Limitation – A Perspective between Tribunals – CESTAT vis-à-vis GSTAT

Summary: The article analyses the powers of the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) and the Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal (GSTAT) to condone delays in filing appeals, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in The Property Company (P) Ltd. v. Rohinten Daddy Mazda (2026). The Supreme Court held that the Limitation Act, 1963 generally applies only to civil courts and that quasi-judicial bodies and tribunals cannot invoke Section 5 of the Act or exercise any inherent power to condone delay unless expressly authorised by the governing statute. Comparing the statutory provisions, the article notes that Section 129A(5) of the Customs Act empowers CESTAT to condone delays upon showing sufficient cause without prescribing an outer time limit, whereas Section 112(6) of the CGST Act restricts GSTAT to condoning delays only within an additional three months for appeals and forty-five days for cross-objections. It concludes that tribunals must operate strictly within their statutory limits.

Limitation – A Perspective between Tribunals – CESTAT vis-à-vis GSTAT
[By A. Rangadham, Authorized Representative, CESTAT, Hyderabad]

Human limitations may have no boundaries but legal limitations do. There has been much debate, arguments, angst, etc., on the limitations of the Tribunals in granting relief of delayed appeals.

In this context the Supreme Court in its recent decision has set the limits of the Tribunal in condoning the delay in appeals filed before it. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of The Property Company (P) Ltd., v. Rohinten Daddy Mazda – 2026 INSC 33 dt. 07-01-2026 comprehensively dealt with the question – Whether Tribunals / Quasi-judicial bodies have the power to condone the delay in filing an appeal and the principles underlying § 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 could be made applicable?

The above question was answered thus:

• In the absence of a specific provision in the special legislation expressly extending the application of the Act, 1963 to proceedings before the concerned quasi-judicial body, the thumb rule is that the rules of limitation, would remain inapplicable to quasi-judicial bodies.
• Proceedings before quasi-judicial bodies would be governed by their own prescribed period of limitation without any conflict with the timelines laid out in the Schedule to the Act, 1963.
• The Act, 1963 only applies to ‘civil courts’, unless expressly indicated otherwise in any special law governing quasi-judicial bodies.
• 5 of the Act, 1963 cannot be resorted to by statutory authorities, which are not ‘courts’. It is not to be utilized by statutory bodies for the purpose of extending time or condoning delay.
• There is no such thing as inherent power to condone delay in filing any proceedings, unless specifically warranted and permitted by law.
• When a statutory authority is ‘deemed’ to be a court for certain limited and specific purposes, it must not be taken to mean that it would be a court for any and all other purposes as well.
• 29(2) of the Act, 1963 states that, if any special or local law prescribes a certain period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, which is different from that of the Schedule to the Act, 1963, then it is that period of limitation under the special or local law which takes precedence.
• Any quasi-judicial body or tribunal which otherwise does not fall within the ambit of § 5 of the Act 1963 and which is also not specifically empowered to condone delay cannot extend time under the notion that the prescribed period is only directory. The mere use of the word ‘may’ would not indicate that a period prescribed is directory.
• The general rule insofar as quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals are concerned, is that the provisions of the Act, 1963 do not apply unless indicated otherwise. Therefore, “express inclusion” must be present.

The principles laid down in the above judgment, lays to rest any lingering doubts that may persist that the Tribunal has power to condone delay, if the special Act under which it was constituted does not provide for the same.

Power to condone delay: CESTAT VS. GSTAT: –

• 129A(5) of the Customs Act, 1962 provides that – The Appellate Tribunal may admit an appeal or permit the filing of a memorandum of cross-objections after the expiry of the relevant period referred to in sub-section (3) or sub-section (4), if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period.
• 35B(5) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 are pari materia provisions.
• 112(6) of the CGST Act, 2017 provides that – The Appellate Tribunal may admit an appeal within three months after the expiry of the period referred to in sub-section (1) or permit the filing of an application within three months after the expiry of the period referred to in sub-section (3), or permit the filing of a memorandum of cross-objections within forty-five days after the expiry of the period referred to in sub-section (5) if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period.

CESTAT being a creature of the Customs Act, 1962, must act within the dictates of the said Act. § 129A(5) expressly provides that any appeal filed before it after the expiry of the relevant period, may admit an appeal, if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the prescribed period. The qualifying words are ‘may admit’ and ‘satisfied that there was sufficient cause’. Hence, the power granted to condone the delay in filing an appeal is discretionary and it can be exercised only if sufficient cause is shown. The scope and extent of ‘sufficient cause’ is discussed later in this article.

The powers of GSTAT are circumscribed, as can be seen from the provisions of § 112(6) of the CGST Act, 2017. GSTAT has the power to permit the filing of an appeal within three months after the expiry of the period prescribed under sub-section (1) / (3). And in the case of cross-objections, permit the filing of a memorandum of cross-objections within forty-five days after the expiry of the period referred to in sub-section (5). Hence, the outer limit for permitting the filing of an appeal or cross-objection is three months or forty-five days respectively. GSTAT may permit to file the appeal within the extended period of three months only if ‘sufficient cause’ is shown.

While CESTAT has no outer limit for condoning the delay in filing an appeal / cross-objections, GSTAT has expressly been prohibited from condoning the filing of an appeal / cross-objections beyond a period of three months / forty-five days respectively.

What is ‘sufficient cause’?

The judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs v. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors [2025 INSC 1104] dt. 12-09-2025 has put the spot light on the phrase ‘sufficient cause’. It was held that –

• Mere good cause is not sufficient enough to turn back the clock and allow resuscitation of a claim otherwise barred by delay.
• The court must be satisfied that the cause is real, bona fide, and free of negligence.
• Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilize the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure.
• Length of delay is immaterial, and what matters is the acceptability of the explanation.
• In certain cases, unavoidable circumstances such as illness, fraud, miscommunication, or bona fide mistake may stretch over long periods, yet remain excusable if they are explained with candour and supported by material.
• The test is qualitative rather than quantitative. Sufficient cause must be shown in substance, not in empty form.
• The course must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. As limitation goes to the root of the matter, a court or an adjudicating authority cannot directly go to the merits of the case without deciding the issue of limitation first.
• For the purpose of seeking condonation of delay in filing of an appeal or application beyond the stipulated period of limitation, the delay in the filing has to be explained from the date of the receipt of the order up to actual date of filing of such appeal.

From the above, it is lucid that GSTAT cannot condone the delay in filing an appeal / cross-objection beyond the limit prescribed under the statute whereas CESTAT is not constrained by an outer limit. As well the Tribunal may condone a delay only subject to the party showcasing ‘sufficient cause’ for the delay. The Tribunal has no power to ignore the provision even if it may cause hardship or inconvenience to the party before it. The Tribunal has no choice but to give full effect to the provisions under which it is bound to operate. The Tribunal cannot go by lofty ideals in violation of the statutory provisions as it would amount to showing utter disregard to the statute.