Summary: The CGST Act, 2017 imposes interest, penalties and other consequences on taxpayers for statutory defaults, but does not establish an equivalent, comprehensive mechanism for holding tax officers personally accountable for knowingly unlawful adjudication. This article examines the imbalance through mandatory hearing requirements under Section 75(4), restrictions on demands under Section 75(7), statutory limitation periods and the protection of good-faith actions under Section 157. Drawing on judicial decisions including Satyam Shivam Papers, Merino Industries, Kamlakshi Finance, M.K. Gupta and K.K. Dhawan, it considers personal costs, compensation, judicial discipline, departmental proceedings and criminal liability for knowing misconduct. It also examines the limitations of existing remedies and proposes a reciprocal GST accountability provision that would distinguish honest errors from wilful or reckless violations, provide an opportunity of hearing to the officer and ensure proportionate consequences without discouraging legitimate tax administration.
The Officer Who Breaks The Law: The Case For Reciprocal Accountability Under GST Act
- 1. Introduction
- 2. The Scheme of the Act: Duties Without Consequences
- 3. Section 157 and the Limits of Good Faith
- 4. What the Courts Have Done Under Article 226
- 5. When the Officer Disobeys the High Court Itself
- 6. Why the Judicial Remedy Remains Occasional
- 7. Compensation and the Personal Liability of the Officer
- 8. Disciplinary Liability for Quasi Judicial Orders
- 9. The Criminal Law Already Uses the Test of Intent
- 10. Lessons from Other Systems
- 11. A Reciprocal Provision for the GST Law
- First Principle: Liability Only for Wilful or Reckless Disregard
- Second Principle: Finding by the Appellate or Judicial Forum
- Third Principle: Personal and Certain Consequences
- Fourth Principle: Limiting Protection Under Section 157
- 12. Conclusion
1. Introduction
The Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 are, in their scheme of penalties, written for one party only. The registered person who files a return late pays a late fee. The one who pays tax late pays interest under Section 50. The one who commits any of the twenty one offences listed in Section 122(1) pays a penalty, and the one who contravenes a provision for which no separate penalty is provided is caught by the general penalty under Section 125. Intention is often irrelevant. Apart from the gradation between Sections 73 and 74, a clerical slip is penalised much as a deliberate default is.
The proper officer is bound by the same statute. He must grant a personal hearing under Section 75(4) when it is requested in writing or when an adverse decision is contemplated. He cannot confirm a demand in excess of the amount, or on grounds other than those, specified in the show cause notice, by reason of Section 75(7). He must pass his order within the period fixed by Sections 73(10) and 74(10) and, for later periods, Section 74A. He is bound by the judgments of the jurisdictional High Court. Yet when he breaks any of these commands, the Act provides no consequence for him. The order is quashed, the matter is remanded, and the same officer decides it again. The dealer bears the cost of the writ petition, the blocked credit and the attached bank account. The State bears the cost of the litigation. The officer bears nothing.
This article examines whether that asymmetry is justified in law, what the existing law already offers by way of accountability, and how a reciprocal provision could be written into the GST law without discouraging honest adjudication.
2. The Scheme of the Act: Duties Without Consequences
The statute speaks to the officer in mandatory terms. Section 75(4) says that an opportunity of hearing shall be granted. Section 75(7) says that the amount of tax, interest and penalty demanded in the order shall not be in excess of the amount specified in the notice. The time limits in Sections 73(10) and 74(10) are outer limits on the power itself. These are not directory guidelines, and the High Courts have consistently treated their breach as fatal to the order.
But the only consequence the law attaches to the breach falls on the order, not on its author. The quashing of the order is a remedy for the dealer only in the sense that the demand goes, and it is a remedy that the dealer must pay for, by filing a writ petition or an appeal with pre deposit. Where the dealer cannot afford the litigation, the defective order is recovered as if it were valid. The officer’s breach therefore operates against the dealer automatically, and so does the dealer’s own breach. The law makes the weaker party carry the burden of both.
A mandatory rule without a sanction for its breach depends wholly on the conscience of the person it binds. The daily cause list of the High Court shows how far that conscience can be relied upon.
3. Section 157 and the Limits of Good Faith
The usual answer is Section 157(2), which bars any suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding against an officer for anything done or intended to be done in good faith under the Act or the Rules. The protection is real, but it is narrower than is commonly assumed.
Good faith is defined in Section 3(22) of the General Clauses Act, 1897: a thing is deemed to be done in good faith where it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not. Honesty is the test. A negligent order passed honestly is protected. An order passed with knowledge that the law forbids it is not passed honestly, and falls outside the shield.
In State of Gujarat v. Paresh Nathalal Chauhan, 2024 INSC 277, the Supreme Court expunged an observation of the Gujarat High Court that the protection of Section 157 may not be available to search officers whose conduct the High Court had found unauthorised. The ground of the decision matters. The Supreme Court did not hold that officers enjoy absolute immunity. It held that good faith is a defence which a statutory functionary is entitled to plead, and that whether an act was done in good faith is for the court to decide, on the facts, in the proceeding in which the defence is raised. The High Court’s remark was set aside because it was premature, not because it was wrong in principle.
Section 157 is therefore a defence, not an exemption. It presupposes that a legal proceeding against an officer is possible and only regulates its outcome. What the GST law lacks is not immunity for the officer but any proceeding in which his conduct can be tested.
4. What the Courts Have Done Under Article 226
In the absence of a statutory remedy, the High Courts have used their power to award costs. The leading authority is Assistant Commissioner (ST) v. Satyam Shivam Papers Pvt. Ltd., SLP (C) No. 21132 of 2021, decided on 12 January 2022. Goods could not reach the buyer within the validity of the e way bill because the road was blocked by an agitation, a fact the officer himself did not dispute. He nonetheless imposed tax and penalty of ₹69,000. The Telangana High Court quashed the order with costs of ₹10,000. When the State came to the Supreme Court, the Court dismissed the petition, added a further ₹59,000 as costs, and made it clear that the State could recover the costs, after paying the dealer, directly from the person responsible for this “entirely unnecessary litigation.”
The Allahabad High Court has followed the same course. In Merino Industries Ltd. v. State of U.P., Writ Tax No. 1406 of 2025, a demand of more than ₹5.82 crore had been confirmed without the personal hearing the dealer had asked for in writing. The Division Bench presided over by the Chief Justice quashed the order, imposed personal costs of ₹20,000 on the Joint Commissioner, to be deposited with the High Court Legal Services Committee, and directed the Commissioner to take remedial measures, observing that petitions complaining of such breaches were being filed every day.
In Rajdhani Udyog v. State of U.P., Writ Tax No. 3684 of 2025, decided on 25 August 2025, the officer had proceeded under Section 130 for excess stock in the face of binding judgments that such cases must go under Section 73 or 74. The Court imposed costs of ₹5,000 payable to the petitioner out of the officer’s salary, called for a personal affidavit from the senior administration, and directed training of officers and circulation of legal updates. In MLV Constructions v. State of U.P., Writ Tax No. 752 of 2025, the Lucknow Bench quashed detention and penalty orders under Section 129 and directed that the officer, who had shown in court that he was unfamiliar with the provisions he was applying, be sent for three months of training before being entrusted with such work again.
Other High Courts have done the same. The Delhi High Court in Jupiter Exports v. Commissioner of GST, W.P.(C) 6673 of 2021, decided on 24 July 2023, refused to treat a telephone conversation as a personal hearing, set aside a demand of more than ₹6.67 crore and imposed costs. The Bombay High Court has imposed costs of ₹50,000 on an officer who passed a demand order before the sixty day window for voluntary payment had run out.
Behind all of these lies the principle of judicial discipline laid down in Union of India v. Kamlakshi Finance Corporation Ltd., AIR 1992 SC 711, that in deciding quasi judicial issues “revenue officers are bound by the decisions of the appellate authorities.” The Court explained that disregard of binding decisions only harasses assessees and throws the administration of tax laws into confusion. The officer who ignores a binding precedent is not exercising an independent judgment. He is refusing to follow the law.
5. When the Officer Disobeys the High Court Itself
The breaches discussed so far are breaches of the statute. A graver breach is disobedience of a direction given by the High Court in the very matter. When the Court sets aside an order and remits the case with directions on how it is to be decided afresh, those directions bind the officer as completely as the statute does. In The Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, AIR 1961 SC 182, the Supreme Court held that a subordinate authority which refuses to carry out the clear directions of a superior tribunal acts in defiance of the hierarchy on which the administration of justice rests, and issued mandamus to compel obedience. Kamlakshi Finance applied the same principle to revenue officers.
A matter from my own practice shows how little that principle restrains an officer in practice. A brick kiln dealer under the composition scheme had closed his business and his registration had been cancelled. A demand under Section 74 for an old financial year was set aside by the High Court because the notices had been placed only on the common portal after cancellation of registration, contrary to a binding circular of the Commissioner, a point the Standing Counsel conceded. The Court remitted the matter with specific directions, one of which required at least fifteen days of advance notice of the hearing.
On remand, a fresh case built on e way bills was served on a Saturday evening, with the reply due on Sunday and the hearing fixed for Monday. Fifteen days became two. The fresh demand rested on composition orders issued two years after cancellation and never physically served, which is the very defect for which the first order had been struck down. The order records that counsel appeared on a date when nobody appeared, and a reminder on the file states that no reply had been filed when the reply had been received in the office weeks earlier. The dealer has had to come to the High Court a second time for the same tax period.
The law does provide for this. Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines civil contempt as wilful disobedience of any judgment, decree, direction or order of a court, and Section 12 provides for simple imprisonment up to six months, or fine up to two thousand rupees, or both. But contempt vindicates the authority of the Court; it does not compensate the dealer, stay the recovery or undo the demand. The dealer must still file a fresh writ petition, and the contempt petition becomes a second litigation at his expense. In practice the officer answers that the remand was complied with in form, and the matter rarely goes further.
If an officer can disregard a direction given by the High Court in the same case without any consequence, no statutory command will be safe in his hands. Disobedience of a direction of the Court in the very matter is the clearest instance of wilful conduct the law can find, and it must be the first ground in any scheme of accountability.
6. Why the Judicial Remedy Remains Occasional
These decisions are significant, but they remain exceptions. In the great majority of writ petitions where the breach is plain, the order is quashed and the matter remanded without any costs at all. The reasons are not difficult to see.
First, personal costs are a penal consequence on an individual, and the individual is usually not before the Court in his own name. In State of U.P. v. Mohammad Naim, AIR 1964 SC 703, the Supreme Court held that before adverse remarks are made against a person, he should be before the Court or have had an opportunity of explaining his conduct, and the remarks should be necessary for the decision. Courts apply the same caution to personal costs, and that requires a further hearing on a heavy list. Second, the sums are small. ₹5,000 or ₹20,000 is little against a demand running into crores and against the dealer’s own expense. Third, the remedy depends on the Bench, on the pleadings and on the time available. A rule of accountability that depends entirely on discretion will be applied unevenly, and an uneven sanction deters nobody.
The judgments themselves show the limit. They respond to a pattern which the courts openly acknowledge, but they cannot create a scheme. That is the function of the legislature.
7. Compensation and the Personal Liability of the Officer
The general law already accepts that a public functionary who harasses a citizen may be made to pay. In Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta, (1994) 1 SCC 243, the Supreme Court held that where the exercise of discretion is mala fide and the citizen is entitled to compensation for harassment, the officer can no longer claim the protective cover of his office. The Court directed the authority to fix responsibility on the officers concerned and to recover the compensation from them. In Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, (1993) 2 SCC 746, the Court recognised compensation in public law under Articles 32 and 226 as a remedy distinct from a civil action for damages.
These principles were developed in consumer and fundamental rights cases, but nothing in them is confined to those fields. A demand confirmed beyond the show cause notice, a bank account attached while an appeal is pending, or a recovery made in the teeth of a stay, causes loss that is just as real and just as measurable. What is missing in tax cases is not the principle but its regular application.
8. Disciplinary Liability for Quasi Judicial Orders
It was once argued that an officer cannot be disciplined for an order passed in the exercise of quasi judicial power, because the remedy against a wrong order is an appeal. The Supreme Court rejected that argument in Union of India v. A.N. Saxena, (1992) 3 SCC 124, and settled the law in Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan, (1993) 2 SCC 56, which concerned an Income Tax Officer. The Court held that an officer who exercises quasi judicial power negligently or recklessly, or in order to confer undue favour on a person, “is not acting as a Judge” and may be proceeded against departmentally. In Union of India v. Duli Chand, Civil Appeal No. 2168 of 2006, decided on 21 April 2006, the Court upheld a punishment imposed on an officer for gross negligence in allowing refund claims.
The service rules applicable to State Tax officers in Uttar Pradesh are therefore fully capable of reaching a wilful breach of Section 75. The difficulty is that the dealer has no part in that process, the department is under no obligation to begin it, and the quashing of an order by the High Court is not treated as a reason to begin it. A remedy which the wrongdoer’s own department controls, and need never use, is not accountability in any real sense.
9. The Criminal Law Already Uses the Test of Intent
The objection that an officer cannot be punished for an order he passes is answered by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 itself. Section 198, which carries forward Section 166 of the Indian Penal Code, punishes a public servant who knowingly disobeys any direction of the law as to the way in which he is to conduct himself as such public servant, intending to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will cause, injury to any person. Section 201, corresponding to Section 167 of the Indian Penal Code, punishes a public servant who, being charged with the preparation of a document, frames it in a manner he knows to be incorrect, intending or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause injury.
An order which records that an opportunity of hearing was given when none was given, or which confirms a demand on a ground absent from the notice with full knowledge of Section 75(7), comes within the words of these provisions. The criminal law does not punish error. It punishes knowing disobedience. That is precisely the line a reciprocal provision in the GST law should draw.
These sections are almost never invoked in tax matters, and the reason is procedural. Section 218 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, which replaces Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, bars cognizance without the previous sanction of the Government. The new law introduces a deemed sanction where the Government fails to decide within one hundred and twenty days, which is a real advance. But prosecution for an assessment order will always be a remedy of the last resort. The GST law needs a civil consequence that is proportionate and certain.
10. Lessons from Other Systems
Section 119A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, inserted by the Finance Act, 2020, required the Central Board of Direct Taxes to adopt a Taxpayers’ Charter, and the Charter so adopted includes a commitment to hold the department’s authorities accountable. But the Charter confers no enforceable right and provides no remedy when the commitment is broken. The GST law does not have even a charter.
The United States offers a contrast. Section 7433 of the Internal Revenue Code allows a taxpayer to sue the United States for damages where, in connection with the collection of federal tax, an officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service recklessly, intentionally or negligently disregards the Code or the regulations. Recovery is limited to actual, direct economic damages and the costs of the action, subject to a ceiling of one million dollars for reckless or intentional disregard and one hundred thousand dollars for negligence. Section 1203 of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 went further, listing ten acts for which an IRS employee must be removed from service, subject only to mitigation by the Commissioner personally.
The American experience is instructive both ways. Section 7433 shows that a statutory claim for an officer’s wilful breach can exist alongside an effective tax administration. Section 1203 shows the danger of excess: within a few years the Treasury itself asked Congress to soften it, reporting that it had hurt morale, and revenue agents complained that it made them hesitant to pursue genuine defaulters. A reciprocal provision for India should therefore be measured, confined to wilful or reckless conduct, and decided by an independent forum. Its object is to make the officer careful, not afraid.
11. A Reciprocal Provision for the GST Law
The asymmetry can be corrected without weakening the administration of the tax. What is needed is not a new forum or a long inquiry, but a short provision in the Central and State Acts built on four principles.
First Principle: Liability Only for Wilful or Reckless Disregard
The first principle is that the officer answers only for wilful or reckless disregard of the law, never for an honest mistake. An officer who takes a wrong but genuine view of a provision, or of the evidence, is corrected by the appeal, as he is today. The provision would reach only the officer who denies a hearing that has been asked for in writing, confirms a demand beyond the show cause notice, passes an order after the time limit has expired, ignores a binding judgment of the jurisdictional High Court or the Supreme Court, or departs from a direction given by the High Court in the same matter, knowing that the law forbids what he is doing.
Second Principle: Finding by the Appellate or Judicial Forum
The second principle is that the finding should be recorded by the forum which sets the order aside, whether the Appellate Authority, the Appellate Tribunal or the High Court, after giving the officer an opportunity of being heard. That forum has already examined the record. The hearing to the officer meets the concern expressed in Mohammad Naim, and no separate inquiry is needed.
Third Principle: Personal and Certain Consequences
The third principle is that the consequence must be personal and certain. Once such a finding is recorded, the officer should be liable to a penalty recoverable from his salary, and the finding should be entered in his service record, so that a repeated finding becomes misconduct under the rules governing his service. At the same time, the State, not the officer, should compensate the dealer with interest on the amount deposited or recovered under the order set aside and the costs of the proceeding, so that the dealer is not left to pursue the officer himself.
Fourth Principle: Limiting Protection Under Section 157
The fourth principle is that the protection of Section 157 should not extend to an act in respect of which the absence of good faith has been judicially found. That is no more than what Paresh Nathalal Chauhan already recognises: good faith is a defence to be adjudicated, and once it has been adjudicated against the officer, the shield has no further work to do.
Nor would such a provision be new in principle. The statute already grades the dealer’s liability according to his state of mind: Section 73 for the case without fraud, Section 74 for fraud, wilful misstatement and suppression. A provision that grades the officer’s liability in the same way would only apply to the State the standard the State applies to the citizen.
12. Conclusion
The power to tax carries the power to injure, and the GST law has armed the proper officer generously: attachment, blocking of credit, cancellation of registration, detention and recovery. It has been far less careful about how that power is used. The courts have shown, in Satyam Shivam Papers, Merino Industries and Rajdhani Udyog, that a wilful breach can be visited on the officer personally. Yet officers continue to disobey even the directions given by the High Court in the very case, and the dealer pays for a second round of litigation. The general law, through M.K. Gupta, K.K. Dhawan and Section 198 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, has long accepted that a public servant who knowingly disobeys the law must answer for it. What remains is for Parliament and the State legislatures to say so in the taxing statute itself. The dealer is presumed to know the law and is penalised for breaking it. The officer who administers that law should be held to no lower standard.
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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are the personal thoughts of the author. They are not binding and are not a statement of the statute; the provisions of the Act and the judgments referred to shall prevail.






