Section 74 CGST: SC Ruling on Limitation and SCN Validity

Section 74 CGST After G.R. Infra Projects: Limitation, Explanation 2 and Section 75(2) Analysed

Summary: Article discusses the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s Order dated 19 August 2026 in G.R. Infra Projects Limited Ratlam Vs State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. quashing a Show Cause Notice dated 13 June 2025 issued under Section 74 of the CGST Act for FY 2018-19. The Court held that allegations of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts necessary to invoke the extended period must emanate from the notice itself and cannot subsequently be supplied through a counter affidavit. The material examines limitation under Section 73, including the COVID-19 exclusion, the distinction between the period for issuance of notice and passing of order, Section 168A notifications, Explanation 2 to Section 74, and Section 75(2). It also discusses the Court’s refusal to sustain the notice, its direction to desist from further proceedings, and related jurisprudence including Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner. The material further considers the implications of the ruling for subsequent Section 74 and Section 74A proceedings.

1. Introduction

The Hon’ble Supreme Court, by an Order dated 19 August 2026, has quashed a Show Cause Notice issued under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 read with the Madhya Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The Division Bench of Hon’ble Mr. Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Hon’ble Mr. Justice K. Vinod Chandran held that the allegations of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts, which alone justify invocation of the extended period, must emanate from the notice itself and cannot be supplied subsequently through a counter affidavit filed in Court.

The Order also sets aside the judgment of the Hon’ble Madhya Pradesh High Court at Indore in W.P. No. 40749 of 2025 dated 29 October 2025 (Neutral Citation 2025:MPHC-IND:31486), which had declined to interfere at the notice stage.

While the proposition that a Section 74 notice must contain the foundational allegations is not new, the Order carries several implications which have not received attention in the commentary so far. These include the distinction between the limitation for issuance of the notice and for passing of the order, the year-wise manner in which the COVID-19 exclusion is to be computed, the complete absence of any reference to the notifications issued under Section 168A, the use of an expression which does not find place in Section 74 at all, and the deliberate omission of any direction under Section 75(2). Each of these is examined below.

2. Brief Facts

The assessee, engaged in design and construction of roads and highways, was subjected to a search under Section 67 of the CGST Act in August 2022. Summons had been issued in March 2022 covering the period from FY 2017-18 to FY 2020-21. Statements were recorded from the Accountant, the Authorised Signatory and the Director. A draft notice-cum-investigation report dated 3 March 2025 was prepared, followed by an intimation dated 29 April 2025 in Form GST DRC-01A under Rule 142(1A) of the CGST Rules, 2017. Upon objection that the draft notice had not been served, the same was furnished on 27 May 2025, and the Show Cause Notice under Section 74 came to be issued on 13 June 2025 for FY 2018-19.

The Order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court does not set out the heads of demand. From the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court, the demand of Rs. 1,52,56,431 was raised under the following four heads:

• Inter-State outward supply – GSTR-3B vis-à-vis e-way bill – Rs. 1,06,954;
• Inter-State inward supply – GSTR-3B vis-à-vis e-way bill – Rs. 42,19,025;
• Ineligible input tax credit in respect of site office – Rs. 2,69,014;
• Post-supply cancellation of vendors – Rs. 1,06,61,438.

It is significant that the largest head, constituting nearly 70% of the demand, relates to denial of input tax credit consequent upon cancellation of the registration of suppliers subsequent to the supplies having been effected.

3. Question for Consideration

Whether the Show Cause Notice dated 13 June 2025, issued for FY 2018-19, could be treated as one validly issued under Section 74 of the CGST Act, the ordinary period of limitation under Section 73 having admittedly expired.

4. Contentions

For the assessee: a notice under Section 74 can be issued only where fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts is alleged, and such allegation must be borne out by the notice itself. The notice being beyond three years, Section 73 was unavailable.

For the Revenue: the learned Government Advocate sought to take the Court through the counter affidavit, wherein the allegations of fraud and suppression of facts had been elaborated so as to justify proceedings under Section 74 and not under Section 73.

5. Findings of the Hon’ble Supreme Court

5.1 Refusal to look at the counter affidavit (Para 5)

The Court declined to examine the counter affidavit, on the trite principle that where a notice or order is assailed for non-application of mind, the requirements which render it valid must be contained in the notice or order itself, and cannot be supplanted by a counter affidavit filed in Court. Although the Order does not cite it, the principle is that laid down in Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors., (1978) 1 SCC 405.

5.2 Computation of limitation under Section 73 (Paras 6 to 8)

The Court traced the chain as follows: Rule 80 of the CGST Rules requires the annual return to be furnished on or before 31 December following the financial year, which for FY 2018-19 would be 31 December 2019; successive notifications under Section 44(1) extended the same to 31 December 2020; three years therefrom under Section 73(10) took the outer limit to 31 December 2023; the exclusion granted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, Suo Motu W.P. (C) No. 3 of 2020, covering 15 March 2020 to 28 February 2022, was applied to the extent of the period falling within the said three years, being 1 year and 2 months; and the extended period accordingly fell on 28 February 2025.

The notice having been issued on 13 June 2025, it was held to be barred by limitation under Section 73, and the validity of the notice therefore turned entirely upon whether Section 74 could be invoked.

5.3 Recital of the departmental record (Para 9)

The Court set out, from the counter affidavit, the entire investigative history – the summons, the failure to produce documents, the inspection, the statements recorded, the twenty occasions between 1 September 2022 and 7 February 2025 on which the assessee did not appear, the draft notice-cum-investigation report, the DRC-01A intimation and the eventual issuance of the notice.

It is submitted that Para 9 is not in conflict with Para 5. The recital serves to demonstrate that the material was available with the Department and yet found no place in the notice. The infirmity, in other words, lay in the drafting of the notice and not in the adequacy of the investigation.

5.4 The two infirmities in the notice (Para 10)

First, that but for a bland statement of “fraud or concealment of facts”, nothing was stated as to how fraud was inferred or concealment detected. The allegations leading to such inference must emanate from the notice, and there cannot be a mechanical use of the statutory expressions without listing out the aspects which persuaded the Proper Officer to conclude that such surreptitious devices had been employed.

Secondly, that the use of the disjunctive “or” itself indicated that the Assessing Officer was not certain whether the proceedings were founded on fraud or on concealment of facts.

5.5 Relief granted (Paras 11 to 13)

The Court found no reason to sustain the notice, held that the High Court had erroneously upheld it, set aside the impugned order as well as the Show Cause Notice, and directed the respondent-State to desist from taking any further proceedings in pursuance thereof. The Civil Appeal was allowed. Notably, no remand was directed, no liberty was granted to issue a fresh notice, and no direction was issued under Section 75(2).

6. Analysis and Author’s Observations

6.1 28 February 2025 is the outer date for the order, not for the notice

The date of 28 February 2025 is already being cited as the settled outer limit for FY 2018-19. That requires qualification. The computation in Para 8 arrives at the outer limit under Section 73(10), which governs the passing of the order.

Section 73(2), which the Court expressly noticed in Para 6, mandates that the Proper Officer shall issue the notice at least three months prior to the time limit specified in Section 73(10). Applying that to the Court’s own computation, the outer date for issuance of a Show Cause Notice under Section 73 for FY 2018-19 would be 30 November 2024 and not 28 February 2025. The Court had no occasion to draw the distinction, since 13 June 2025 was beyond either date.

Whether the said interval is mandatory or merely directory is presently sub judice. In M/s Bengal Cold Rollers Private Limited v. The Assistant Commissioner (ST), W.P. (C) No. 836 of 2026 with SLP (C) No. 23718 of 2026, the Hon’ble Supreme Court by Order dated 21 July 2026 issued notice and stayed the judgment of the Hon’ble Telangana High Court dated 25 June 2026, which had held the corresponding six-month timeline under Section 74(2) to be directory. The question therefore remains open.

6.2 The COVID-19 exclusion is year-specific and not a uniform period

Para 8 does not lay down that the exclusion is 1 year and 2 months. It lays down a method, namely that the exclusion is that portion of the period from 15 March 2020 to 28 February 2022 which falls within the three-year period applicable to the year under consideration. Since the due date for the annual return differs from year to year, the method yields a different result for each financial year.

Applying the method adopted by the Court, the position may be tabulated as under:

Only the row pertaining to FY 2018-19 represents the computation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The remaining rows are the author’s extrapolation applying the same method, and the notified due date for each year should be independently verified before being relied upon.

Two consequences follow. For FY 2017-18, the three-year period commenced before the exclusion window opened, with the result that the entire window falls within it and the exclusion available is materially longer than for FY 2018-19. Carrying the figure of 1 year and 2 months across to FY 2017-18 would therefore concede approximately nine months without warrant. Conversely, from FY 2020-21 onwards the exclusion contributes nothing at all.

6.3 Silence on the notifications issued under Section 168A

The Order makes no reference whatsoever to Notification No. 13/2022-Central Tax, Notification No. 9/2023-Central Tax or Notification No. 56/2023-Central Tax, by which the time limits under Section 73(10) were extended in exercise of power under Section 168A. On that route, the outer date for FY 2018-19 stood at 30 April 2024, whereas the suo motu route adopted by the Court yields 28 February 2025.

The validity of those notifications has been the subject of divergent views – the Hon’ble Madras High Court in M/s Tata Play Limited v. Union of India, W.P. Nos. 17184 of 2024 and connected matters dated 12 June 2025, held Notification  9/2023 and 56/2023 to be ultra vires, observing inter alia that a notification under Section 168A cannot override the exclusion of limitation granted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court; the Hon’ble Gauhati High Court in M/s Barkataki Print and Media quashed Notification 56/2023 for want of a prior recommendation of the GST Council; while the Hon’ble Allahabad and Patna High Courts took a contrary view. The controversy is pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s HCC-SEW-MEIL-AAG JV v. Assistant Commissioner of State Tax, SLP (C) No. 4240 of 2025 and connected matters.

It may be anticipated that the Revenue will seek to contend that the suo motu exclusion operates in addition to the notified extensions, which for FY 2018-19 would carry the outer date well into 2025 and revive notices presently treated as time-barred. It is submitted that such a contention would be untenable, since both instruments address the same force majeure period and to apply both would amount to excluding the same fourteen months twice over. The point nevertheless requires to be met on the pleadings. For this reason, the present Order ought not to be cited as having conclusively settled limitation for FY 2018-19 at 28 February 2025.

6.4 “Concealment of facts” is not an expression known to Section 74

While Para 10 fastens upon the disjunctive “or”, a related point deserves notice. Section 74(1) is attracted by reason of “fraud, or any wilful-misstatement or suppression of facts to evade tax”. The expression “concealment of facts” does not occur in Section 74, nor anywhere else in the CGST Act. It is the vocabulary of Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which speaks of concealment of the particulars of income.

The notice in the present case therefore did not merely reproduce the statutory expressions mechanically; it employed an expression alien to the charging provision in place of one that the statute prescribes. It is submitted that a notice which alleges “concealment” rather than suppression of facts to evade tax has not alleged the statutory ingredient at all, and the objection may be taken as an independent ground.

6.5 Explanation 2 to Section 74 – the statutory definition of suppression

Unlike the Central Excise Act, 1944, the CGST Act defines the expression. Explanation 2 to Section 74 provides that “suppression” shall mean non-declaration of facts or information which a taxable person is required to declare in the return, statement, report or any other document furnished under the Act or the rules, or failure to furnish any information on being asked for, in writing, by the Proper Officer.

Read against Para 9, the Department’s own case was that the assessee sought time and did not produce the required documents, and did not appear on twenty occasions over nearly two and a half years. Such conduct, if properly pleaded and established, would arguably attract the second limb of Explanation 2 on its plain terms.

The Department, in other words, had available to it a statutory definition apposite to its own facts, and yet did not succeed, solely for the reason that none of it was incorporated in the notice. That, it is submitted, is the true import of the ruling, and it counsels caution: the infirmity is one of drafting and is capable of being cured in subsequent notices.

One qualification must, however, be pressed whenever the Revenue relies upon Explanation 2. The Explanation defines suppression, but Section 74(1) requires that the suppression be “to evade tax”. The Explanation widens the conduct which constitutes suppression; it does not dispense with the element of intent, which continues to flow from the charging words themselves.

6.6 Composition of the demand as an indicator of mechanical invocation

The four heads of demand extracted in Para 2 above are, without exception, ordinary heads of a Section 73 proceeding – reconciliation differences between GSTR-3B and e-way bill data, and denial of input tax credit. There is no allegation of fake invoicing, circular trading or non-existent suppliers.

The largest head, being denial of credit on account of post-supply cancellation of vendor registrations, merits separate emphasis. In substance, the Department attributes to the recipient an intent to evade tax at the time of the transaction on the strength of an event which occurred thereafter, over which the recipient had no control and of which it could have had no knowledge. A subsequent cancellation of the supplier’s registration cannot, of itself, constitute the surreptitious device of the recipient. Following the present ruling, the objection may be raised not merely on merits but as one going to jurisdiction.

6.7 Absence of any direction under Section 75(2)

Section 75(2) provides that where the notice issued under Section 74(1) is not sustainable for the reason that the charges of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts to evade tax have not been established, the Proper Officer shall determine the tax as if the notice were issued under Section 73(1), Section 75(3) allowing two years from the date of communication of the direction.

No such direction was issued in the present case, and the omission is deliberate. Section 75(2) re-characterises a notice; it does not alter the date of its issuance. A notice issued on 13 June 2025, if treated as one under Section 73, remains a notice issued after the expiry of the period prescribed by Section 73. The deeming fiction cannot confer a jurisdiction which did not exist on the date of issue.

The practical consequence bears emphasis, as it determines the manner in which a reply ought to be framed. Where the period under Section 73 was still available on the date of the Section 74 notice, success on the ground of “no fraud” results only in re-determination under Section 75(2), the tax and interest surviving and the higher penalty alone falling away. Where the period had already expired, success on the same ground is fatal to the entire demand. The computation under Section 73(2) for the year in question is therefore the first exercise to be undertaken upon receipt of any Section 74 notice for FY 2017-18 to FY 2019-20.

6.8 Collateral consequences of a mechanical invocation of Section 74

The choice between Section 73 and Section 74 is ordinarily discussed only in terms of limitation and penalty. Two further consequences deserve mention, both of which constitute demonstrable prejudice and may be pleaded as such.

Section 17(5)(i) blocks input tax credit in respect of tax paid in accordance with the provisions of Section 74, for demands upto FY 2023-24. The label therefore operates to the detriment not only of the noticee but potentially of the credit chain downstream.

Section 128A, which waives interest and penalty in respect of FY 2017-18 to FY 2019-20, operates in relation to demands under Section 73 and not Section 74 as such. A mechanical invocation of Section 74 in a routine mismatch case thus deprives the assessee of a relief which the legislature intended it to have. It may be noted that Section 128A does contemplate the situation where a notice under Section 74 is directed to be re-determined under Section 75(2) pursuant to an order of the Appellate Authority, the Appellate Tribunal or a Court.

6.9 Maintainability of a writ petition against a Show Cause Notice

The Hon’ble High Court had declined to interfere on the familiar ground that the assessee had an efficacious remedy in adjudication and thereafter in appeal. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Court had erroneously upheld the notice and set aside both.

Though not articulated as such, this is a holding on maintainability. The rule that a writ petition does not ordinarily lie against a Show Cause Notice has always been subject to the exception of want of jurisdiction, and the present Order furnishes authority of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the absence of the foundational allegations from a Section 74 notice is a jurisdictional infirmity and not a matter to be examined in adjudication on merits. The objection of alternative remedy, when raised at the threshold, may now be met accordingly.

6.10 The ruling in Audi Automobiles delivered six days earlier by the same Bench

On 13 August 2026, the very same Bench of Hon’ble Mr. Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Hon’ble Mr. Justice K. Vinod Chandran decided Audi Automobiles & Ors. v. Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, Indore, Civil Appeal Nos. 10504-10506 of 2017, Neutral Citation 2026 INSC 858, holding that the extended period under the proviso to Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was unavailable to the Department.

Two propositions from that ruling are directly applicable to Section 74. First, that there cannot be a suppression or misstatement which is not wilful and yet constitutes a permissible ground for invoking the extended period, the requirement of intent to evade running through even the contravention limb. Secondly, that where the relevant facts were already within the knowledge of the Department – in that case, that the chassis had been cleared at 110% of the cost of manufacture – an omission on the part of the assessee does not amount to suppression, and the Department was required to act within the normal period.

Read together, the two rulings supply complementary defences arising from the same facts: Audi Automobiles on merits, that the extended period is substantively unavailable where wilfulness is absent or where the Department was already aware of the facts; and G.R. Infra Projects on jurisdiction, that the foundational allegations must appear on the face of the notice. In the present case itself, the Department had conducted a search under Section 67 in August 2022 and recorded statements from three officers of the company, which knowledge would, on the reasoning in Audi Automobiles, independently negate suppression.

6.11 Position from FY 2024-25 under Section 74A

Sections 73 and 74 continue to govern demands up to FY 2023-24. From FY 2024-25, Section 74A, inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2024, provides a single limitation of 42 months from the due date of the annual return for issuance of the notice, and 12 months from the notice for passing of the order, extendable by a further six months.

It may appear that the present ruling loses relevance from FY 2024-25, the allegation of fraud no longer conferring any advantage in point of limitation. That inference would be incorrect. Under Section 74A the allegation continues to determine the quantum of penalty – broadly, 10% of the tax or ₹10,000 whichever is higher in ordinary cases, as against a penalty equivalent to the tax where fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression is alleged, with graded reductions on early payment. The requirement that the allegation be spelt out in the notice therefore survives, attaching to a different consequence. The ratio does not lapse with the provision; it migrates, and from FY 2024-25 the ruling will be relied upon to resist the higher penalty limb of Section 74A.

7. Settled Jurisprudence on Fraud, Wilful Misstatement and Suppression

The following authorities under the erstwhile indirect tax statutes continue to hold the field and may be relied upon, subject to being read alongside Explanation 2 to Section 74:

I. Collector of Central Excise, Hyderabad v. Chemphar Drugs & Liniments, 1989 (40) E.L.T. 276 (S.C.) : (1989) 2 SCC 127 – something positive beyond mere inaction or failure is required; conscious and deliberate withholding of information must be established.

II. Cosmic Dye Chemical v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay, 1995 (75) E.L.T. 721 (S.C.) : (1995) 6 SCC 117 – the word “wilful” qualifies both misstatement and suppression; mens rea is essential and an inadvertent or bona fide omission will not suffice.

III. Continental Foundation Joint Venture Holding v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh-I, 2007 (216) E.L.T. 177 (S.C.) : (2007) 10 SCC 337 – an incorrect construction of law or non-disclosure under a bona fide belief does not amount to suppression; intentional withholding with an ulterior motive must be shown.

IV. Uniworth Textiles Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Raipur, 2013 (288) E.L.T. 161 (S.C.) : (2013) 9 SCC 753 – mere non-payment of duty does not by itself amount to collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression; the extended period is a narrow exception and not the ordinary rule.

V. Audi Automobiles & Ors. v. Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, Indore, 2026 INSC 858 – the most recent restatement, rendered by the very Bench which decided the present case.

A related conflation may also be guarded against. Section 155 places the burden of proving eligibility to input tax credit upon the person claiming it. That burden is distinct from the burden of establishing fraud or suppression for the purposes of the extended period, which rests upon the Revenue. A failure to discharge the former is not proof of the latter, and the two ought not to be permitted to be treated as one.

8. Practical Takeaways

a. The first exercise on receipt of any Section 74 notice for FY 2017-18 to FY 2019-20 should be the computation of limitation with reference to Section 73(2), and not Section 73(10), since that determines whether success on the ground of “no fraud” results in re-determination or in quashing.

b. The jurisdictional objection should be taken at the threshold and in the reply itself, and not reserved for appeal.

c. The notice should be examined for the statutory vocabulary. Expressions such as “concealment”, “evasion” or “non-compliance” are not ingredients of Section 74.

d. Where the heads of demand are ordinary reconciliation differences or credit denials arising from vendor cancellation, this may be demonstrated head-wise and quantified, the composition of the demand being itself indicative of a mechanical invocation.

e. Where a search, audit or scrutiny preceded the notice, the knowledge of the Department should be pleaded as negating suppression, relying upon Audi Automobiles.

f. From the Revenue’s standpoint, a notice under Section 74 should set out the specific acts or omissions attributed, adopt one limb rather than reciting all in the disjunctive, identify the limb of Explanation 2 relied upon, establish the nexus with intent to evade tax, and expressly incorporate the investigation report or statements relied upon rather than merely enclosing them.

9. Conclusion

The ruling in G.R. Infra Projects is likely to be cited widely for the proposition that a Section 74 notice must contain the foundational allegations of fraud. That proposition is correct but incomplete.

The Order additionally treats the absence of such allegations as an infirmity of jurisdiction, thereby sustaining a challenge at the notice stage; forecloses recourse to Section 75(2) where the ordinary period has expired; and applies the suo motu exclusion of limitation to a departmental time limit by a method requiring separate computation for each financial year, without adverting to the notifications issued under Section 168A whose validity remains before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

Equally, the ruling ought not to be over-read. The Department in this case had the benefit of a search, statements recorded from three officers, twenty recorded non-appearances, a detailed investigation report and a statutory definition of suppression apposite to its facts. It did not succeed because none of that material found its way into the four corners of the notice – an infirmity which is readily capable of correction. The Order is therefore best understood not as a shield against Section 74, but as a statement of where the allegation must be recorded, and, for the notices now being drafted, as guidance on how that is to be done.

Cases Discussed

1. G.R. Infra Projects Limited Ratlam Vs State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (Supreme Court of India)

2. Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors., (1978) 1 SCC 405

3. Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, Suo Motu W.P. (C) No. 3 of 2020

4. M/s Bengal Cold Rollers Private Limited v. The Assistant Commissioner (ST), W.P. (C) No. 836 of 2026 with SLP (C) No. 23718 of 2026

5. M/s Tata Play Limited v. Union of India, W.P. Nos. 17184 of 2024 and connected matters

6. Gauhati High Court in M/s Barkataki Print and Media

7. M/s HCC-SEW-MEIL-AAG JV v. Assistant Commissioner of State Tax, SLP (C) No. 4240 of 2025 and connected matters

8. Audi Automobiles & Ors. v. Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, Indore, Civil Appeal Nos. 10504-10506 of 2017, Neutral Citation 2026 INSC 858

9. Collector of Central Excise, Hyderabad v. Chemphar Drugs & Liniments, 1989 (40) E.L.T. 276 (S.C.) : (1989) 2 SCC 127

10. Cosmic Dye Chemical v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay, 1995 (75) E.L.T. 721 (S.C.) : (1995) 6 SCC 117

11. Continental Foundation Joint Venture Holding v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh-I, 2007 (216) E.L.T. 177 (S.C.) : (2007) 10 SCC 337

12. Uniworth Textiles Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Raipur, 2013 (288) E.L.T. 161 (S.C.) : (2013) 9 SCC 753

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Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal and are intended for general information. The status of SLP (C) No. 4240 of 2025 concerning Notifications 9/2023-CT and 56/2023-CT, and of SLP (C) No. 23718 of 2026 concerning Section 74(2), may be verified before the limitation positions discussed above are relied upon, as may the notified due date of the annual return for each financial year referred to in the table at Para 6.2. Nothing in this article constitutes legal advice, and readers should seek independent professional advice on the facts of any particular matter before acting on any view expressed herein. The views expressed are personal.

Autor Mihirkumar V. Patel is an independent Advocate practicing before the High Court of Gujarat, Debts Recovery Tribunal-1 and 2 at Ahmedabad, Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal at Mumbai, and the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad. He specializes in Writ Petitions (Article 226), Direct and Indirect Tax Litigation, Commercial Litigation, Land disputes, RERA, Banking, SARFAESI Act, RDB Act, and Recovery Disputes.