It warms the innermost cockles of every nerve of my brain and heart to see that the Supreme Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Maniyar Iliyaz @ Shaik Riyaz & Anr vs P. Ayyappan & Ors in Civil Appeal No(s). 4665-4666/2025 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2026 INSC and so also in 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 632 that was pronounced just recently on June 19, 2026 declared most emphatically that the freedom to walk on demarcated and well-maintained footpaths is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution which has priority over movement by motorized vehicles and which includes the right to access safe and well-demarcated footpaths. It must be laid bare that this enriching judgment came in a case of the death of a five-year-old boy who was crushed to death by a truck tanker while walking to the neighbourhood school with his father. It must be also noted that the Apex Court clarified that the freedom to walk is subject to reasonable restrictions, but added that it must be ensured that common spaces are not monopolized by vehicle drivers alone.
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Hon’ble Mr Justice Atul S Chandurkar of the Apex Court sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “Like any young father, the appellant lovingly readied his five-year-old son and left home at 9 am to drop him at the neighbourhood school. Who could have ever imagined that it would be the last walk with his son? As father and son were walking towards the school, a tanker came from behind and struck the boy, crushing his waist and lower body. He succumbed to the injuries.”
As we see, the Bench points out in para 2 that, “Take it for granted, there was neither a footpath nor a pedestrian crossing.”
Plainly speaking, the Bench observes in para 3 that, “Accidents like this continue to occur, perhaps they are inevitable till we restructure our rights regime as regards access to roads and recognize concerned about it and is, in fact, monitoring the implementation of safety guidelines S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India in W.P. (C) No. 295/2012; this Court also passed certain guidelines in In Re: Phalodi Accident, 2026 INSC 388 as well. The issue is something more fundamental, and it is in recognition of the simplest of the simple human activity- “Walking”. While the right to walk is inextricably connected to life, our Constitution recognises and guarantees it as a fundamental right – “All citizens shall have the right…to move freely throughout the territory of India”. (Article 19(1)(d)).”
Most significantly and most forthrightly, the Bench encapsulates in para 4 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “It is necessary, rather compelling, that we first disabuse our minds of associating this “right to move” only with movement on wheels. We have started walking long before wheels were put on our path. The primary right of movement under Article 19(1)(d) is the Fundamental Right to Walk, a right that precedes the right to move on wheels and this precious right must extend to guaranteeing access to safe and well demarcated footpath. The citizen’s fundamental right to walk on a demarcated footpath is primary and shall have priority over movement by motorised vehicles.”
Most alarmingly and most commendably, the Bench envisages in para 5 holding explicitly that, “It is rather strange that we failed to focus on recognizing and securing this “right to walk”. It may be because wheels eclipsed our imagination, and our municipal administration was busy creating roads that are suitable for motorised vehicles. It could also be elitism to start with, for machines with wheels were only for the rich, but as economies progressed and cheaper motor vehicles were introduced, the entire spectrum of motorised transportation dominated the roads, pushed aside the walkers to the extent that they are treated as a nuisance for the drivers who routinely run over the walkers and their footpaths. This should stop from now on as we declare the fundamental right to walk on demarcated footpaths alongside motorised roads.”
Do note, the Bench notes in para 6 that, “The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is not and has never been the statute that recognises the fundamental right to walk. In fact, the Motor Vehicles Act has been an impediment and, in many ways, undermined the precious rights of walkers. The absence of safe and comfortable footpaths to walk on, and even when they exist, their subjugation to motor transport, has been a civilizational problem.”
To say the very least, the Bench points out in para 7 stipulating that, “It is not at all difficult to imagine how a wide, well-demarcated and uninterrupted footpath can change the beauty of and equitable access to our cities and towns – this could truly be transformative of our urban and rural living. In reality, how much does it take to create a well-demarcated footpath wherever a road exists? All that the fundamental right to walk demands is a comfortable space for an easy and carefree walk. Should this not be the minimum of the minimum duty that a municipal authority owes to the citizens?”
Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 8 while underscoring the paramount importance of walking that, “Walking has always triggered the Indian imagination- it has deep cultural, (For instance, the Nagar Sankirtan, a traditional neighbourhood procession where communities walk through streets singing devotional folk songs to reclaim public spaces as sites of shared cultural and musical heritage.) social, (For instance, the Pandharpur Wari, an 800-year-old pilgrimage that temporarily dissolves caste hierarchies as thousands walk together in egalitarian devotion.) religious (For instance, the Kanwar Yatra, an annual monsoon trek where devotees of Lord Shiva carry sacred Ganges water over hundreds of miles as an act of physical penance) political, (For instance, the Dandi March, when Mahatma Gandhi’s 241-mile padayatra transformed a simple act of walking into a powerful tool of anti-colonial resistance.) and reformative (For instance, the Bhoodan Movement, led by Vinoba Bhave, who walked over 70,000 km to persuade landowners to voluntarily redistribute land to the landless.) roots. Walking is a struggle for the not so fortunate, meditation in motion for many, resistance for others, discovery for the inquisitive, a cohesive strategy for sharp socio-political minds. It certainly did inspire and ignite some of the ideals of the freedom struggle – which we have a duty to cherish Article 51-A of the Constitution. In that sense, walking is not just motion, it certainly embodies expressional, congregational and associational rights under Article 19(1)(a), Article 19(1)(b) and Article 19 (1)(c). Unfortunately, we have failed to recognize these aspects to such an extent that the phrase “pedestrian” has acquired pejorative shades. We labour to emphasize the freedom to walk subject to reasonable restrictions, only to ensure that access to common spaces- in both urban areas and rural areas is distributed in such a way that it is not a monopoly of the motorized class alone.”
Quite significantly, the Bench underscores in para 9 propounding that, “Though late in the day, we must affirm and secure to our citizens this fundamental right to walk on demarcated footpaths. Clear articulation and declaration of such a right is necessary to recognise the correlative duty to provision and maintain footpaths. The duty bearers are the Urban Development Authorities, Municipal Corporations, Municipalities, and even Panchayats.”
Do note, the Bench notes in para 10 that, “If a road exists, there must then be a duty to ensure that a footpath is demarcated and maintained for the walkers. This is an enforceable duty. The fundamental right to walk on demarcated footpaths shall override the privilege of a motorised vehicle.”
It would be instructive to note that the Bench then hastens to add in para 16 noting precisely that, “To enhance and effectuate the fundamental right to walk on demarcated footpaths, it is necessary to establish a regulatory body. Working with perpetual seal and succession, such a regulator will develop and retain institutional memory so that it can act on the basis of the experience, data, and information it has gathered and processed. Institutional expertise is critical, and such a regulator will employ human resources with domain expertise and talent. The regulator will maintain institutional integrity by taking independent and objective decisions without governmental or industrial control. These values shall flow naturally if there is institutional transparency and accountability. It is in this perspective that we need to effectuate the fundamental right to walk.”
Most remarkably and most rationally, the Bench then expounds in para 20 holding concisely that, “Returning to the discussion and the articulation of the right, the correlative duty and followed by the constitutional statutory remedies, in conclusion, we declare as under:
a. The right to walk is a fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution. It is integral to the right to movement guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d), read with Article 19(1)(a), Article 19(1)(b), Article 19(1) (c) and Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The fundamental right to walk will take within its sweep the right to demarcated footpaths. These rights are primary and shall have priority over movement by motorised vehicles.
b. The fundamental right to walk on demarcated footpaths has a correlative duty. If the road exists, there is a duty to ensure that there are demarcated and well-maintained footpaths for walkers. The duty bearers are the urban development authorities, municipal corporations, municipalities and even panchayats, who must endeavour to demarcate, construct, maintain, and safeguard footpaths and other necessary pedestrian infrastructure, as walking is integral to life.
c. The violation of the right to walk on demarcated footpaths will entitle the citizens to invoke constitutional and legal remedies against duty bearers for restitution and compensation. This remedy is independent of the remedies that are available under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.”
It would be worthwhile to note that the Bench notes in para 17 that, “Returning to the facts of the present case, the claim petition filed by the father for compensation of Rs. 25,00,000/- was considered and MACT, by its award dated 30.05.2016, granted Rs. 7,82,000/- with interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from the date of the petition till realisation. In an appeal filed by the appellant as well as the Insurance Company, by the order impugned before us, the High Court dismissed the appellant’s appeal and, while allowing the respondent’s appeal, reduced the compensation to Rs. 4,70,000/-.”
It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 18 that, “We are of the opinion that the High Court committed an error in reducing the compensation granted by the MACT. In a recent decision in Karuna Parmar v. Prakash Sinha 2025 INSC 1244, involving a similar factual situation in which the deceased minor was 6 years old, this Court fixed the child’s daily income at Rs. 223/- and, by referring to the notification issued under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, it prescribed the wages payable to a skilled worker for the year 2014. Consequently, the monthly income was calculated at Rs. 6,690/-, and the deceased’s annual income was taken as Rs. 80,280/- (6,690 × 12). After adding 40% towards future prospects, the annual income was assessed as Rs. 1,12,392/- (80,280 + 32,112). Upon deduction of 50% towards personal and living expenses, the annual loss of dependency was determined as Rs. 56,196/-. Applying the multiplier of 18, the total loss of dependency was computed as Rs. 10,11,528/-. Applying the same to the instant case, the compensation is required to be recalculated as an amount of Rs. 10,11,528/- towards loss of dependency, an amount of Rs. 96,800/- towards loss of consortium, an amount of Rs. 18,150/- towards loss of estate and Rs. 18,150 towards funeral expenses.”
Adding more to it, the Bench then as a corollary directs and holds in para 19 that, “In this view of the matter, the appellant(s) will be entitled to compensation of Rs. 11,44,628/- and the amount shall be paid within a period of two months from today.”
As an aside, the Bench then graciously records in para 21 that, “We place on record the valuable assistance rendered by Mr. Mamidipudi V Mukunda, learned counsel appointed as amicus curiae. We direct the Registry to re-number this case as a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution by changing the cause title to Re: Fundamental Right to Walk and Footpath. The Government of India, through the Ministries of Housing and Urban Affairs, Rural Development and Road Transport and Highways, is impleaded as a party in person. We request Mr. K.M. Nataraj, ASG, to assist the court.”
Finally, the Bench then aptly concludes by directing and holding in para 22 that, “The appeal(s) and pending application(s), if any, are disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs.”
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