DNA Evidence Establishes Paternity, Not Consent: Delhi HC Upholds Acquittal

Summary: The Delhi High Court, in KXXXXX v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr., upheld the acquittal of Respondent No. 2 and dismissed the complainant’s appeal. The Court held that a DNA report establishing biological paternity proves the fact of sexual intercourse but does not, by itself, establish whether the relationship was consensual. It considered the allegations of repeated sexual acts, threats, coercion and administration of an intoxicating substance, along with the DNA evidence. The Court examined the Trial Court’s assessment of inconsistencies in the complainant’s testimony, the delay in disclosure and reporting, the surrounding circumstances and the defence of a consensual relationship. Relying on the principles governing appeals against acquittal, including the Supreme Court’s decision in Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., the Court held that an acquittal should not be disturbed where the Trial Court’s view is reasonably possible. Interference requires patent perversity, manifest illegality, misreading or omission of material evidence, or other compelling and substantial reasons. The Court also cautioned that the conduct of a complainant in a sexual-offence case cannot be assessed through stereotypical assumptions. It ultimately held that the gravity of an accusation cannot substitute the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Preface

The Delhi High Court, in KXXXXX v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr., CRL.A. 320/2026 and CRL.M.A. 10175/2026, Neutral Citation No. 2026:DHC:7451, considered an appeal against the acquittal of Respondent No. 2 in a prosecution involving allegations of sexual offences.

The Court held that although the DNA report established that Respondent No. 2 was the biological father of the child, it did not determine whether the sexual relationship was consensual. Applying the settled principles governing appellate interference with an acquittal, the Court found no sufficient ground to disturb the Trial Court’s decision.

Introduction

The judgment was delivered by a Single Judge Bench comprising Hon’ble Ms Justice Madhu Jain. Paragraph 1 records that the hearing was conducted through hybrid mode.

Purpose of the Appeal

In paragraph 2, the Court recorded that the appeal had been filed by the complainant under Section 419 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 against the Trial Court’s judgment acquitting Respondent No. 2 of offences alleged under Sections 328, 376(2)(n), 377, 506 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Identifying particulars relating to the Trial Court proceedings, police station and FIR have been omitted from this article to protect the identity and privacy of the complainant and her children.

Factual Matrix

According to the prosecution case, the complainant was married and had an adopted child. Respondent No. 2 was known to her family and allegedly established physical relations with her against her wishes by using threats, inducements and coercion. It was further alleged that, on one occasion, an intoxicating substance was administered to her before physical relations were established.

The complainant subsequently became pregnant and gave birth to a child. During the investigation, DNA samples of the complainant, Respondent No. 2 and the child were obtained and examined by the forensic laboratory. The DNA report concluded that Respondent No. 2 was the biological father of the child.

Specific dates, family circumstances and other potentially identifying particulars have been omitted because their publication could enable indirect identification of the complainant or the children.

Offences Charged

The complainant subsequently disclosed the alleged incidents to her husband and family members, following which a criminal case was registered. Her statement was also recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

During the investigation, the complainant was medically examined and the requisite biological samples were collected. The police filed a charge sheet against Respondent No. 2 for the alleged offences, followed by a supplementary charge sheet placing the DNA report on record.

The Trial Court subsequently framed charges against Respondent No. 2 for offences punishable under Sections 328, 376(2)(n), 377, 506 and 509 of the IPC. Respondent No. 2 pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.

Trial Court Acquittal and Scope of Appellate Interference

The Trial Court acquitted Respondent No. 2 of all charges. While evaluating the evidence, it considered, among other matters, the alleged inconsistencies in the complainant’s testimony, the delay in disclosure and reporting, the surrounding circumstances and the defence that the relationship was consensual.

In paragraph 23, the High Court identified the principal issue as whether the judgment of acquittal suffered from perversity, patent illegality or misappreciation of material evidence sufficient to warrant appellate interference.

The Court stated in paragraph 24:

“It is well settled that where the view taken by the learned Trial Court is a reasonably possible view on the evidence, the appellate Court would not interfere merely because another view is also possible. An acquittal can be reversed only where the appreciation of evidence by the learned Trial Court is shown to be perverse, manifestly illegal, based on a misreading of material evidence, or where the conclusion of guilt is the only conclusion reasonably possible on the evidence. The Supreme Court has repeatedly reiterated that an acquittal cannot be reversed merely on account of a difference of opinion.”

Referring to Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 89, the Court reproduced the following principles:

“From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court, it can be said that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible. The following principles have to be kept in mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the appeals against an order of acquittal:

(a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity;

(b) whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence on record;

(c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are ‘compelling and substantial reasons’ for doing so. If the order is ‘clearly unreasonable’, it is a compelling reason for interference;

(d) the appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after re-appreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;

(e) if the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and

(f) the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.”

In paragraph 36, the Court cautioned against assessing the conduct of a complainant through stereotypical notions:

“This Court is conscious that the conduct of a prosecutrix in a sexual offence cannot be judged on the basis of stereotypical notions of how a victim ought to behave. Nor can delay in reporting a sexual offence, by itself, be treated as sufficient to discard the prosecution case. However, the conduct of the parties and the surrounding circumstances are not wholly irrelevant when the Court is required to determine the credibility of competing versions and whether the prosecution has established the charges beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case, the learned Trial Court did not treat any one circumstance as conclusive; rather, it considered the evidence cumulatively.”

Presumption of Innocence

In paragraph 45, the Court held:

“The present case is therefore not one where material evidence has been wholly ignored or where the conclusion of acquittal is demonstrably unsustainable. The learned Trial Court has examined the evidence and arrived at a conclusion which is reasonably possible on the material before it. The fact that another view may also be possible is not sufficient to justify interference in an appeal against acquittal. The strengthened presumption of innocence in favour of the accused consequently operates in his favour.”

DNA Evidence Did Not Establish Whether the Relationship Was Consensual

The DNA evidence established biological paternity and consequently supported the conclusion that sexual intercourse had taken place. The High Court, however, held that such scientific evidence did not independently establish whether the relationship was consensual or non-consensual.

The evidentiary value of the DNA report was therefore considered along with the oral testimony, surrounding circumstances, delay in reporting and the other material placed before the Trial Court. The DNA result could not, by itself, satisfy the prosecution’s burden of proving the charged offences beyond reasonable doubt.

Gravity of Allegation Cannot Replace Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt

In paragraph 46, the Court held:

“This Court is also mindful that the offence alleged is grave and the allegations made by the prosecutrix are serious. Nevertheless, the gravity of the accusation cannot substitute the standard of proof required in a criminal trial. The prosecution must establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, and where the evidence permits a reasonable view consistent with innocence, the benefit must go to the accused. The reliance placed by learned counsel for the appellant on the aforesaid judgments is misplaced. The said decisions, having been rendered in materially different factual and evidentiary circumstances, are clearly distinguishable and, therefore, do not advance the case of the appellant.”

Conclusion

In paragraph 47, the Delhi High Court concluded:

“In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds no compelling ground to interfere with the judgment dated 07.10.2024 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dwarka Courts, New Delhi. The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are based on an appreciation of the evidence and cannot be termed perverse, manifestly illegal or wholly unreasonable.”

The appeal was consequently dismissed and the judgment acquitting Respondent No. 2 was upheld. The Court also directed that a copy of its order be sent to the Trial Court for information and necessary compliance.

The ruling reiterates that DNA evidence establishing paternity proves a biological relationship but does not, without supporting evidence, decide the separate legal question of consent. It also reaffirms the limited scope of appellate interference with an acquittal and the requirement that criminal charges must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Editorial Note: The identity of the appellant-complainant and particulars capable of directly or indirectly identifying her or her children have been withheld in accordance with Section 228A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the corresponding protections under Section 72 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and the directions of the Supreme Court in Nipun Saxena & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., (2019) 2 SCC 703. Respondent No. 2 has also not been named because, in the circumstances of this case, disclosure of his identity could facilitate identification of the complainant.