Shanker Doon & Ors. Vs Government of NCT of Delhi & Ors. (Delhi High Court)
The Delhi High Court, in Shanker Doon & Ors. Vs Government of NCT of Delhi & Ors., decided two connected Letters Patent Appeals filed by students of professional colleges affiliated with Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University and the Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi. The appeals challenged the Single Judge’s judgment dated 31 August 2017 in W.P.(C) 2217/2016, which had allowed a petition filed by the Self Financing Educational Institutions Association against the Delhi Government’s notification dated 10 March 2016. That notification had rescinded an earlier notification dated 19 February 2016 accepting revised fee recommendations of the State Fee Regulatory Committee (SFRC). The principal controversy concerned whether the Government could retrospectively implement revised fees for academic years already underway or completed and whether it could subsequently withdraw the notification accepting the Committee’s recommendations. The Court examined the statutory framework governing fee fixation, the interests of students and educational institutions, and the Government’s powers under the General Clauses Act, 1897.
The dispute arose under the Delhi Professional Colleges or Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee, Regulation of Admission, Fixation of Non-Exploitative Fee and Other Measures to Ensure Equity and Excellence) Act, 2007. The legislation regulates admissions and fees in professional educational institutions and seeks to prevent capitation fees and exploitative charges. Under Section 6, the Government is empowered to constitute a Fee Regulatory Committee to recommend institution-wise and course-wise fees. The Government may accept and notify those recommendations or refer them back to the Committee for reconsideration. The SFRC was constituted through a notification dated 1 February 2013 and submitted its recommendations for the relevant fee period. The Government eventually accepted those recommendations through the notification dated 19 February 2016, purporting to apply revised fees to academic sessions commencing in 2014. However, on 10 March 2016, within approximately 25 days, the Government rescinded the notification after receiving objections from students affected by the retrospective increase.
The Government argued that the retrospective enhancement imposed an unexpected financial burden on thousands of students who had selected their courses and institutions based on the prevailing fee structure. It submitted that students from economically weaker sections faced particular hardship because scholarships already disbursed could not be retrospectively increased to accommodate higher fees. The Government also contended that the statutory scheme contemplated fee determination before the commencement of the relevant academic year and did not authorise retrospective implementation. Reliance was placed on Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which concerns the power to amend, vary or rescind notifications and orders. The Government maintained that this provision empowered it to withdraw the February 2016 notification. It further argued that the subsequent notifications issued in July 2016 had addressed the fee structure prospectively and that the Single Judge had failed to appreciate the limitations imposed by the 2007 Act.
The students separately challenged the financial consequences of the retrospective revision. They alleged that certain institutions had demanded substantial additional fees and had adopted coercive measures, including restrictions connected with examinations and the issuance of degrees. The students of Chander Prabhu Jain College of Higher Studies and School of Law referred to demands of ₹55,800 for BBA and BBA (CAM) courses and ₹51,900 for BCA courses. They argued that the Single Judge’s judgment had imposed financial liabilities upon students who had not been parties to the original writ proceedings. They also disputed the reasoning that references to provisional fees in admission brochures automatically authorised retrospective recovery. According to the students, a prospectus could not override the statutory requirements governing fee fixation or confer powers that the legislation did not otherwise provide. The students maintained that the Government’s withdrawal of the February 2016 notification was necessary to protect their interests and prevent an unauthorised retrospective burden.
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The Self Financing Educational Institutions Association, on the other hand, defended the revised fee structure and challenged the Government’s decision to rescind its acceptance of the SFRC recommendations. The institutions contended that their fees had remained unrevised for several years and that the recommendations were based on a statutory process involving examination of their financial requirements and operating costs. They relied upon the fact that students had been informed through admission brochures that the existing fees were provisional and subject to revision following the Committee’s recommendations. The Single Judge had accepted the Association’s challenge, observing that the Government had initially approved the recommendations after considering the relevant material and could not arbitrarily reverse its decision merely because students subsequently objected to the increase. The Single Judge had also considered the financial requirements of educational institutions and the statutory objective of permitting non-exploitative but sustainable fee structures.
The Division Bench examined the scheme of Section 6 of the 2007 Act and distinguished between the dates on which fee recommendations were prepared, accepted and made enforceable. It held that the statutory framework did not permit the Government to impose revised fees retrospectively for an academic year that had already commenced before the relevant recommendations could lawfully operate. Accordingly, the fee revision notified on 19 February 2016 could not be implemented for the academic year 2014-15. However, the Court adopted a different approach for 2015-16 because the SFRC recommendations had already been submitted to the Government on 24 November 2014, before that academic year commenced. The Government had delayed taking a decision for approximately one and a half years without providing an adequate explanation. The Bench held that such administrative delay could not prejudice the educational institutions, which were entitled to charge the recommended course-wise fees for 2015-16. The Court therefore recognised the institutions’ entitlement for that academic year while rejecting retrospective implementation for 2014-15.
The Division Bench also considered the scope of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act and the Supreme Court’s decision in State of Bihar v. D.N. Ganguly, AIR 1958 SC 1018. It observed that the power to rescind a notification is not unlimited and must be exercised consistently with the object, context and statutory scheme of the legislation under which the notification was issued. Applying this principle, the Court held that the Government could withdraw the February 2016 notification only to the extent necessary to prevent its impermissible retrospective operation for 2014-15. The rescinding notification dated 10 March 2016 was invalid insofar as it withdrew the revised fee structure for 2015-16 onwards. Consequently, both appeals were partly allowed. The Single Judge’s judgment was set aside to the extent that it permitted revised fees for 2014-15, while the educational institutions were held entitled to claim the recommended course-wise fees for 2015-16. No costs were awarded. The judgment thus distinguishes impermissible retrospective fee revision from an institution’s entitlement arising from recommendations submitted before the relevant academic year and clarifies the limits on governmental rescission powers.
Cases Discussed
- State of Bihar v. D.N. Ganguly & Ors., AIR 1958 SC 1018 — Considered for the principle that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act must be applied in accordance with the scheme and object of the governing legislation.
- Shree Sidhbali Steels Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (2011) 3 SCC 193 — Cited regarding the power to rescind statutory notifications.
- Rasid Javed & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., (2010) 7 SCC 781 — Cited on the scope of statutory notification powers.
- Superintendent of Taxes, Dhubri & Ors. v. Onkarmal Nathmal Trust & Ors., (1976) 1 SCC 766 — Relied upon in submissions concerning statutory powers.
- Vice Chancellor, MDU, Rohtak v. Jahan Singh, (2007) 5 SCC 77 — Cited on the limitations governing retrospective subordinate legislation.
- Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority v. Sharad Kumar Jayantikumar Pasawalla & Ors., (1992) 3 SCC 285 — Referred to concerning the limits of statutory authority.
- Firm A.T.B. Mehtab Majid & Co. v. State of Madras & Anr., 1963 Supp (2) SCR 435 — Cited concerning the legal consequences of withdrawing statutory instruments.
- State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. v. Hirendra Pal Singh & Ors., (2011) 5 SCC 305 — Referred to in submissions concerning rescission.
- Cannanore Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Cochin & Ors., (1978) 2 ELT J375 — Cited regarding retrospective operation.
- Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. & Anr. v. Ajit Kumar Kar & Ors., (2008) 11 SCC 591 — Cited on the correction of mistakes.
- Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 6 SCC 697 — Referred to in the context of professional education.
- Income Tax Officer v. I.M.C. Ponnoose & Ors., AIR 1970 SC 385 — Cited regarding retrospectivity.
- B.N. Tewari v. Union of India, AIR 1965 SC 1430 — Cited regarding statutory notification powers.
- Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (1985) 1 SCC 641 — Referred to concerning subordinate legislation.
- Bhadrachalam Paperboards & Anr. v. Mandal Revenue Officer, A.P. & Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 634 — Cited concerning statutory interpretation.
- Nazir Ahmad v. King-Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253 — Referred to concerning compliance with prescribed statutory procedures.
- Babu Verghese & Ors. v. Bar Council of Kerala & Ors., (1999) 3 SCC 422 — Cited on statutory procedural requirements.
- State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. v. K. Shyam Sunder & Ors., (2011) 8 SCC 737 — Referred to concerning educational law.
- State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ajay Singh & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 825 — Cited in relation to statutory powers.
