- Introduction
- Part I — Section 52 as it applies in Gujarat
- Part II — The auction sale and the moment of vesting
- Part III — A notice registered after the sale cannot reach back
- Part IV — A lis pendens is not an injunction
- Part V — Is the borrower’s application against the purchaser maintainable?
- Part VI — Can the purchaser have the notice cancelled by a writ?
- Part VII — Where the auction purchaser is genuinely exposed
- What is to be done
- Final Conclusion
Introduction
The doctrine of lis pendens is usually discussed as a shield for a litigant. A party who has sued for a property should not find, at the end of the suit, that the property has been sold to a stranger who claims to take free of the litigation. That is a sound principle, and nothing in this article questions it. But in SARFAESI matters the doctrine is increasingly used for a different purpose. A borrower whose right of redemption has gone, who has obtained no stay and who has not pressed the hearing of his own application, registers a notice of lis pendens long after the sale, and then relies on that notice to say that the auction purchaser cannot deal with the property. The notice is used, in effect, as a substitute for the injunction that the borrower never obtained.
The law in Gujarat is in some ways more favourable to the auction purchaser in this situation than the law elsewhere, because Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act has been amended in its application to the State. In other ways it is less favourable, because the Gujarat High Court has consistently treated a registered notice of lis pendens as the entitlement of the litigant, to the point of directing revenue authorities to enter it in the record of rights without any order of a court. Both lines of authority have to be read together.
The author’s own view is that the auction purchaser who has paid the full price and holds a registered sale certificate stands on firm ground, and that a notice registered after the sale cannot, on the Gujarat text of Section 52, reach back and affect that purchase. The argument of this article is, however, deliberately limited. The notice does not become meaningless, a writ petition to cancel it is rarely the right remedy, and the purchaser remains exposed on one question that the notice does not touch at all: whether the bank complied with the sale-notice rules.
Part I — Section 52 as it applies in Gujarat
In its original form, Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provides that during the pendency of a suit or proceeding which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party so as to affect the rights of any other party under any decree or order which may be made in it, except under the authority of the court and on such terms as it may impose. No registration is required. The doctrine operates from the institution of the suit.
In the area that became the State of Gujarat, the section was amended by the Transfer of Property and the Indian Registration (Bombay Amendment) Act, 1939, which continues to apply in the State. The amended sub-section (1) makes the doctrine conditional: it applies only “if a notice of the pendency of such suit or proceeding is registered under section 18 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908”, and the bar operates on the property “after the notice is so registered”. Sub-section (2) prescribes what the notice must contain: the name and address of the owner of the property or other person whose right is in question, a description of the property, the court in which the matter is pending, the nature and title of the suit or proceeding, and the date of its institution. The same Act inserted clause (ee) in Section 18 of the Registration Act, making such notices optionally registrable documents.
Two features of the amended text are important for what follows. The first is that the operation of the doctrine in Gujarat is prospective from the date of registration; the words “after the notice is so registered” are not found in the original section. The second is that the amended section retains the closing words “except under the authority of the Court and on such terms as it may impose”. The court in which the proceeding is pending therefore keeps the power to permit a dealing with the property, on terms, notwithstanding the registered notice.
The Gujarat High Court explained the purpose of the amendment in Dipakbhai Manilal Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2007 (2) GLR 1297. Under the amended section, the principles of lis pendens apply to a transaction entered into after the institution of a suit only if the notice is registered with the prescribed particulars. The purpose of registration is to put a person who is interested in purchasing the property, and who searches the title at the Sub-Registrar’s office, on notice of the pending litigation, so that he cannot later plead ignorance of it. The same reasoning was applied by the High Court in L.R. of Nathabhai Kuberbhai Valand v. Special Secretary, Revenue Department, Special Civil Application No. 16135 of 2017, decided on 07.09.2017, and in Amad Noormamad Madakia v. Ghanchi Ismail Hasan Madakia, Special Civil Application No. 9767 of 2008, decided on 10.10.2023, where the High Court considered the Gujarat amendment after the matter had been remitted to it for that purpose.
Two further points must be added for completeness. The first is that registration of the notice does not require the leave of the court or any interim order. The notice is signed and presented by the party. A borrower who has obtained no stay from the Tribunal is, for that reason alone, not disentitled from registering it. The second is that the Supreme Court, considering the identical Maharashtra amendment in Celir LLP v. Sumati Prasad Bafna, 2024 INSC 978 (paras 171 to 176), held that the absence of a registered notice does not make the doctrine ipso facto inapplicable, and that whether it should be applied to an unregistered pendency is a matter for the court’s discretion on the facts. That decision tempers the strict reading of the amended text. It does not, however, address the different question considered in Part III: whether a notice registered after a transfer has been completed can affect that transfer.
Part II — The auction sale and the moment of vesting
Before the effect of the notice can be considered, it is necessary to identify exactly when the auction purchaser’s rights arose. Under Rule 9 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, the highest bidder pays twenty-five per cent of the price on the acceptance of the bid and the balance within the time allowed; on payment, the authorised officer issues a sale certificate under Rule 9(6) and delivers the property. Section 13(6) of the SARFAESI Act then provides that any transfer of the secured asset after taking possession vests in the transferee all rights in, or in relation to, the secured asset as if the transfer had been made by the owner. The sale certificate is the document of title (B. Arvind Kumar v. Government of India, (2007) 5 SCC 745).
The borrower’s right to stop the sale is governed by Section 13(8). As substituted with effect from 1 September 2016, it permits the borrower to tender the dues, with all costs and charges, at any time “before the date of publication of notice for public auction”. The Supreme Court held in Celir LLP v. Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Pvt. Ltd., (2024) 2 SCC 1, that the borrower’s right of redemption stands extinguished on the date of publication of the auction notice, and that courts should not lightly unsettle a confirmed SARFAESI sale. In M. Rajendran v. KPK Oils and Proteins India Pvt. Ltd., 2025 INSC 1144, the Court applied that principle in favour of auction purchasers who had paid the full price and obtained a sale certificate, holding that they had acquired a vested right which the borrower could not defeat by later payments, and rejecting the argument that the borrower’s loan pre-dated the 2016 amendment. See also Shakeena v. Bank of India, (2021) 12 SCC 761.
For the auction purchaser, therefore, the critical dates are the dates of full payment and of the sale certificate. Once those are complete, the purchaser holds a vested title. In Gujarat that title is usually reflected soon afterwards in the record of rights, when a mutation entry is made on the strength of the registered sale certificate. Where the borrower objects to the mutation and the objection is rejected by the revenue authorities in a disputed case, that order adds a further layer of finality on the revenue side. It does not decide title, but it records that the State’s own record has accepted the purchaser as holder.
Part III — A notice registered after the sale cannot reach back
The central question for the auction purchaser is whether a notice of lis pendens registered after the sale was completed can affect that sale. On the Gujarat text of Section 52, the answer in the author’s view is that it cannot. The bar operates on the property “after the notice is so registered”. A transaction completed before the notice existed is not a transaction entered into after registration. Dipakbhai and the decisions that follow it say in terms that the doctrine applies to such transactions “only if” the notice is registered. Nothing in the amended section suggests that registration relates back to the institution of the proceeding.
The purpose of the amendment, as the High Court has explained it, points the same way. The notice is meant to warn a prospective purchaser searching the title. An auction purchaser who has already bought, paid and registered is not a prospective purchaser. There was nothing for the notice to warn him of, because it did not exist when he bought. To treat the later notice as affecting the earlier purchase would turn a device of notice into a device of retrospective encumbrance, which is not what the amendment says or intends.
Two independent considerations support the same conclusion. First, the sale is made by the secured creditor in enforcement of a mortgage that pre-dates the borrower’s application. In Danesh Singh v. Har Pyari, 2025 INSC 1434 (paras 64 and 67), the Supreme Court held that a purchaser from a mortgagor takes the property subject to the rights of the mortgagee. A borrower cannot use the pendency of his own challenge to defeat a sale made in enforcement of a prior security interest, at a time when no restraint operated. Secondly, the pendency of a Securitisation Application is not a stay. The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned against treating it as one (United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110). A bank that sells while no order restrains it, and a purchaser who buys in that sale, act lawfully.
It must be acknowledged that Celir LLP v. Sumati Prasad Bafna (2024) gives the court a discretion to apply the doctrine even where no notice was registered. A borrower may therefore argue that the purchase, made during the pendency of the application, should be treated as a pendente lite transfer whatever the date of the notice. That argument has two difficulties. The first is that the transfer in question was not made by the borrower or by a stranger acting in collusion with him; it was made by the secured creditor in the exercise of a statutory power, and Section 52 has never been understood to prevent a mortgagee from enforcing a pre-existing mortgage. The second is that, even in Celir, the Supreme Court recognised the protection that the law gives to a bona fide auction purchaser where the sale was made when no restraint operated (para 220, applying Janak Raj v. Gurdial Singh, AIR 1967 SC 608). The discretion is real, but it is unlikely to be exercised against a purchaser who bought in a public auction advertised in the newspapers, with no connection to either party.
The position is different for a transfer by the auction purchaser after the notice is registered. The purchaser is ordinarily impleaded as a party to the Securitisation Application once the borrower amends it to challenge the auction. A transfer by a party after the notice is registered falls squarely within the amended Section 52. The notice therefore does not touch the purchaser’s own title, but it may affect a buyer from him. That distinction is the key to everything that follows.
Part IV — A lis pendens is not an injunction
The borrower’s application to restrain the auction purchaser usually rests on the registered notice. It is therefore necessary to be precise about what the notice does. It does not make a transfer void. The settled position is that a transfer made during the pendency of a suit is valid between the transferor and the transferee, but subject to the result of the litigation (Thomson Press (India) Ltd. v. Nanak Builders & Investors (P) Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC 397; Celir LLP v. Sumati Prasad Bafna, 2024 INSC 978, paras 177 and 178). Nor does the notice prevent registration. In Heerabhai Govabhai Parmar v. State of Gujarat, Special Criminal Application No. 3801 of 2013, decided on 29.10.2021, the Gujarat High Court quashed a prosecution of a Sub-Registrar who had registered a sale deed despite a registered notice of lis pendens and a pending suit, holding that he was bound to follow the procedure of the Registration Act and that the transfer remained valid subject to the outcome of the suit.
It follows that a borrower who produces a registered notice has not thereby made out a case for an injunction. An order restraining a party from dealing with property is an order under the general law of interim relief, and the applicant must establish a prima facie case, the balance of convenience and irreparable injury. The registered notice proves none of these. If anything, it cuts against irreparable injury, because the borrower’s own case is that any buyer from the purchaser will be bound by the outcome. A borrower cannot at the same time say that a transfer will be subject to the result of his application and that a transfer will cause him loss that cannot be undone.
The Gujarat High Court’s decisions on revenue entries should be read with this in mind. In Dadabhai Abhalbhai Lalu v. State of Gujarat, Special Civil Application No. 16223 of 2017, decided on 05.09.2017, Jitendrakumar Ishwarlal Desai v. State of Gujarat, Special Civil Application No. 10279 of 2026, decided on 28.07.2026, and Umarbhai Allarakhabhai Khafi v. State of Gujarat, Special Civil Application No. 2979 of 2026, decided on 07.05.2026, the High Court directed Mamlatdars to enter registered notices of lis pendens in the record of rights without insisting on an order of a court, notwithstanding a Government circular of 2022 to the contrary. Those decisions confirm that a borrower may have the notice reflected in the 7/12. But the same decisions make clear that the entry creates no additional right in favour of the party registering it, and that it must be made only after notice to the affected party under the Land Revenue Code. An auction purchaser who is the recorded holder is entitled to that notice, and should appear and object.
Part V — Is the borrower’s application against the purchaser maintainable?
Before the merits of the borrower’s application are reached, there is a prior question that is often overlooked. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act is to examine whether the measures taken by the secured creditor under Section 13(4) are in accordance with the Act and the Rules, and, if they are not, to grant the reliefs set out in Section 17(3). The dealings of an auction purchaser with property that has vested in him under Section 13(6) are not measures of the secured creditor. An application that seeks to restrain the purchaser from selling his own property, rather than to restrain the bank from taking a measure, falls outside the subject matter of the Section 17 proceeding.
The point is reinforced by a basic rule of interim relief: an interim order can only be granted in aid of the final relief claimed (State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12). A Securitisation Application, even when amended to challenge the auction, typically seeks the setting aside of the sale and restoration of possession. It does not seek a permanent injunction against the purchaser’s dealings with the property. An interim restraint on those dealings “till the final disposal” of the application is therefore not an order in aid of any final relief the Tribunal could grant.
The borrower’s conduct is relevant at this stage as well. The order-sheets of the Tribunal are frequently the most valuable document for the auction purchaser. They will often show that the borrower never pressed his prayer for interim relief, that he sought adjournments, that he was absent on dates of hearing, and occasionally that he declined to argue interim relief when the Tribunal was ready to hear it and the bank was about to take possession. An applicant who has consciously allowed the auction to proceed without seeking any restraint is in a weak position to seek, years later, a restraint against the purchaser.
The Supreme Court’s decision in G. Vikram Kumar v. State Bank of Hyderabad, 2023 INSC 475, is instructive here, though its facts must be stated accurately. In that case the borrower’s challenge was pending before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, which had rejected the borrower’s application for stay. The bank then auctioned the property. A third person, who had entered into an agreement with the borrower with knowledge of the pending proceedings, obtained relief from the High Court against the auction. The Supreme Court set that relief aside. It held that the statutory remedy lay under Section 17, that a person who dealt with the property with knowledge of the pending proceedings could not be permitted to benefit from his own wrong, and that the borrower had neither invoked Section 13(8) nor offered to clear the dues (paras 8 to 8.5). The principle that emerges is that relief which a party has not obtained in the statutory proceeding cannot be obtained indirectly by another route. A notice of lis pendens registered after the sale, followed by an application to restrain the purchaser, is precisely such another route.
Part VI — Can the purchaser have the notice cancelled by a writ?
An auction purchaser who wishes to sell will naturally ask whether the notice can simply be removed. The registered notice will appear in any title search, and a buyer’s advocate will flag it. The question is whether a writ petition under Article 226 lies to quash its registration.
In principle such a writ is not barred. It would be directed against the Sub-Registrar, whose act of registration is the act of a statutory authority. The Bombay High Court has quashed registrations of notices of lis pendens where Section 52 had no application at all, because the proceeding concerned only a money claim and no right to immovable property was in question (Gorakh Ramchandra Mali v. State of Maharashtra, 2014 (7) ALL MR 663; Vardhaman Enterprises v. State of Maharashtra, Writ Petition (L) No. 20203 of 2023, decided on 12.04.2024). In those cases the registration was held to be without jurisdiction, and the alternative remedy under the Registration Act did not bar the writ.
Those decisions, however, will rarely help an auction purchaser. Once the borrower has amended his application to seek the setting aside of the sale and restoration of possession, a right to the very property is directly and specifically in question, and the registration is within jurisdiction. A registering officer has no power to cancel a document once registered (Satya Pal Anand v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2016) 10 SCC 767), so the High Court would have to quash the registration itself, which it does only on a clear finding of nullity. The only jurisdictional argument left to the purchaser is that the Debts Recovery Tribunal is not a “Court” within Section 52. The Supreme Court has held, for certain purposes, that the Tribunal is not a civil court (Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. v. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, (2009) 8 SCC 646). But the argument is untested in this context, and it sits uncomfortably with the purchaser’s own stand that the Tribunal is the proper forum to decide the challenge to the auction.
There is also the question of alternative remedy. The amended Section 52 itself gives the court in which the proceeding is pending the power to authorise a dealing with the property on terms. The Tribunal is seized of the matter, and its orders are appealable to the Appellate Tribunal. The Supreme Court has repeatedly discouraged High Courts from entertaining writ petitions in SARFAESI matters where the statutory remedy is available, subject to the recognised exceptions (PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank, (2024) 6 SCC 579). And the Gujarat High Court’s consistent approach, as Part IV shows, has been to treat a registered notice of lis pendens as the litigant’s entitlement. A writ petition seeking cancellation is therefore likely to be met with a direction to approach the Tribunal, and a dismissal would be used against the purchaser in the Tribunal itself.
A writ will be appropriate in narrower situations: if a Sub-Registrar refuses to register a document of the purchaser because of the notice, if a Mamlatdar refuses to mutate the purchaser’s name on the strength of a registered sale certificate, or if the Securitisation Application remains pending for years without an effective hearing, in which case the High Court can be asked to direct its disposal within a time frame.
Part VII — Where the auction purchaser is genuinely exposed
It would be incomplete, and unfair to the reader, to suggest that the auction purchaser’s position is unassailable. The notice of lis pendens is not the real risk. The real risk lies in the borrower’s challenge to the sale itself, and in particular to the sale notice.
Rule 8(6) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules requires a notice of thirty days to the borrower before the sale, and Rule 9(1) requires that no sale be completed before thirty days from the publication of the notice, reduced to fifteen days for a subsequent sale after an earlier auction has failed. The Supreme Court treated compliance with the notice period as mandatory in Mathew Varghese v. M. Amritha Kumar, (2014) 5 SCC 610. That decision was rendered under the unamended Section 13(8), and its reasoning, which was closely linked to the borrower’s right of redemption up to the date of sale, has to be read in the light of the 2016 amendment and Celir. But a Tribunal that finds that the sale notice was published or served only days before the auction may still hold that the sale was not conducted in accordance with the Rules.
Even then, setting aside a completed sale is not automatic. A sale in a duly advertised public auction may be set aside only for fraud, collusion or a material irregularity that has caused prejudice (K. Kumara Gupta v. Sri Markendaya and Sri Omkareswara Swamy Temple, (2022) 5 SCC 710). A borrower who never offered to pay the dues, before or after the sale, will find it difficult to show prejudice from the shortness of notice (ITC Ltd. v. Blue Coast Hotels Ltd., (2018) 15 SCC 99). And any order restoring the property to the borrower would ordinarily be conditional on the bank’s dues being paid and the purchaser being refunded. The auction purchaser should nevertheless understand that this is the issue on which the case will finally turn, and that it depends on the bank’s record of compliance rather than on anything the purchaser did.
Practitioners should also be cautious about one argument that auction purchasers sometimes take: that the Securitisation Application itself was barred by limitation because it was filed more than forty-five days after the measure. Where the measure was taken during 2020 or 2021, the period may fall within the exclusion of limitation ordered by the Supreme Court during the pandemic, which excluded the period from 15 March 2020 to 28 February 2022. A plea of limitation that ignores the exclusion costs credibility and adds nothing.
What is to be done
For the auction purchaser, the first step is to assemble the documents that establish the chronology: the proof of payment, the registered sale certificate, the possession receipt, the mutation entry and any order of the revenue authorities rejecting objections to it, the current record of rights, and the date of registration of the borrower’s notice. The second step is to obtain certified copies of the Tribunal’s order-sheets, because they usually show whether the borrower ever sought or obtained interim relief. The reply to the borrower’s application should lead with maintainability and chronology: the application is outside Section 17, the notice was registered after the sale and cannot operate retrospectively, a notice is not an injunction, and the borrower cannot obtain indirectly what he never obtained directly. If the purchaser wishes to deal with the property, the correct course is an application to the Tribunal under the amended Section 52(1) for authority to do so on terms, together with a request for an early final hearing, rather than a writ petition. If the borrower applies to the Mamlatdar for an entry of the notice, the purchaser should appear and object.
For the borrower, the lesson is that the registered notice is a protection, not a weapon. It ensures that a buyer from the purchaser cannot claim ignorance of the pending application. It does not substitute for the interim relief that the borrower did not seek in time, and it will not carry an injunction against the purchaser on its own. A borrower who wishes to protect the property must seek interim relief when the measure is taken, press the hearing of his application, and, if he wishes to redeem, tender the dues before the sale notice is published.
For the bank, the lesson is that the auction purchaser’s position in litigation is only as strong as the bank’s record of compliance with Rules 8 and 9. The sale notice, its publication in two newspapers, its service on the borrower and its affixation on the property should be documented and preserved, and the dates should be checked against the thirty-day and fifteen-day requirements before the auction is held, not after it is challenged.
For the practitioner on either side, the useful discipline is to keep the questions separate. Whether the notice was validly registered, whether it can affect a transfer completed before it, whether it supports an injunction, whether the application seeking the injunction is maintainable, and whether the sale itself complied with the Rules are five different questions, and the evidence on each is different.
Final Conclusion
The discussion can be drawn together in a few propositions. First, in Gujarat, Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act operates only upon registration of a notice under Section 18(ee) of the Registration Act, and its bar applies to dealings with the property “after the notice is so registered”. Celir LLP v. Sumati Prasad Bafna (2024) gives the court a discretion where no notice is registered, but it does not convert a notice registered after a completed transfer into one that reaches back to that transfer.
Second, the auction purchaser’s title vests on payment of the full price and issue of the sale certificate under Rule 9(6), by force of Section 13(6) of the SARFAESI Act. The borrower’s right of redemption ends on publication of the sale notice under the amended Section 13(8). A notice of lis pendens registered by the borrower after these events cannot affect the purchase, which was made by a secured creditor enforcing a prior mortgage at a time when no court or Tribunal had restrained the sale.
Third, a registered notice of lis pendens is not an injunction. It does not make a later transfer void and does not prevent its registration; it only makes the transferee subject to the outcome of the pending proceeding. It cannot, by itself, support an order restraining the auction purchaser from dealing with the property, and a borrower who seeks such an order must still satisfy the settled tests of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury.
Fourth, an application in a Section 17 proceeding to restrain the auction purchaser from selling his own property is open to a serious objection on maintainability. It is not directed at a measure of the secured creditor, and it does not operate in aid of any final relief the Tribunal can grant. The borrower’s conduct, including failure to press interim relief at the time of the auction and years of non-prosecution, weighs heavily against such relief, and G. Vikram Kumar forbids obtaining indirectly what was not obtained in the statutory proceeding.
Fifth, a writ petition to cancel the registered notice will rarely succeed once the borrower has challenged the auction, because a right to the property is then directly in question. The correct course for a purchaser who wishes to sell is an application to the Tribunal under the amended Section 52(1) for authority to deal with the property on terms, coupled with a request for an early final hearing. Revenue entries of the notice may be made under the Gujarat High Court’s decisions, but only after notice to the recorded holder, who should appear and object.
Sixth, and finally, the auction purchaser’s real exposure lies not in the notice but in the borrower’s challenge to the sale itself, particularly on compliance with the notice periods under Rules 8(6) and 9(1). Even there, a completed sale in a duly advertised public auction will not be set aside without fraud, collusion or a material irregularity causing prejudice, and any restoration will ordinarily be conditional on the dues being paid and the purchaser being refunded.
The Gujarat amendment to Section 52 was designed to protect purchasers by giving them a public record to search. It is ironic that it is now invoked, in SARFAESI matters, against a purchaser who bought in a public auction, paid the full price and registered his title long before any notice existed. The law, read as it is written, does not support that use. A notice registered after the sale cannot reach back to it, and a notice of lis pendens has never been an injunction. The borrower who wished to stop the sale had his remedy in Section 13(8) and in an application for interim relief before the Tribunal, at the time when it mattered. The auction purchaser, for his part, should not overreach either. His title is secure against the notice, but it remains subject to the outcome of the borrower’s challenge to the sale, and the right forum to free the property for an onward sale is the Tribunal in which that challenge is pending.
******
About the Author & Disclaimer: Mihirkumar V. Patel is an independent Advocate practising before the Gujarat High Court, DRT, DRAT and City Civil Court, specialising in tax, commercial, banking, RERA, arbitration and recovery disputes. Email: [email protected]. Views expressed are personal and do not constitute legal advice. Readers should verify applicable laws and judicial precedents before relying on this article.






