under Article 226 to a litigant who has approached it without pleading an appropriate case for relief, this is a fit case where the appellants deserve to be granted some relief based on the principle that an action/order which is wholly contrary to an express judicial order passed in exercise of competent jurisdiction is a nullity and cannot be accepted14.
12. Appellant—Prithviraj S. Singh—is no more, while the appellant— Shivadatta R. Singh—is stated to be surviving. Ex debito justitiae, the appellants would have been entitled to larger relief if only their writ petitions had been appropriately drafted and the right points had been argued. Since that stage has passed, we exercise our power under Article 142 of the Constitution and direct the school to pay to each of the appellants Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees ten lakh) only as lump sum compensation for wrongful termination of their services within three months from the date of receipt of this order from the heirs/legal representatives of late Prithviraj S. Singh and from Shivadatta R. Singh or his authorised representative. Such payment of compensation shall be treated as full and final settlement of all the dues of the appellants and no further claim shall be entertainable in this behalf. In default of payment within three months, as aforesaid, the school shall be liable to pay interest at 12% per annum on such sum until payment is actually released.
13. The appeals are disposed of on the above terms.
14. Connected applications, if pending, shall also stand disposed of.
Notes:
1 in C.A. No. 10193 of 2016
2 in the connected C.A. No. 10194 of 2016
3 school (run by the respondent no. 4—trust)
4 committee
5 the Rules
6 the Act
7 Appeal Nos. MUM/1/2005 and MUM/2/2005 by Prithviraj S. Singh and Shivadatta R. Singh, respectively
8 tribunal
9 High Court
10 Writ Petition (Lodg.) Nos. 774 of 2005 and No. 776 of 2005 against Prithviraj S. Singh and Shivadatta R. Singh, respectively
11 (1997) 10 SCC 386
12 Writ Petition Nos. 2506 of 2006 and 2507 of 2006 filed by Prithviraj S. Singh and Shivadatta R. Singh, respectively
13 impugned judgment
14 See: Ram Saran Varshney v. State of U.P., (2016) 3 SCC 724




