Atal Agrawal Vs ITO (ITAT Raipur Bench)
Seven Days Means Seven Clear Days—AO’s Five-Day Shortcut Makes Reassessment Take the Exit u/s 148A(b)
The Controversy
The Assessee challenged the order dated 19.01.2026 passed by the CIT(A)/NFAC for AY 2018-19. The principal legal objection concerned the validity of the notice issued by the AO u/s 148A(b).
The notice was dated 24.03.2022, while the Assessee was required to submit his response by 30.03.2022. According to the Assessee, the statutory requirement of allowing “not less than seven days” was not satisfied because both the date of issuance of notice & the last date fixed for compliance had to be excluded. Once these two terminal dates were excluded, the Assessee was left with only five clear days.
The issue before the Raipur ITAT was, therefore, whether the apparent interval between 24.03.2022 & 30.03.2022 amounted to seven days or whether the statutory expression “not less than seven days” required seven complete intervening days.
Section 148A(b): Opportunity Must Be Real, Not Mathematical Make-Believe
Section 148A(b), as applicable to the proceedings, required the AO to provide an opportunity of hearing by issuing a show-cause notice specifying a time of not less than seven days but not exceeding thirty days from the date of issuance.
The Assessee argued that this minimum period was mandatory. The date on which the notice was issued could not be counted because no complete opportunity was available on that date. Similarly, the date fixed for compliance could not be counted as a complete intervening day. Consequently, the notice failed to satisfy the statutory minimum by two days.
The defect was not merely procedural or technical. The stipulated minimum period represented the Legislature’s determination of the time reasonably required by an assessee to understand the allegations, gather the necessary records & furnish a meaningful explanation before reassessment proceedings were initiated.
Avani Ferro Alloys Shows the Way
The ITAT found that an identical issue had recently been decided by the same Bench in DCIT v. Avani Ferro Alloys Pvt. Ltd., ITA Nos. 88 to 91/RPR/2025, order dated 06.08.2026.
In that case, the notice u/s 148A(b) was issued on 16.03.2022, requiring compliance on or before 23.03.2022. The Revenue contended that the interval represented seven days & therefore complied with the provision. The Tribunal rejected this computation by applying the settled principle that where a statute uses the expression “not less than” a specified number of days, both terminal dates must be excluded.
Accordingly, a notice that merely appears to span seven calendar dates may still fail to provide seven clear intervening days. On that basis, the jurisdictional notice in Avani Ferro Alloys was quashed.
Supreme Court’s Rule of Clear Days
The Tribunal relied upon the principle explained by the Supreme Court in Pioneer Motors (P.) Ltd. v. Municipal Council, Nagercoil, AIR 1967 SC 684.
The Supreme Court had held that where the statute requires notice of “not less than” a particular period, the requirement is one of clear days. Both the first day & the last day must be excluded while calculating the stipulated interval. Thus, the date of issuance or service & the date fixed for the proposed action or compliance cannot be included merely to manufacture the minimum statutory period.
This principle assumes particular significance u/s 148A(b), because the provision does not use the expression “within seven days.” It consciously employs the words “not less than seven days,” thereby prescribing an inviolable minimum opportunity.
Three High Courts, One Legal Answer
The Tribunal also referred to the Karnataka High Court’s decision in PCCIT v. Smt. Komarla Yogendra Keertana, (2025) 307 Taxman 106 (Kar.), wherein a notice failing to provide the mandatory minimum period of seven days was held invalid.
The Rajasthan High Court in Bijendra Singh v. PCCIT, (2025) 478 ITR 493 (Raj.), following Pioneer Motors, similarly held that both terminal dates must be excluded while computing a statutory period expressed as “not less than” a particular number of days.
The Gujarat High Court in Atul Mahavirprasad Paldecha v. ITO, (2025) 307 Taxman 331 (Guj.) also adopted the same view. The judicial position was therefore clear: seven days under the statute means seven clear days, not five clear days dressed up as seven.
A Jurisdictional Defect, Not a Curable Irregularity
Applying these principles, the ITAT observed that the notice issued on 24.03.2022 required the Assessee to respond by 30.03.2022. Excluding both terminal dates, the notice allowed only five clear days.
Since the AO failed to provide the minimum time expressly mandated u/s 148A(b), the notice was not in accordance with law. Once the foundational notice was invalid, the subsequent order u/s 148A(d), notice u/s 148 & all consequential reassessment proceedings could not independently survive.
The Tribunal accordingly quashed the notice dated 24.03.2022 & declared all subsequent proceedings to be non est in law. As the Assessee succeeded on this threshold jurisdictional ground, the remaining grounds became merely academic.
The Final Verdict
The Assessee’s appeal was allowed & the entire reassessment stood quashed.
The ruling conveys a simple but important message: when Parliament grants an assessee not less than seven days, the AO cannot borrow the first day, confiscate the last day & call the remaining five days sufficient. A statutory opportunity is not a ceremonial formality. If the mandatory clock is shortened, the reassessment clock stops altogether.
Cases Discussed
- DCIT-1(1), Raipur Vs. Avani Ferro Alloys Pvt. Ltd. — ITA Nos.88 to 91/RPR/2025, dated 06.08.2026: The Raipur Bench held that a notice under Section 148A(b) must provide seven clear days and quashed a notice that failed to satisfy the statutory requirement.
- PCCIT v. Smt. Komarla Yogendra Keertana — (2025) 307 Taxman 106 (Kar.): The Karnataka High Court held that failure to provide the minimum seven-day period under Section 148A(b) renders the notice liable to be quashed.
- Bijendra Singh v. PCCIT — (2025) 478 ITR 493 (Raj.): The Rajasthan High Court, following Pioneer Motors, held that both terminal dates are excluded when calculating a statutory period expressed as “not less than” a specified number of days.
- Pioneer Motors (Private) Ltd. v. Municipal Council, Nagercoil — AIR 1967 SC 684: The Supreme Court laid down the principle that where “not less than” a specified number of days are required to intervene, both terminal days are excluded from computation.
- Atul Mahavirprasad Paldecha v. ITO — (2025) 307 Taxman 331 (Guj.): The Gujarat High Court was referred to for the same principle concerning the minimum statutory response period under Section 148A(b).
FULL TEXT OF THE JUDGMENT/ORDER OF ITAT RAIPUR
The present appeal preferred by the assessee emanates from the order of the Ld.CIT(Appeals)/NFAC, Delhi dated 19.01.2026 for the assessment year 2018-19 as per the grounds of appeal on record.
2. The contention in law assailed by the Ld. Counsel for the assessee is that notice u/s.148A(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short ‘the Act’), dated 24.03.2022 does not provide mandatory clear cut 7 days time to the assessee for his response. That in effect, the date of issuance of notice i.e. 24.03.2022 and date of compliance sought from the assessee i.e.30.03.2022, therefore, in between there is only clear cut 5 days only which is 2 days short of mandatory requirement of clear cut 7 days time in the notice issued u/s. 148A(b) of the Act. For the sake of completeness, notice u/s. 148A(b) of the Act, dated 24.03.2022 is extracted as follows:
3. We find that similar issue has been dealt with by this Bench in favour of the assessee and against Revenue recently in the case of DCIT-1(1), Raipur Vs. Avani Ferro Alloys Pvt. Ltd, ITA Nos.88 to 91/RPR/2025, dated 06.08.2026 wherein it was held and observed as follows:
“60. The Ld. Counsel for the assessee submitted that the notice issued u/s 148A(b) on 16.03.2022 is void ab initio. He submitted that the notice called for a response on or before 23.03.2022 which does not constitute a clear 7 days as required by the mandatory provisions of section 148A(b). He submitted that the statutory mandate requires a period of ‘not less than seven days’ to be provided for compliance. He submitted that in computing this period, both the date of issuance and the date of compliance must be excluded. Consequently the jurisdictional notice is rendered void and all subsequent proceedings emanating from it are a ‘nullity and non-est in the eyes of law’.
61. Referring to the decision of Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of PCCIT vs. Smt. Komarla Yogendra Keertana reported in (2025) 307 Taxman 106 (Kar), he submitted that the Hon’ble High Court in the said decision has held that where impugned notice issued u/s 148A(b) did not provide the assessee minimum statutory period of seven days to respond, same was rightly quashed.
62. Referring to the decision of Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court in the case of Bijendra Singh vs. PCCIT reported in (2025) 478 ITR 493 (Raj), he submitted that the Hon’ble High Court in the said decision following the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pioneer Motors (Private) Ltd. vs. Municipal Counsel, Nagrecoil reported in AIR 1967 SC 684 has held that both the terminal dates have to be excluded for the purpose of complying with the requirement of words ‘not less than .. days”.
63. The Ld. DR on the other hand submitted that the Assessing Officer has issued notice u/s 148A(b) on 16.03.2022 asking the assessee to submit its details on or before 23.03.2022. Thus, a period of 7 days have been given. Therefore, the arguments advanced by the Ld. Counsel for the assessee are liable to be rejected and the notice issued is to be held as valid notice.
64. We have heard the rival arguments made by both the sides, perused the orders of the Assessing Officer and the Ld. CIT(A) / NFAC and the paper book filed on behalf of the assessee. We have also considered the various decisions cited before us. We find the Assessing Officer issued a notice under clause (b) of section 148A on 16.03.2022 by asking the assessee to submit the details in the portal on or before 23.03.2022, the details of which are as under:
65. Under these circumstances, we have to see as to whether a period of 7 days as mandated by the provisions of section 148A(b) are fulfilled or not. We find an identical issue had come up before Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court in the case of Bijendra Singh vs. PCCIT (supra). The Hon’ble High Court in the said decision while deciding the aspect of calculating the days in a case where the provision requires a notice of ‘not less than particular days’, following the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pioneer Motors (Private) Ltd. vs. Municipal Council (supra) has observed as under:
“10. Section 148A(b) of the Act requires providing opportunity of being heard to the assessee by serving upon him/her notice to show cause within such time, as may be specified in the notice being ‘not less than seven days’ but not exceeding thirty days from the date, on which such notice is issued.
11. The aspect of calculating the days in a case where the provision requires a notice of ‘not less than particular days’, has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Pioneer Motors (Private) Ltd. vs. The Municipal Council, Nagrecoil : AIR 1967 SC 684, wherein it has, inter-alia, been laid down as under:
“The words “not being less than one month” do imply that clear one month’s notice was necessary to be given, that is, both the first day and the last day of the month had to be excluded. To put it in the language used by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, p. 351 :-
“..when…….. ‘not less than’ so many days are to intervene, both the terminal days are excluded from the computation.”
12. It has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that both the terminal days have to be excluded for the purpose of complying with the requirement of words ‘not less than …. days “. Admittedly, in the present case, the notice dated 16.03.2022 was issued/posted on 17.03.2022 and the date fixed for response was 23.03.2022. Excluding two days i.e. the date of sending of the notice as well the last date indicated, even if the notice was received by the petitioner, the same falls short of seven days’ period, as envisaged by provisions of Section 148A(b) of the Act; and as such, for violation of mandatory provisions of Section 148A(b) of the Act, the notice issued to the petitioner cannot be sustained.”
66. We find the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of PCCIT vs. Smt. Komarla Yogendra Keertana (supra) has held that where impugned notice issued u/s 148A(b) did not provide the assessee minimum statutory period of seven days to respond, the same is liable to be quashed.
67. Similar view has been taken by Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the case of Atul Mahavirprasad Paldecha vs. ITO reported in (2025) 307 Taxman 331 (Guj). Since in the instant case the Assessing Officer has not given the mandatory period of clear 7 days for replying to the notice issued under clause (b) of section 148A, therefore, such notice being not in accordance with law is liable to be quashed. We, accordingly, hold that the notice issued by the Assessing Officer on 16.03.2022 under clause (b) of section 148A is not in accordance with law and therefore, the same is quashed. Since the assessee succeeds on this legal ground, the appeal filed by the Revenue becomes infructuous and the same is dismissed.
68. In the result, all the 4 appeals filed by the Revenue are dismissed”
4. That on the same parity of reasoning, since in the instant case the A.O has not given the mandatory period of clear 7 days for replying to the notice issued under clause (b) of section 148A, therefore, such notice being not in accordance with law is liable to be quashed. We, accordingly, hold that the notice issued by the Assessing Officer on 24.03.2022 under clause (b) of section 148A is not in accordance with law and therefore, the same is quashed. Rest all other subsequent proceedings are non-est as per law. Rest other grounds stands academic only.
5. In the result, appeal of the assessee is allowed.
Order pronounced in the open court on 3rd September, 2026.
