Filing of Challan Or Charge-Sheet Is Not By Itself a Bar To Grant Of Anticipatory Bail: Jharkhand High Court
It is definitely entirely in the fitness of things and so also perfectly in order that the Jharkhand High Court at Ranchi in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Abhay Kumar Mishra Vs The State of Jharkhand & Anr. in A.B.A. No. 3354 of 2026 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2026:JHHC:18476 that was pronounced just recently on 24.06.2026 has minced absolutely just no words to hold indubitably that the filing of challan or charge-sheet is not by itself a bar to grant of anticipatory bail. It must be noted that in this noteworthy judgment that was pronounced by the Single Judge Bench of the Jharkhand High Court at Ranchi comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, the Court granted anticipatory bail to Abhay Kumar Mishra who is the former Secretary of a school who apprehended arrest in connection with a 2017 police case pertaining to serious allegations of cheating, forgery and criminal breach of trust. It is also further clarified by the Ranchi High Court that as long as a genuine apprehension of arrest exists, an anticipatory bail application remains maintainable even after the investigation has concluded and summons have been issued by the Trial Court.
At the very outset, this progressive, pragmatic, persuasive and pertinent judgment authored by the Single Judge Bench of the Jharkhand High Court at Ranchi comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “Heard Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, Mr. Saket Kumar, learned A.P.P. appearing for the State and Mr. Mahesh Tewari, learned counsel, who is appearing in person for the informant.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 2 that, “The petitioner is apprehending his arrest in connection with Jagarnathpur P.S. Case No. 314 of 2017 corresponding to G.R. No. 4984 of 2017, registered for the offence under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 379 and 120(B)/34 of the Indian Penal Code, pending in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class-IV, Ranchi.”
While elaborating on the most relevant point, the Bench puts forth in para 3 that, “Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner at the outset submits that this matter is arising out of the FIR of the year 2017 and earlier the petitioner has filed Cr.M.P. No. 1990 of 2021 for quashing of the entire criminal proceedings. He next submits that in that Cr.M.P., the petitioner was provided the interim protection, as such, the petitioner has no occasion to file the anticipatory bail application. He then submits that however, the said interim protection has been vacated, but the case is still pending. He further submits that now the chargesheet has been submitted by the police and the petitioner has co-operated in the investigation and in view of that anticipatory bail may kindly be provided to the petitioner.”
Delving deeper into the petitioner’s version, the Bench observes in para 4 that, “Learned senior counsel submits that the informant is nowhere involved with the concerned society or not associated with the concerned school, however, he has chosen to file the FIR against the petitioner. He next submits that the petitioner was elected as the Secretary of the School in the year 2015 and for that the dispute arose and pursuant to that all false allegations have been made against the petitioner. He then submits that the allegations are made for a tender of the school building, however, the school building has already been completed and that was sanctioned by the competent authority. He further submits that there was a typographical error in preparation of the note-sheet, as in place of six class rooms, it has wrongly been typed as five class rooms, however, the same was corrected later on by the petitioner. He also submits that now the chargesheet has already been submitted on 31.12.2023. He also submits that for the identical allegation, another case being Chutia P.S. Case No. 130 of 2022 has also been lodged against the petitioner and others, in which, the petitioner has already been provided the privilege of anticipatory bail in A.B.A. No. 1629 of 2025 by the co-ordinate bench of this court and other two of the co-accused persons have also been provided the privilege of anticipatory bail in the said case in A.B.A. Nos. 3962 and 3967 of 2025 by this court.”
As a corollary, the Bench then concedes in para 10 observing that, “In view of the above submissions of learned counsel appearing for the parties, the court has gone through the materials including the annexures as well as the counter affidavit filed by the informant. It is an admitted position that the case is arising out of a police investigation and now the chargesheet has been submitted on 31.12.2023 and the learned court has been pleased to take cognizance against the petitioner and further summons have also been issued against the petitioner.”
It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 13 that, “It transpires that the said case is arising out of a private complaint case, in which, the co-ordinate bench of this court has rejected the anticipatory bail application and directed the accused to surrender before the learned court and seek the regular bail and in this background, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that there is inquiry under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C., as such, the said direction of the High Court was unwarranted and it has been clarified that in a private complaint case, there is no need of arrest and the accused is required to appear before the learned court, however, the facts of the present case is otherwise, as the petitioner was earlier protected by the co-ordinate bench of this court, which was later on vacated and further the present case is arising out of a police case and after investigation the chargesheet has been submitted and the petitioner has already co-operated in the investigation and pursuant to that the chargesheet has been submitted, however apprehension is there to the petitioner, on appearance, he can be taken into custody.”
Most rationally, the Bench points out in para 14 that, “There is no restriction of entertaining the petition if any apprehension is there. In the way, the things in the present case has gone as subsequently, another FIR has been lodged in the year 2020, in which, the petitioner and others have already been provided the privilege of anticipatory bail, it cannot be ruled out that the petitioner is not having apprehension on his appearance, as the case is arising out of the police investigation, as such, the judgment, on which, Mr. Tewari has relied was dealing with a private complaint case, in which, the ratio has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the facts of the present case are otherwise. Accordingly, the court finds that if there is apprehension, the anticipatory bail can be maintained.”
Most significantly, the Bench encapsulates in para 18 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “The filing of a challan or charge-sheet is not, by itself, a bar to the grant of anticipatory bail. An application under Section 438 CrPC corresponding to Section 482 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 cannot be rejected solely on that ground. The court must consider the application on its merits and in light of the facts and circumstances of the case. Reference may be made to the case of Ravindra Saxena’s v. state of Rajasthan reported in (2010) 1 SCC 684 . where in the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paras-9, 10 and 11, has held as under:
9. In our opinion, the High Court ought not to have left the matter to the Magistrate only on the ground that the challan has now been presented. There is also no reason to deny anticipatory bail merely because the allegation in this case pertains to cheating or forgery of a valuable security. The merits of these issues shall have to be assessed at the time of the trial of the accused persons and denial of anticipatory bail only on the ground that the challan has been presented would not satisfy the requirements of Sections 437 and 438 CrPC.
10. In our opinion, the High Court committed a serious error of law in not applying its mind to the facts and circumstances of this case. The High Court is required to exercise its discretion upon examination of the facts and circumstances and to grant anticipatory bail “if it thinks fit”. The aforesaid expression has been explained by this Court in Gurbaksh Singh case [(1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] as follows : (SCC p. 583, para 18)
“18. … The expression ‘if it thinks fit’, which occurs in Section 438(1) in relation to the power of the High Court or the Court of Session, is conspicuously absent in Section 437(1). We see no valid reason for rewriting Section 438 with a view, not to expanding the scope and ambit of the discretion conferred on the High Court and the Court of Session but, for the purpose of limiting it. Accordingly, we are unable to endorse the view of the High Court that anticipatory bail cannot be granted in respect of offences like criminal breach of trust for the mere reason that the punishment provided therefor is imprisonment for life. Circumstances may broadly justify the grant of bail in such cases too, though of course, the court is free to refuse anticipatory bail in any case if there is material before it justifying such refusal.”
11. The salutary provision contained in Section 438 CrPC was introduced to enable the court to prevent the deprivation of personal liberty. It cannot be permitted to be jettisoned on technicalities such as “the challan having been presented, anticipatory bail cannot be granted”. We may notice here some more observations made by this Court in Gurbaksh Singh [(1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] : (SCC p. 586, para 26)
“26. We find a great deal of substance in Mr Tarkunde’s submission that since denial of bail amounts to deprivation of personal liberty, the court should lean against the imposition of unnecessary restrictions on the scope of Section 438, especially when no such restrictions have been imposed by the legislature in the terms of that section. Section 438 is a procedural provision which is concerned with the personal liberty of the individual, who is entitled to the benefit of the presumption of innocence since he is not, on the date of his application for anticipatory bail, convicted of the offence in respect of which he seeks bail. An overgenerous infusion of constraints and conditions which are not to be found in Section 438 can make its provisions constitutionally vulnerable since the right to personal freedom cannot be made to depend on compliance with unreasonable restrictions. The beneficent provision contained in Section 438 must be saved, not jettisoned. No doubt can linger after the decision in Maneka Gandhi [Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248], that in order to meet the challenge of Article 21 of the Constitution, the procedure established by law for depriving a person of his liberty must be fair, just and reasonable. Section 438, in the form in which it is conceived by the legislature, is open to no exception on the ground that it prescribes a procedure which is unjust or unfair. We ought, at all costs, to avoid throwing it open to a constitutional challenge by reading words in it which are not to be found therein.””
Resultantly, the Bench directs and holds in para 19 that, “In the attending facts and circumstances of the case, I am inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner, above named.”
Finally, the Bench then concludes aptly by directing and holding in para 20 that, “Accordingly, the petitioner, named above, is directed to surrender before the learned court within three weeks from today and in the event of his surrender/arrest, the petitioner shall be released on bail, on furnishing bail bonds of Rs. 25,000/- (twenty five thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each, to the satisfaction of learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class-IV, Ranchi, in connection with Jagarnathpur P.S. Case No. 314 of 2017 corresponding to G.R. No. 4987 of 2017, subject to the condition that the petitioner will co-operate in the trial and further subject to conditions as laid down under Section 482 (2) of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.”
In a nutshell, we thus see that the Jharkhand High Court has made it indubitably clear that filing of challan or a charge-sheet is not by itself a bar to grant of anticipatory bail. It is incumbent that Judges all across India should strictly pay heed to what the Ranchi High Court has held so explicitly, elegantly, eloquently and effectively in this leading case! No denying or disputing it!
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