Case Law Details
Rule 2 (1) (b) provides the qualification to be a Member. Needless to say, the same is in total accord with the Act. The first proviso to Rule 5 introduces part time Member. We have held that the said proviso, as far as it introduces the concept of part time Member, is contrary to the provision contained in the enabling Act. Section 46 of the Act nowhere envisages about the part time Members.
The second proviso, we have already mentioned, is an innovative one. Thereafter, we have at length referred to the qualifications for a person to be a Member who is eligible to be a district judge. Once we have held that there cannot be a part time Member, a person who is qualified to be a district judge can be a Member if he meets the criterion laid down in the pronouncements of this Court. They are strictly followed. We really perceive no justification for the introduction of the second proviso to bring in officers from the Indian Legal Service who are qualified to become district judges to be part time Members. If the officer satisfies the requisite qualification, he can be appointed as a Member. Therefore, in our consideration, the second proviso has been incorporated to bring in only part time Members and once the introduction of part time Members is treated to be ultra vires the Act, the rest part of the Rule is absolutely redundant. To repeat at the cost of repetition, if the officer belonging to Indian Legal Services is qualified to be a district judge, he can compete and be selected for the post of Member and that qualification is to be in accord with the pronouncements of law of this Court.
The High Court, as we find, had quashed the appointment of part time Members and the appointment of Chairperson who was a part time Member once. As the appointment of part time Member was quashed, as a logical corollary, such a person could not be allowed to be appointed to the post of Chairperson. To elaborate; the disqualified Member cannot hold the post of a Chairperson as a stop gap arrangement. Thus, we do not find any error in that regard in the judgment passed by the High Court.
At this juncture, we are obliged to clarify the position further. This Court while issuing notice had granted stay on the operation of the judgment. We have been apprised by Mr. Bhatt that the Central Government, at present, has been scrupulously following the mandate of the Act and only qualified persons are appointed as Members and Chairperson. To avoid any confusion, we clarify that the judgments and orders passed by the Appellate Tribunal by the Chairperson or Members who were not qualified and whose appointments have been quashed shall not be treated to be null and void. In this regard we may refer with profit the decisions in Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh [AIR 1981 SC 1473] and M.M. Gupta and others v. State of J. & K. and others [AIR 1982 SC 1579] wherein this Court, while quashing the appointments of the respondents, had clarified that the orders and judgments delivered by them during the period they had continued to function as district judges on the basis of invalid appointments could not be rendered as legally invalid and void. In the larger interest of justice, they are treated as valid and binding. Relying on the said dictum, we clarify the position accordingly.
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