In re Ganpati Trader (CAAR Delhi)
Summary: M/s Ganpati Trader filed five applications dated 12.06.2026 seeking an advance ruling on the classification of roasted areca nuts in whole, cut and split forms proposed for import into India. The applications were registered as Nos. 36–40/2026-27. At the personal hearing on 08.09.2026, the applicant’s advocate reiterated the submissions made in the applications.
The Customs Authority for Advance Rulings, Delhi considered whether it could admit the applications before addressing classification. It explained that the first proviso to Section 28-I(2) of the Customs Act, 1962 prevents an application from being allowed where the question is pending in the applicant’s own case before a customs officer, the Appellate Tribunal or a court, or where the same question has already been decided by the Appellate Tribunal or a court. The Authority distinguished the applicant-specific pending-matter bar from the bar concerning a question already decided by a higher forum.
Referring to the obligation of subordinate authorities to follow judicial precedent, the Authority found that the classification question was covered by the Madras High Court decision identified in the order as *M/s Shahnaz International Pvt. Ltd.* [2023 (386) E.L.T. 214 (Mad.)]. It therefore declined to pronounce a ruling on classification and rejected the applications under Section 28-I(2)(b). **The order does not itself determine the tariff classification of Ganpati Trader’s goods.**
Cases Discussed
- Union of India v. Kamlakshi Finance Corporation Ltd., 1991 (55) ELT 433 (SC) — cited on judicial discipline and the binding nature of higher judicial decisions.
- M/s Shahnaz International Pvt. Ltd., 2023 (386) E.L.T. 214 (Mad.) — treated by the Authority as covering the classification question. The case name is reproduced as it appears in the supplied order.
FULL TEXT OF THE ORDER OF CUSTOMS AUTHORITY FOR ADVANCE RULINGS, DELHI
M/s Ganpati Trader, 1st Floor, 2739, Room No. 101, Zere Fasil, Naya Bazar, North Delhi, Delhi- 110006 (herein referred to as “applicant”), having IEC No. 0516008701 and PAN – AFJPJ0491E, submitted five applications dated 12.06.2026 before the Customs Authority for Advance Rulings, New Delhi (herein referred to as “CAAR, New Delhi”) for obtaining Advance Ruling under Section 28I of the Customs Act, 1962, to seek clarity on the classification of “Roasted Areca Nut (Whole); Roasted Areca Nut (Cut) and Roasted Areca Nut (Split)” on the import to India. These applications were accordingly registered under Serial No. 36-40/2026-27 dated 12.06.2026.
2. The opportunity of Personal hearing was granted to the applicant on 08.09.2026. Sh. Harish Kohli, Advocate appeared virtually for personal hearing and reiterated the submission made during the filling of Application.
3. Findings, Discussion & Conclusion
3.1. I have gone through the applications of advance ruling and relevant provisions in this regard. I consider it necessary to first address the question of maintainability of the present application. Section 28I (2) of the Customs Act, 1962 governs the admissibility of applications before the Customs Authority for Advance Rulings. The relevant portions of that provision reads as under:
“28I. Procedure on receipt of application: (1) on receipt of an application, the Authority shall cause copy thereof to be forwarded to the [ Principal Commissioner of Customs or Commissioner of Customs] and, if necessary, call upon him to furnish the relevant records:
Provided that where any records have been called for by the Authority in any case, such records shall, as soon as possible, be returned to the Principal Commissioner of Customs or Commissioner of Customs]
(2) The Authority may, after examining the application and the records called for, by order, either allow or reject the application Provided that the Authority shall not allow the application question raised in the application is, where the
(a) already pending in the applicant’s case before any officer of customs, the Appellate Tribunal or any Court,
(b) the same as in a matter already decided by the Appellate Tribunal or any Court.”
3.2. From the above, I find that Section 28I (2) of the Customs Act, 1962 governs the admissibility of applications before the Custom Authority for Advance Rulings (CAAR). The first proviso to Section 28I (2) stipulates that the Authority shall not allow the application where the question raised in the application is (a) already pending in the applicant’s case before any officer of customs, the Appellate Tribunal or any Court; or (b) the same as in a matter already decided by the Appellate Tribunal or any Court.
3.3. Further, I understand that the entire mechanism of advance rulings is a trade facilitation measure introduced with the aim of reducing litigation and providing certainty to assessees, consistent with Article 3 of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement. The WTO framework itself recognizes two distinct situations where advance rulings may be declined: (a) when the issue is pending in the applicant’s own case, and (b) when the issue has already been decided by an appellate tribunal or court. The first is applicant-specific, whereas the second is applicant-agnostic. This distinction is necessary because advance rulings are implemented by Departmental officers who are duty bound to apply the law as settled in their jurisdiction. In India, this position is fortified by the ruling of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Kamlakshi Finance Corporation Ltd., 1991 (55) ELT 433 (SC), which underscores the binding nature of precedent and the obligation of lower authorities to follow higher judicial pronouncements.
3.4. It is a settled principle of law that rulings of the Tribunal and Courts are binding on subordinate authorities. The CAAR, being a statutory authority under the Customs Act, is equally bound by such precedents. To allow fresh applications on questions already adjudicated by higher judicial fora would risk the creation of conflicting rulings and introduce uncertainty, an outcome contrary to the very object of the advance ruling mechanism. Clause (b) therefore operates as a statutory reinforcement of judicial discipline, making it explicit that once a question has been conclusively determined by the Tribunal or Courts, the Authority cannot re-adjudicate the same issue at the behest of another party.
3.5. In the instant case, I observed that the question raised regarding the classification of roasted areca nuts in the present applications is squarely covered by the judgment of the Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of M/s Shahnaz International Pvt. Ltd. [2023 (386) E.L.T. 214 (Mad.)]. Therefore, in adherence to judicial discipline and binding precedent and in terms of Section 28I (2)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962, I refrain from pronouncing any ruling on the question of classification raised in the instant applications.
3.6 As discussed above, in terms of Section 28I (2)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 and in adherence to the principles of judicial discipline and binding precedent, I deem it appropriate to refrain from pronouncing any ruling on the question raised in the instant application regarding classification of the subject goods and therefore, the instant applications are liable to be, and are accordingly, rejected.
4. The application are not allowed and disposed of accordingly.
