Summary: The Supreme Court in Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule & Ors. clarified that applications for extension of an arbitral tribunal’s mandate under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 must be filed before the “Court” defined under Section 2(1)(e), and not necessarily before the High Court or Supreme Court that appointed the arbitrator under Section 11. The dispute arose after a substitute arbitrator appointed by the Bombay High Court failed to conclude the proceedings within the statutory period, leading the Commercial Court to grant an extension, which was challenged on jurisdictional grounds. The Court held that an appointing court becomes functus officio after appointing the arbitrator and does not retain supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings. It also rejected the argument based on Section 42, holding that proceedings under Section 11 are not before a “Court” as defined under Section 2(1)(e). The judgment establishes that jurisdiction is determined by the statutory framework rather than by the identity of the appointing authority, providing procedural clarity for Section 29A applications.
Introduction
Arbitration is often described as a faster and more efficient alternative to traditional litigation.. But what happens when the process chosen to avoid delays becomes stalled because arbitrators fail to meet the prescribed deadline? In such situations, parties need to step into a court to extend the timeline.
Now this provision gave rise to an important jurisdictional question that had generated conflicting decisions across several High Courts, i.e., which court has the authority to extend the tribunal’s mandate? The Hon’ble Supreme Court addressed this issue in “Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule & Ors.”, 2026 INSC 92, bringing clarity to an area of arbitration law: whether the court that appointed the arbitrator or the “Court” as defined under Section 2(1)(e) has the authority to extend the tribunal’s mandate.
Background of the Dispute
The dispute arose from a family settlement deed among members of the Chowgule family in Goa. After arbitration was invoked, the presiding arbitrator resigned and a substitute arbitrator was appointed by the Bombay High Court under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. When the tribunal failed to render its award within the statutory period, the respondent obtained an extension under Section 29A from the Commercial Court. Sheela Chowgule challenged this order, arguing that only the High Court, which had appointed the arbitrator, could extend the tribunal’s mandate.
Proceedings before high court
The matter eventually reached High Court. A Single Judge referred the matter to a Division Bench. One view accepted Sheela Chowgule’s contention, holding that the appointing High Court alone had jurisdiction to grant an extension. This gave rise to a key question regarding the interpretation of “Court” under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act. Since Section 29A contains no indication that a different meaning should apply, the statutory definition of “Court” became central to resolving the jurisdictional dispute.
Interpretation of Section 2(1)(e)
The confusion deepened because the Arbitration Act defines “Court” very precisely in Section 2(1)(e) which provides a open ended definition of “Court” for the purposes of the Act. Unless a particular provision indicates otherwise, this definition must govern the interpretation of the term wherever it appears. It specifically identifies which courts qualify as a “Court” under the Act. Unless the text of a specific provision provides a clear reason to depart from this definition, it must be followed. There is nothing in Section 29A that provides any such reason.
The Supreme Court’s Reasoning
The Doctrine of “Functus Officio”
The appointing court’s role ends with the appointment of the arbitrator. When the High Court or the Supreme Court appoints an arbitrator under Section 11, the court becomes “functus officio”, meaning its function is complete and it has no further role . Such appointment does not create a continuing supervisory jurisdiction over the proceedings.
Jurisdiction Does Not Flow From Hierarchy
The Hon’ble court rejected the misconception to assume that the Supreme Court or High Court keeps a watch over the conduct of arbitral proceedings like Orwell’s “Big Brother is watching you.” Hierarchy is not a source of jurisdiction. Referring to Dicey’s statement that, “however high you may be, the law is above you,” the Court emphasised that law, and law alone, is the source of jurisdiction.
The respondents (Sheela Chowgule’s) Argument Under Section 42 for keeping the matter before the same court
One additional argument considered by the court was based on Section 42 of the Act, provides that once an application is filed before a court, all subsequent applications must be made before the same court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court rejected this argument on the ground that the High Court, while exercising powers under Section 11, is not a “Court” within the meaning of Section 2(1)(e) of the Act.
Significance of the Judgement
This judgment provides procedural clarity for parties involved in domestic arbitration across India. That uncertain procedure increased costs for the parties and wasted the time of those who had chosen arbitration precisely to avoid such consequences.
Now the jurisdiction under the Act is determined by the statutory framework and not by the identity of the authority that appointed the arbitrator.
Whenever the mandate of an arbitral tribunal expires and an extension is required under Section 29A, parties need not approach the High Court or the Supreme Court merely because one of these appointed the arbitrator under Section 11. Instead, they must identify the appropriate “court” as defined under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act and file the application before that court.
Conclusion
The Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in this judgment serves as a reminder of enduring constitutional importance. By holding that jurisdiction to extend an arbitral tribunal’s mandate must be determined in accordance with Section 2(1)(e), When Parliament defines a term, that definition must be respected. As Dicey reminded us, “however high you may be, the law is above you,” and The Hon’ble Supreme Court simply held every court, including itself, to that standard.
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