Rajneesh Kumar & Anr. Vs Ved Prakash (Supreme Court of India)
The Supreme Court of India, in Rajneesh Kumar & Anr. Vs Ved Prakash (2024 INSC 891), dismissed two Special Leave Petitions challenging the Himachal Pradesh High Court’s refusal to condone a delay of 534 days in filing a civil appeal. The Court held that negligence or carelessness attributed to an advocate does not, by itself, constitute sufficient justification for condoning a long and inordinate delay. Litigants are expected to remain vigilant about their rights and the progress of judicial proceedings initiated at their instance. The decision arose from a civil dispute in which Rajneesh Kumar and another had instituted a suit against Ved Prakash, who filed a counterclaim. The plaintiffs’ suit was dismissed for default on 23 May 2009, and their restoration proceedings also failed. The counterclaim proceeded ex parte and was decreed on 17 January 2015. The plaintiffs subsequently filed an appeal challenging the decree, accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking condonation of a delay of 534 days.
The plaintiffs contended that their former advocate had repeatedly informed them that the proceedings remained pending and that they became aware of the decree only on 18 May 2016, when they consulted another advocate concerning execution proceedings. According to their application, they obtained the relevant court records on 22 June 2016 and thereafter proceeded with the appeal. The District Judge, Shimla, by order dated 27 June 2019, condoned the delay, relying on the principle that a litigant should not suffer for counsel’s fault and that courts should adopt a liberal approach to applications seeking condonation. Ved Prakash challenged that order before the Himachal Pradesh High Court, arguing that the plaintiffs had suppressed material facts concerning their actual knowledge of the counterclaim and had improperly shifted responsibility to their previous counsel.
The Himachal Pradesh High Court examined the trial court’s proceedings and found documentary evidence contradicting the plaintiffs’ explanation. The record established that the plaintiffs had been proceeded against ex parte on 23 May 2009, that an application for setting aside the ex parte order had subsequently been filed, and that notices had been issued requiring their appearance on 22 March 2012. Importantly, the order sheet dated 22 March 2012 recorded the personal presence of one of the plaintiffs during proceedings concerning the counterclaim. The High Court therefore concluded that the plaintiffs were aware of the counterclaim but deliberately concealed that knowledge while seeking discretionary relief. Although the High Court acknowledged authorities favouring liberal construction of sufficient cause, including N. Balakrishnan Vs M. Krishnamurthy and Rafiq Vs Munshilal, it distinguished the present matter because of the plaintiffs’ lack of candour and suppression of material facts. Relying on decisions concerning the requirement to approach courts with clean hands, including Dalip Singh Vs State of Uttar Pradesh, it set aside the District Judge’s condonation order on 9 December 2019 and dismissed the application under Section 5. The subsequent review petition was rejected on 10 July 2020.
Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners sought interference with the High Court’s decisions. The Supreme Court examined the High Court’s findings and observed that litigants increasingly attempt to attribute negligence and carelessness to their advocates when proceedings result adversely. Referring to Salil Dutta Vs T.M. & M.C. Private Ltd., (1993) 2 SCC 185, the Court reiterated that an advocate acts as the agent of the litigant and that there is no absolute principle permitting a party to disown counsel’s conduct whenever convenient. The Court recognised that relief may be granted to an innocent litigant in appropriate circumstances notwithstanding counsel’s negligence, but clarified that such protection is not automatic. It further relied on Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Co. Vs Employees State Insurance Corporation, (1971) 2 SCC 860, explaining that limitation laws require timely assertion of rights, protect the availability of evidence and discourage stale or unsupported claims.
The Supreme Court concluded that even assuming negligence on the part of the petitioners’ former advocate, such negligence alone could not justify the prolonged delay, particularly in the circumstances recorded by the High Court. Finding no error warranting interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, it dismissed both Special Leave Petitions and disposed of pending applications. Consequently, the Himachal Pradesh High Court’s decision setting aside condonation of the 534-day delay remained undisturbed. The ruling reinforces that liberal consideration of delay-condonation applications must be assessed alongside the litigant’s diligence, bona fides, truthful disclosure and the specific circumstances established by the judicial record.
Related Reading: The issue of condonation of a 534-day appeal delay was also examined in the Himachal Pradesh High Court proceedings. Read: 534-Day Appeal Delay Cannot Be Condoned Due to Suppression of Facts: Himachal Pradesh High Court.
Cases Discussed
- Salil Dutta Vs T.M. & M.C. Private Ltd., (1993) 2 SCC 185 (Supreme Court) — Relied upon by the Supreme Court for the principle that an advocate acts as the litigant’s agent and that a party cannot invariably disown counsel’s acts.
- Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Co. Vs Employees State Insurance Corporation, (1971) 2 SCC 860 (Supreme Court) — Relied upon to explain the object of limitation statutes and the importance of timely assertion of rights.
- Rafiq Vs Munshilal, (1981) 2 SCC 788; AIR 1981 SC 1400 (Supreme Court) — Considered by the first appellate court and referred to in the Supreme Court’s quotation from Salil Dutta concerning counsel’s default.
- N. Balakrishnan Vs M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 (Supreme Court) — Cited before the High Court regarding liberal construction of sufficient cause in delay-condonation proceedings.
- Vedabai @ Vaijayanatabai Baburao Patil Vs Shantaram Baburao Patil, (2001) 9 SCC 106 (Supreme Court) — Cited regarding the approach to condonation of delay.
- Municipal Corporation, Gwalior Vs Ram Charan (D) by LRs., AIR 2003 SC 2164 (Supreme Court) — Cited in support of liberal consideration of delay-condonation applications.
- Ganesharaju (D) through LRs. Vs Narasamma (D) through LRs., (2013) 11 SCC 341 (Supreme Court) — Cited on condonation of delay.
- Khodiyaar Rolling Mills Vs Paschim Gujarat Vij Company Limited, (2018) 18 SCC 794 (Supreme Court) — Referred to by the High Court concerning limitation and sufficient cause.
- Bhivchandra Shankar More Vs Balu Gangaram More, (2019) 6 SCC 387 (Supreme Court) — Referred to concerning the principles governing condonation of delay.
- Robin Thapa Vs Rohit Dora, (2019) 7 SCC 359 (Supreme Court) — Referred to concerning the liberal approach to limitation where justified by the facts.
- Dalip Singh Vs State of Uttar Pradesh, (2010) 2 SCC 114 (Supreme Court) — Relied upon by the High Court regarding suppression of material facts and the obligation to approach courts with clean hands.
- Hari Narain Vs Badri Das, AIR 1963 SC 1558 (Supreme Court) — Quoted through Dalip Singh concerning inaccurate or misleading statements in special leave petitions.
- Welcome Hotel Vs State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 1015 (Supreme Court) — Discussed through Dalip Singh concerning denial of relief to parties who mislead courts.
- G. Narayanaswamy Reddy Vs Governor of Karnataka, AIR 1991 SC 1726 (Supreme Court) — Referred to concerning suppression of material facts in proceedings under Article 136.
- S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs Jagannath, JT 1993 (6) SC 331 (Supreme Court) — Discussed concerning withholding material documents and obtaining judicial relief through concealment.
- Prestige Lights Ltd. Vs State Bank of India, (2007) 8 SCC 449 (Supreme Court) — Referred to concerning full disclosure and clean hands in writ proceedings.
- A.V. Papayya Sastry Vs Government of A.P., AIR 2007 SC 1546 (Supreme Court) — Discussed concerning the discretionary nature of Article 136 jurisdiction.
- Sunil Poddar Vs Union Bank of India, (2008) 2 SCC 326 (Supreme Court) — Mentioned in the extracted precedent concerning equitable discretion and truthful disclosure; citation reproduced from the supplied source.
- Oswal Fats and Oils Limited Vs Additional Commissioner (Administration), (2010) 4 SCC 728 (Supreme Court) — Cited concerning the obligation to disclose all material facts.
- Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited Vs State of Maharashtra, (2013) 9 SCC 92 (Supreme Court) — Referred to concerning the requirement of candour in judicial proceedings.
- Sciemed Overseas Inc. Vs BOC India Limited, (2016) 3 SCC 70 (Supreme Court) — Relied upon regarding adverse consequences of false or misleading statements before courts.
- Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan University Vs Union of India, (2019) 1 SCALE 700 (Supreme Court) — Referred to concerning suppression of facts and misrepresentation.
- Re: Suo Motu Proceedings Against R. Karuppan, Advocate, (2001) 5 SCC 289 (Supreme Court) — Quoted concerning false evidence and the sanctity of affidavits.
- Mohan Singh Vs Amar Singh, (1998) 6 SCC 686 (Supreme Court) — Quoted concerning tampering with judicial records and filing false affidavits.
FULL TEXT OF THE ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
1. Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 935 of 2021 arises from the order passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh dated 09.12.2019 in the Civil Revision Application No. 96 of 2019 by which the High Court allowed the Civil Revision Application filed by the original defendant/counter claimant and thereby quashed and set aside the order passed by the District Judge, Shimla condoning the delay of more than 534 days in filing the appeal by the petitioners herein (original plaintiffs).
2. Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 936 of 2021 arises from the order passed by the High Court in Review Petition No. 5 of 2020 dated 10.07.2020 by which the High Court rejected the review application.
3. It appears from the materials on record that the petitioners herein (original plaintiffs) filed a civil suit against the respondent (defendant). The respondent herein had filed counter claim in the said suit. The civil suit came to be dismissed for default and the application for restoration moved by the petitioners herein was also ordered to be dismissed for default. The counter claim of the respondent was allowed vide the judgment and decree dated 17.01.2015 passed in the very same suit.
4. The petitioners herein being dissatisfied with the ex parte order passed in the counter claim challenged the same before the first appellate court by way of an appeal. However, the appeal was time barred by 534 days.
5. The first appellate court condoned the delay of 534 days in preferring the appeal essentially on the ground that the litigant should not suffer on account of negligence on the part of the advocate and the court should adopt a liberal approach in condoning the delay.
6. The respondent herein being dissatisfied by the order passed by the first appellate court condoning the delay challenged the same before the High Court. The High Court allowed the civil revision application by which the order passed by the appellate court condoning the delay of 534 days came to be quashed and set aside.
7. In such circumstances, the petitioners are here before this Court with the present petitions.
8. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties.
9. The High Court in its impugned order observed as under:-
“14. Thus, it is evidently clear that the respondents were not only fully aware of the pendency of the counter-claim on 22.3.2012, yet this fact has been deliberately and wilfully concealed and not stated in the application for restoration. In fact the entire blame has been put on the earlier counsel that had been representing them.
x x x x
22. Since the respondents had not approached the Court with clean hands and have rather suppressed the material facts, that too, deliberately and intentionally regarding knowledge of pendency of the counter-claim at least on 22.03.2012 and thereby tried to gain an unfair advantage from the Court, that too, by casting serious allegations on the previous counsel(s), no indulgence much less discretion could have been exercised in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs, that too, for condoning the delay of more than 534 days.”
10. It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the head of the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in the trial court. We have noticed over a period of time a tendency on the part of the litigants to blame their lawyers of negligence and carelessness in attending the proceedings before the court. Even if we assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the court initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief.
11. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to a decision of this Court in the case of Salil Dutta v. T.M. & M.C. Private Ltd. reported in (1993) 2 SCC 185, wherein this Court observed as under:-
“8. The advocate is the agent of the party. His acts and statements, made within the limits of authority given to him, are the acts and statements of the principal i.e. the party who engage him. It is true that in certain situations, the court may, in the interest of justice, set aside a dismissal order or an ex parte decree notwithstanding the negligence and/or misdemeanour of the advocate where it finds that the client was an innocent litigant but there is no such absolute rule that a party can disown its advocate at any time and seek relief. No such absolute immunity can be recognized. Such an absolute rule would make the working of the system extremely difficult. The observations made in Rafiq [AIR 1981 SC 1400] must not be understood as an absolute proposition. As we have mentioned hereinabove, this was an on-going suit posted for final hearing after a lapse of seven years of its institution. It was not a second appeal filed by a villager residing away from the city, where the court is located. The defendant is also not a rustic ignorant villager but a private limited company with its head office at Calcutta itself and managed by educated businessmen who know where their interest lies. It is evident that when their applications were not deposed of before taking up the suit for final hearing they felt piqued and refused to appear before the court. May be, it was part of their delaying tactics as alleged by the plaintiff. May be not. But one thing is clear they chose to non-cooperate with the court. Having adopted such a stand towards the court, the defendant has no right to ask its indulgence. Putting the entire blame upon the advocate and trying to make it out as if they were totally unaware of the nature or significance of the proceedings is a theory which cannot be accepted and ought not to have been accepted.”
(Emphasis supplied)
12. As regards the law of limitation, we may refer to the decision of this Court in Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Go. v. The Employees State Insurance Corporation, (1971) 2 SCC 860, wherein this Court held as under:-
“The necessity for enacting periods of limitation is to ensure that actions are commenced within a particular period, firstly to assure the availability of evidence documentary as well as oral to enable the defendant to contest the claim against him; secondly to give effect to the principle that law does not assist a person who is inactive and sleeps over his rights by allowing them when challenged or disputed to remain dormant without asserting them in a Court of law. The principle which forms the basis of this rule is expressed in the maximum vigilantibus, non dermientibus, jura sub-veniunt (the laws give help to those who are watchful and not to those who sleep). Therefore, the object of the statutes of limitations is to compel a person to exercise his right of action within a reasonable time as also to discourage and suppress stale, fake or fraudulent claims.”
(Emphasis supplied)
13. In view of the aforesaid, we find no error not to speak of any error of law in the impugned judgment of the High Court warranting interference in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
14. In the result, these petitions fail and are dismissed.
15. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
