Amresh Shrivastava Vs State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (Supreme Court of India)
Summary: The Supreme Court of India, comprising Justices Abhay S. Oka and Augustine George Masih, allowed the appeal filed by Amresh Shrivastava against the State of Madhya Pradesh and others, setting aside the judgment dated 30 April 2019 passed by the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Gwalior Bench, and restoring the Single Judge’s order dated 26 April 2017 quashing the disciplinary chargesheet issued against him. The dispute concerned the initiation of departmental proceedings against a Tehsildar for a land settlement order passed in the exercise of quasi-judicial powers approximately 14 years before issuance of the chargesheet. The principal legal questions were whether an allegedly incorrect quasi-judicial order, without supporting material showing misconduct or extraneous considerations, could justify departmental action and whether unexplained inordinate delay could itself furnish a ground for quashing the proceedings. The appellant also invoked protection under the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985, but the Supreme Court’s operative reasoning turned on the nature of the alleged misconduct and the substantial delay rather than a general declaration of immunity for revenue officers.
The appellant was appointed as Naib Tehsildar on 15 June 1981 and promoted as Tehsildar on 31 December 1991. While posted in Gwalior district, he exercised statutory powers under Section 57(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959. Kuber Singh and Madho Singh, sons of Suraj Singh, had applied for settlement of 1.500 hectares of land bearing Survey No. 1123/Min-3 situated in Village Barua. Notices were issued, no objections were received, and the Gram Panchayat passed a resolution confirming that the applicants were cultivating the land and recording no objection to settlement in their favour. Having considered the applicable procedure and the Patwari’s statement, the appellant passed the land settlement order on 26 June 1997, subject to prescribed conditions. The order was not challenged through statutory remedies and attained finality. Nevertheless, on 21 September 2009, the Collector, Gwalior, issued a show-cause notice alleging that the land had been settled in favour of ineligible persons contrary to the applicable rules, enabling subsequent transfer of land originally vested in the State. A chargesheet dated 29 April 2011 alleged irregularity and dishonesty in the exercise of statutory powers.
The appellant challenged the chargesheet before the Madhya Pradesh High Court through Writ Petition No. 7114/2011, contending that the impugned land settlement order had been made in the discharge of quasi-judicial functions and that the authorities had not alleged any bribery, gratification, extraneous influence or deliberate misconduct. He argued that an incorrect judicial or quasi-judicial determination could be challenged through the statutory appellate or revisional process but should not automatically become the subject of departmental disciplinary proceedings. He also emphasised the prolonged delay between the 1997 land settlement order and the 2011 chargesheet. The Single Judge accepted the challenge and quashed the chargesheet and disciplinary proceedings because the delay remained unexplained. The State appealed, and the Division Bench reversed that decision by relying on Union of India & Others v. K.K. Dhawan, (1993) 2 SCC 56 (Supreme Court). It reasoned that officers exercising quasi-judicial powers could still face disciplinary proceedings if they acted negligently, recklessly, dishonestly or to confer undue benefits.
Before the Supreme Court, the appellant submitted that the High Court had incorrectly applied K.K. Dhawan because the chargesheet merely questioned the legal correctness of the land settlement order and did not disclose material suggesting corruption, dishonest motive or outside influence. He relied on Virendra Kumar Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Others, Civil Appeal No. 1159 of 2015, decided on 22 January 2015 (Supreme Court), in which departmental proceedings against a revenue officer exercising quasi-judicial powers had been quashed in the absence of allegations showing extraneous considerations. The appellant further referred to Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India & Others, (1999) 7 SCC 409 (Supreme Court) and Krishna Prasad Verma through Legal Representatives v. State of Bihar & Others, (2019) 10 SCC 640 (Supreme Court), supporting the distinction between errors of judgment and actionable misconduct. The State maintained that a Tehsildar remained bound by the statutory conditions governing land settlement and that exercising quasi-judicial functions did not authorise illegal orders. However, its counsel could not provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay or supporting material establishing the alleged extraneous influence.
The Supreme Court examined the six categories identified in K.K. Dhawan in which disciplinary proceedings may be justified against an officer exercising quasi-judicial powers. These include conduct reflecting adversely on integrity, good faith or devotion to duty; prima facie recklessness or misconduct; behaviour unbecoming of a government servant; negligence or omission of essential statutory conditions; conduct intended to favour a party improperly; and action motivated by corruption or gratification. The Court clarified that these categories are guides to determining when disciplinary action may be justified, not rigid requirements applicable without regard to the particular facts. Equally, a merely erroneous order or technical violation does not automatically constitute misconduct. The decisive inquiry is whether the officer’s conduct displays characteristics taking it beyond a bona fide error in the exercise of adjudicatory functions. This distinction also features in judicial discussions of protection for officers exercising quasi-judicial powers.
Applying these principles, the Court found that the allegations against Amresh Shrivastava essentially concerned a wrongful land settlement order. The material contained in the show-cause notice and chargesheet did not demonstrate that the order had been influenced by extraneous considerations, gratification or dishonest motives. The Court observed that the circumstances indicated that the order had been passed in good faith. The charges therefore did not warrant disciplinary proceedings merely because the State subsequently considered the land settlement legally incorrect. The Court accepted the appellant’s reliance on the earlier decisions concerning the limits of departmental action against officers performing quasi-judicial functions. It accordingly answered the first question in the appellant’s favour, without holding that quasi-judicial officers enjoy absolute immunity from disciplinary proceedings.
On the second question, the Court held that the effect of delay must be evaluated with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case. An unexplained delay may justify quashing disciplinary proceedings where the relevant conduct had long been known to the department and no proper reason existed for postponing action. However, the Court also recognised that delay would not necessarily defeat disciplinary proceedings where the department had been unaware of the irregularities or subsequently discovered material indicating serious misconduct, extraneous influence or gratification. The Court referred to State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh & Another, 1990 Supp SCC 738 (Supreme Court), where disciplinary proceedings initiated after a delay of approximately twelve years were not permitted to continue, and P.V. Mahadevan v. Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Housing Board, (2005) 6 SCC 636 (Supreme Court), emphasising the injustice, mental distress and reputational harm arising from unnecessarily delayed departmental proceedings. In the appellant’s case, the prolonged delay remained unexplained even though the alleged irregularity related to a long-standing land settlement order.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the circumstances justified interference both because the chargesheet was founded on an allegedly erroneous quasi-judicial order without supporting material indicating actionable misconduct and because of the inordinate unexplained delay. The appeal was allowed; the Division Bench judgment dated 30 April 2019 was set aside, and the Single Judge’s order dated 26 April 2017 quashing the chargesheet and disciplinary proceedings was restored. The Court made no order as to costs and disposed of all pending applications. The ruling provides guidance for disciplinary authorities dealing with officers exercising statutory adjudicatory functions: an incorrect decision is not by itself sufficient to establish misconduct, while serious allegations of corruption, recklessness or extraneous influence supported by material may justify proceedings. The reason for delay and the department’s knowledge of the alleged conduct remain material when deciding whether proceedings should continue.
Cases Discussed
- Krishna Prasad Verma through LRs. v. State of Bihar & Others, (2019) 10 SCC 640 (Supreme Court) — Relied upon concerning disciplinary proceedings against judicial officers and the distinction between an incorrect decision and misconduct based on extraneous considerations.
- Virendra Kumar Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Others, Civil Appeal No. 1159 of 2015; 22/01/2015 (Supreme Court) — Relied upon as a closely comparable decision concerning disciplinary proceedings arising from a revenue officer’s quasi-judicial order under Section 57(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959.
- P.V. Mahadevan v. Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Housing Board, (2005) 6 SCC 636 (Supreme Court) — Followed concerning the adverse consequences of undue delay in initiating departmental proceedings.
- Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India & Others, (1999) 7 SCC 409 (Supreme Court) — Relied upon for the distinction between legal errors in quasi-judicial decision-making and disciplinary misconduct.
- Union of India & Others v. K.K. Dhawan, (1993) 2 SCC 56 (Supreme Court) — Analysed extensively. The Supreme Court clarified the six illustrative situations in which disciplinary proceedings may be initiated against officers exercising quasi-judicial functions.
- State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh & Another, 1990 Supp SCC 738 (Supreme Court) — Followed concerning unreasonable delay in initiating disciplinary proceedings.
FULL TEXT OF THE JUDGMENT OF SUPREME COURT
1. This appeal challenges the judgment dated 30.04.2019 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh Bench at Gwalior (hereinafter referred to as “Impugned Judgment”) whereby the High Court allowed the Writ Appeal filed by the Respondents, reversing the Order of the learned Single Judge dated 26.04.2017, which quashed the chargesheet dated 29.04.2011 issued to the Appellant. As a result, the disciplinary proceedings and the chargesheet were revived.
2. Facts in instant case are that the Appellant was appointed as Naib Tehsildar on 15.06.1981 and was promoted to Tehsildar on 31.12.1991. Between July 1993 and September 1998, he was posted as Tehsildar in Gwalior district, where he performed various functions, including quasi-judicial duties. An application filed by Kuber Singh and Madho Singh, sons of Suraj Singh for settlement of land measuring 1.500 Hect. of survey no. 1123/Min-3 situated in Village Barua. After issuing notice, no objections were received. The gram panchayat was consulted and passed a resolution stating that the applicants were cultivating the land and had no objections to the settlement in their favour. Following the procedure as prescribed under the rules as also the statement of the Patwari, the said application was allowed subject to certain conditions. Appellant as a quasi-judicial authority passed a land settlement order dated 26.06.1997. The said order was not challenged and the same attained finality.
3. After a significant delay, a Show Cause Notice dated 21.09.2009 was issued to the Appellant by the Collector of District Gwalior. The notice alleged that the land settlement was granted to ineligible persons in an illegal manner, contrary to the rules. It further stated that the mutation order led to the land being sold, which originally vested in the State Government, causing undue benefit to the parties due to negligence and carelessness in duty.
3.1 Subsequently, Chargesheet dated 29.04.2011 was issued to the Appellant by the Commissioner, Gwalior stating that he had executed the land settlement in Survey No. 1123/min-3 illegally, which was indicative of dishonesty.
4. When the chargesheet was issued to him after 13 years, the Appellant challenged it by filing Writ Petition No. 7114/2011 before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh on 19.10.2011, seeking protection under the provisions of the Judges Protection Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as “JPA 1985”). He asserted that he had exercised his powers under Section 57(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959. He argued that the Orders were issued in exercise of quasi-judicial functions. He further contended that inordinate delay, without any conclusion of extraneous influence or misconduct, should bar departmental proceedings.
5. The learned Single Judge decided the Writ in favour of the Appellant, quashing the chargesheet and setting aside the disciplinary proceedings initiated solely on the ground of delay, with their being no explanation thereto for such delay.
6. Assailing the order passed by learned Single Judge. The Respondent No.1 (hereinafter referred to as “respondent-State”) preferred a Writ Appeal, which was allowed. The Division Bench while allowing the appeal, held that an officer who exercise judicial or quasi-judicial powers exercising negligently or recklessly, or in order to confer undue favour on a person, is not acting as a judge. In situations where a government officer acts negligently or fails to meet the prescribed conditions essential for exercising statutory powers, thereby conferring undue favor on a party and compromising their reputation for integrity, good faith, or devotion to duty, departmental proceedings can be initiated if disciplinary action is not taken for violating the conduct rules.
6.1 The Division Bench relied on the decision of this Court in Union of India and others vs. K.K. Dhawan1. Consequently, the Order of the Single Judge was set aside, reviving the chargesheet, while also directing for the completion of the departmental inquiry expeditiously.
7. Learned Senior Advocate and Counsels for the Appellant assailed the Impugned Judgment on the ground that the chargesheet issued against the Appellant would not fall within the ambit and scope of the decision in K.K. Dhawan (supra) which was relied on by the Division Bench for setting aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge. He contended that the Respondent-State’s allegations in the Show Cause Notice and Chargesheet merely suggested that the order was wrong and not in accordance with law. There were no allegations of extraneous influence, bribery, or gratification.
8. To substantiate his argument, the Appellant relied upon the decision of this Court in Virendra Kumar Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Others, wherein a revenue officer in similar facts and circumstances from the State of Madhya Pradesh was made to face departmental proceedings after an inordinate delay against an order passed by him in exercise of his powers as a Tehsildar.
8.1 This Court had ruled that in absence of allegations of extraneous influence, departmental proceedings should not be initiated merely because a quasi-judicial order was incorrect.
8.2 The Appellant on this basis, submits that the charges against the said officer were similar to those made against the Appellant and also the stand taken by the Respondents before the High Court, the judgment of this Court would apply in full force.
9. Further reliance was also placed upon the judgment of this Court in Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar vs. Union of India and Others2, where this Court had held the quasi-judicial officer’s error in judgment does not automatically imply misconduct or favouritism. Disciplinary action requires clear evidence of extraneous influence beyond mere legal mistakes to avoid undermining judicial independence. Similarly, in case of Krishna Prasad Verma through Lrs. vs. State of Bihar and Others3, this Court clarified that while wrong orders by judicial officers should not automatically lead to disciplinary action unless there are allegations of misconduct based on extraneous influences. The remedy under such circumstances would be available to the parties concerned to avail all the remedies available under law. It was further reiterated that unless there are clear cut allegations of misconduct, extraneous influences, gratification of any kind etc., disciplinary proceedings should not be initiated merely on the basis that a wrong order has been passed by the judicial officer or merely on the ground that the judicial order is incorrect.
10. Counsel for the Appellant argues that the 14 – year delay in issuing the chargesheet is excessive and unexplained. This significant delay supports the claim that the departmental inquiry should not continue at such a late stage.
11. Accordingly, employee should not be made to suffer, which means that prompt action must be taken by the department. At the very outset, counsel states that in cases where an order has been passed in exercise of quasi-judicial functions, the statutory remedy available against that order should be pursued unless it was passed under extraneous considerations and there is reasonable justification or material to support such a conclusion. He accordingly prayed for the present appeal to be allowed.
12. Counsel for the Respondent-State, on the other hand, has vehemently opposed the present appeal and supported the Impugned Order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. It is their contention that the Appellant while exercising his powers as a Tehsildar, is a Revenue Officer, and therefore a quasi-judicial officer is bound by the statute. The mandate of the statute, therefore, need to be followed and given effect, which has not been done by the Appellant. What is expected from him is to at least determine the eligibility of the person for the grant of settlement. A licence was not given to the officer to pass illegal orders in contravention to provisions of law which would indicate dishonesty. Counsel for the Respondent-State is unable to address the delay in the issuance of the chargesheet. However, he has submitted that time should not be considered a factor in such matters where departmental proceedings are initiated against an employee. He was unable to provide any material evidence suggesting extraneous considerations or influences that would place this case outside the protection afforded by the law as settled by this Court. Counsel based on the above prayed for dismissal of the appeal.
13. We have considered the submissions made by the counsels for both the parties.
14. The facts as have been narrated above are not in dispute. Two aspects which need to be considered are:
(1) Whether the chargesheet issued to the Appellant by the Respondent-State would fall within the scope of observations that have been carved out by this Court in K.K. Dhawan case (supra)?
(2) Whether inordinate unexplained delay in issuance of the chargesheet (in this case 14 years) would in itself be a ground for quashing the chargesheet issued to the appellant?
15. As regards the first question in K.K. Dhawan case (supra), this Court carved out the following situations where the government is not precluded from taking disciplinary actions for violation of the Code of Conduct: –
“(i) Where the officer had acted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation for integrity or good faith or devotion to duty;
(ii) If there is prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of his duty;
(iii) if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a Government servant;
(iv) if he had acted negligently or that he omitted the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory powers;
(v) if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party;
(vi) if he had been actuated by corrupt motive however, small the bribe may be because Lord Coke said long ago “though the bribe may be small, yet the fault is great.”
After carving out the above exceptions, this Court proceeded to further observe that mere technical violations or the fact that an order is wrong, if not falling under the above enumerated instances, does not warrant disciplinary actions. It was further reiterated that each case depends on its facts, and absolute rules cannot be postulated. The above instances as referred and reproduced hereinabove, are thus only a guide and not meant to be mandatorily adhere to without exception.
16. In the present case, we are of the considered view that the charges alleged against the Appellant in the chargesheet fall under the category of a wrongful order, which does not appear to have been influenced by extraneous factors or any form of gratification. It appears that the order has been passed in good faith, without any indication of dishonesty. Furthermore, the facts outlined in the Show Cause Notice do not suggest any such impropriety. The power exercised by the Appellant in his capacity as a Tehsildar, while passing the order of Land Settlement Order, cannot be considered of a nature that would warrant disciplinary proceedings against him. The decision relied upon by the Counsel for the Appellant as mentioned above, supports this view. Consequently, the first question is answered in favor of the Appellant.
17. As to the second question, regarding whether delay is a ground for stopping the departmental proceedings at the stage of the chargesheet itself, suffice it to say that this varies from case to case. However, in the instant case where there is unexplained inordinate delay in initiating departmental proceedings despite the alleged misconduct being within the knowledge of the department, but still no departmental proceedings are initiated, the answer must go in favour of the employee. However, there may be cases where the department was not even aware of such irregularities or the misconduct, which is of such a nature that it is indicative, based on material considerations of factors other than merit, such as extraneous influences and gratifications. In such cases, such a delay, by itself would not be a valid ground to scuttle the initiation of the process of departmental proceedings.
18. Reference in this regard can be made to the decision of this court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Bani Singh and Another4, wherein the court noted that there was no reason to interfere with the quashing as the disciplinary proceedings were initiated after 12 years of delay. A reference should also be made to the decision of this Court in P.V. Mahadevan vs. MD, T.N. Housing Board5, where it has been reiterated that continuing the departmental proceedings after an undue delay would be unjust, causing unnecessary mental distress and damaging the reputation of the employee for the mistakes committed by the department in initiating disciplinary proceedings.
19. In view of the above, the present appeal is allowed and the Impugned Judgment dated 30.04.2019 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside and consequently the order dated 26.04.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge stands restored.
20. There shall be no order as to costs.
21. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
Notes:
1 (1993) 2 SCC 56
2 (1999) 7 SCC 409
3 (2019) 10 SCC 640
4 1990 (Suppl.) SCC 738
5 2005 (6) SCC 636
