Mayank Jain Vs Union of India & Ors. (Delhi High Court)
LinkedIn Account Restriction: Delhi High Court Dismisses Writ Petition Against Private Platform
Summary: The Delhi High Court has dismissed a writ petition challenging the restriction of a LinkedIn account, holding that the platform and its resident grievance officer were not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 in the circumstances considered.
In Mayank Jain v. Union of India & Ors., W.P.(C) 16207/2026, Justice Amit Mahajan ruled that LinkedIn’s role in facilitating expression and public discourse did not, by itself, constitute the performance of a public duty or governmental function. The judgment, delivered on 2 November 2026, addresses the maintainability of the petition rather than the substantive correctness of the account restriction.
Background of the Dispute
The petitioner approached the High Court alleging that LinkedIn Technology Information Private Limited had restricted his account without any prior warning. According to him, the platform neither disclosed the specific provision of its User Agreement or Professional Community Policies allegedly violated nor identified the activity or conduct underlying its decision.
He further contended that repeated representations, appeals and requests for a manual review had produced only repetitive, template-based responses. These responses allegedly referred to the “number and/or severity” of unspecified violations without furnishing supporting material or providing a reasoned decision.
The petitioner also alleged that a restriction initially described as temporary had continued indefinitely.
Parties and Relief Sought
The petition sought relief against LinkedIn, arrayed as Respondent No. 2, and its resident grievance officer, arrayed as Respondent No. 3. Both were connected with the private platform’s handling of the account restriction.
Although the Union of India was impleaded as Respondent No. 1, the Court noted that the petitioner had sought no specific prayer or direction against it.
The central preliminary question was therefore whether the Court could entertain a writ petition against the private company and its grievance officer. The petitioner failed to persuade the Court that the respondents were subject to writ jurisdiction in relation to the disputed action.
When Can a Writ Lie Against a Private Entity?
The Court explained that Article 226 of the Constitution can extend to private persons or entities where they perform functions qualifying as public functions.
For such a petition to be maintainable, the challenged action must relate to the performance of a public duty or function. The Court described the relevant considerations as including whether the activity involves public interest or is linked to a State obligation, and whether the function is integral to State functions or undertaken through powers vested by law.
The judgment emphasises the nature of the function being performed. A private entity must undertake functions that are fundamentally governmental in nature or exercise authority conferred by law to meet the threshold described by the Court.
LinkedIn’s Public Influence Does Not Establish a Public Duty
The High Court acknowledged that LinkedIn plays a significant role in disseminating information and shaping public opinion. However, it distinguished that influence from the discharge of a legally recognised public duty.
According to the Court, LinkedIn’s primary function is to provide a platform for expression. Public discourse is a consequence of its operations, rather than a public duty imposed upon it.
Its operations remain private in nature, and no governmental mandate delegates a traditional State function to it. The platform is neither required to provide its services in discharge of a public duty nor legally compelled to offer them. Its services are voluntary and user-driven.
Consequently, providing a medium for communication and social interaction does not, by itself, amount to performing a governmental function or discharging State responsibilities.
Reliance on Sanchit Gupta
In its reasoning, the Court referred to Sanchit Gupta v. Union of India & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine Del 5880.
Applying the principles discussed, it concluded that LinkedIn could not be said to perform a public function or discharge a public duty. The same conclusion extended to its resident grievance officer.
Accordingly, the Court held that neither respondent was amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 in the present matter.
Civil Remedy and Pending Grievance Appeal
The Court observed that the petitioner’s legal recourse appeared more appropriate through a civil suit, in which he could claim damages, if any. This observation did not amount to an award of compensation or a finding that damages were payable.
The judgment also recorded that the petitioner had already preferred an appeal before the Grievance Appellate Committee under the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, concerning the same grievance.
Conclusion
The High Court dismissed the petition as not maintainable. Its ruling turns on the absence of a public duty supporting the invocation of writ jurisdiction against LinkedIn and its grievance officer.
The judgment does not decide whether the account restriction was justified, whether the alleged violations occurred, or whether the platform’s responses adequately addressed the petitioner’s complaints. Those substantive grievances remained distinct from the maintainability issue determined by the Court.
Cases Discussed
1. Sanchit Gupta Vs Union of India & Anr. (Delhi High Court) — 2024 SCC OnLine Del 5880. Followed/referred to in paragraph 8 on the absence of public-duty character in the operation of a private social-media platform.
FULL TEXT OF THE ORDER OF DELHI HIGH COURT
1. The petitioner is aggrieved that Respondent No. 2 restricted his LinkedIn account, without any prior warning, without disclosing the specific provision of the User Agreement or Professional Community Policies allegedly violated, and without identifying the particular activity or conduct forming the basis of such restriction.
2. It is contended that despite repeated representations, appeals and requests for a manual review, Respondent No. 2 continues to issue repetitive and template-based responses citing the “number and/or severity” of unspecified violations, without furnishing any supporting material or passing a reasoned order. The petitioner further contends that although the restriction was initially represented as temporary, the same has continued indefinitely.
3. At the very outset it is pertinent to note that the petitioner, by way of the present petition, has sought certain reliefs against Respondent No.2, Linkedin Technology Information Private Limited, which is a private entity along with Respondent No.3, the resident grievance officer of Respondent No.2.
4. Though the petitioner has arrayed the Union of India as Respondent No.1, no specific prayers or directions have been sought against it.
5. The petitioner has failed to persuade this Court as to how a writ petition is maintainable against Respondent Nos. 2 and 3.
6. It is well settled that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable against any person or entity, including private bodies, if they perform functions that can be considered ‘public functions’.
7. Thus, for a writ to be maintainable against a private entity under Article 226 of the Constitution, it must be demonstrated that the action or conduct of the entity must be in the performance of a public duty or function; the nature of the activity should involve a public interest or be linked to a state obligation; and the function performed by the entity should be integral to state functions or be undertaken by virtue of some power vested by law. The threshold for a private entity to be amenable to writ jurisdiction is that it must undertake functions that are fundamentally governmental in nature or are performed by virtue of power vested by law.
8. While the platform provided by Respondent No. 2 plays a significant role in disseminating information and shaping public opinion, its primary function is to provide a platform for expression, with public discourse being a consequence of its operations rather than a public duty. Its operations remain private in nature, and no governmental mandate delegates any traditional State function to it. Respondent No. 2 is neither obligated to provide such a platform in discharge of a public duty nor legally compelled to offer its services, which are voluntary and user-driven. The mere provision of a platform for communication and social interaction does not, by itself, constitute a governmental function or a function integral to the discharge of State responsibilities. (Ref. Sanchit Gupta v. Union of India & Anr. : 2024 SCC OnLine Del 5880)
9. Accordingly, Respondent No. 2 cannot be said to perform a public function or discharge a public duty. Consequently, Respondent No.3, being the resident grievance officer of Respondent No.2 also cannot be said to perform a public function or discharge a public duty.
10. Thus, in the opinion of this Court, Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner’s legal recourse appears more appropriate for a civil suit, where the petitioner could claim damages, if any.
11. It is also pertinent to note that the petitioner has already preferred an appeal before the Grievance Appellate Committee under Section 3A(3) of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 in regard to the present grievance.
12. In view of the above, the present petition is not maintainable and is accordingly dismissed.
