Rajasthan HC Orders Centre And Central Board Of Indirect Taxes And Customs To Pay Rs 5 Lakhs To An IRS Officer
It is definitely a matter of some solace that the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur ultimately in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Manmeet Singh Ahluwalia v. Union of India in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11000/2025 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2026:RJ-JP:32601-DB that was reserved on 16.07.2026 and then finally pronounced most recently on 30.07.2026 has ordered the Central government and the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs to pay Rs 5,00,000 as exemplary costs to an Indian Revenue Service (IRS) officer – Manmeet Singh Ahluwalia who was a Deputy Commissioner of Customs and GST and who was arbitrarily suspended from service. We thus see that the Division Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Munnuri Laxman and Hon’ble Mr Justice Anuroop Singhi quashed a Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) that upheld the suspension order that was directed against Manmeet. It merits noting that the Jodhpur High Court explicitly held that the allegations against the officer that arose from a residential dispute that involved his family members and certain COVID-era leave lapses amounted to a “gross exaggeration of trivial deviations” that could never justify the extreme step of prolonged suspension.
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice Munnuri Laxman for a Division Bench comprising of himself and Hon’ble Mr Justice Anuroop Singhi sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “The challenge in the present writ petition is to the order dated 16.04.2025 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jodhpur Bench (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”), in O.A. No. 237/2022, whereby the reliefs sought by the petitioner, viz., quashing of the orders dated 16.07.2021 and 13.01.2022 extending his suspension, grant of promotion pursuant to the DPC held on 23.02.2022, and consequential financial benefits for the period of extended suspension along with all promotional benefits, were rejected.”
While dwelling briefly on the background of the petitioner, the Division Bench observes in para 2 that, “The petitioner is an officer of the Indian Revenue Service (Customs and GST) of the 2012 batch. He was transferred from Lucknow to New Delhi vide order dated 01.04.2018. While he was posted at New Delhi, he was allotted departmental pool residential accommodation bearing Quarter No. A2D, Vatika Apartment, Mayapuri, New Delhi.”
To put things in perspective, the Division Bench envisages in para 3 while elaborating on the facts of the case stating that, “The initial genesis of the present proceedings is relating to an incident that allegedly occurred on the night of 3rd/4th September, 2019 at about 8:45 p.m. in between Shri S. Mahesh Kumar, Under Secretary, GST Council, and the petitioner’s mother and widowed sister. The allegation was that the petitioner’s family members misbehaved with Shri S. Mahesh Kumar, by using abusive language, and obstructed him from going downstairs from the roof of the flat. During such incident when Ms. Meghna Gupta, Assistant Commissioner, GST Policy Wing intervened, she too was subjected to abusive language by the petitioner’s family members.”
As it turned out, the Division Bench enunciates in para 4 that, “Subsequently, another complaint dated 05.09.2019 was also submitted by one Shri Sumit Garg, a former neighbour of the petitioner’s family, alleging that the petitioner and his family members have also behaved rudely with him during the period they resided as neighbours till January, 2019. Such allegations were not reported immediately but complained after a delay of about nine months.”
As we see, the Division Bench then unfolds in para 5 disclosing that, “The aforesaid incident and complaint prompted the Central Government Office Residence Welfare Association of Vatika Apartment, ‘A’ Block, to pass a resolution asking the Principal Commissioner, GST, to cancel the allotment of the accommodation to petitioner. Pursuant thereto, the Principal Commissioner constituted an Enquiry Committee, which found that the petitioner’s mother and his sister had misbehaved with Shri S. Mahesh Kumar and Ms. Meghna Gupta.”
Delving deeper, the Division Bench then lays bare in para 6 mentioning that, “Based on such findings of the Enquiry Committee, the Estate Officer had issued an eviction notice dated 17.09.2019 to the petitioner, directing him to vacate the premises. Thereafter, an eviction order dated 14.02.2020 was passed. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner preferred Appeal bearing OA No. PPA-2/2020 before the learned Principal District and Sessions Judge, West District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, wherein he got protection. The appeal was ultimately disposed of by granting time to the petitioner to vacate the accommodation on or before 15.04.2021. The appellate court further held that the levy of damages at the rate of 40 times the revised licence fee was declared non est in the eyes of law. However, liberty was granted to the Competent Authority to initiate fresh proceedings for the assessment of damages in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Section 7 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971.”
Further, the Division Bench reveals in para 7 stating that, “By order dated 22.10.2019, the petitioner was transferred from New Delhi to Jodhpur in the backdrop of the incident between the family members of the petitioner and S. Mahesh Kumar and Meghna Gupta. The petitioner vacated the premises on 15.04.2021.”
Furthermore, the Division Bench then specifies in para 8 disclosing that, “Apart from the above incident and complaint, there were some more alleged incidents involving the petitioner & his family members and the officers who were residing in the departmental pool accommodation. One such incident relates to evening of 17.12.2020 between Smt. Ashwini, the Joint Commissioner, and the family members of the petitioner, leading to the registration of an FIR. Another incident allegedly occurred on 01.03.2021 between the petitioner’s family members and Paras Kumar Gupta, Superintendent, Ms. Niharika, Deputy Commissioner, and Ms. Rubal Saroha, Deputy Commissioner. The only allegation is of issuing threats and using intimidating words.”
As a corollary, the Division Bench then discloses in para 9 mentioning that, “In the above background of incidents, the initial suspension order was passed on 04.05.2021, in contemplation of departmental proceedings against the petitioner. The initial period of suspension was for 90 days, which ended on 02.08.2021. Subsequently, the suspension was extended for the first time vide order dated 16.07.2021 for a further period of 180 days, and a second extension order was passed on 13.01.2022. The second suspension order expired on 28.07.2022. There was no further extension. Consequently, the suspension came to an end. Even though suspension was no more, the respondents have passed revocation order dated 16.08.2022 revoking the suspension.”
Do note, the Division Bench notes in para 10 that, “The petitioner in the present case is not aggrieved by the original suspension order dated 04.05.2021. His grievance was with regard to the two extension orders, i.e., dated 16.07.2021 and 13.01.2022. The challenge to such orders was on the ground that there was no valid material before review committee as well competent authority for the extension of suspension. The unjustified extension of suspension should not have been made beyond 90 days, as the definite charge-sheet in the departmental proceedings had not been issued to him before the expiry of 90 days, as required by the judgment of the Apex Court in Ajay Kumar Choudary Vs. Union of India through its Secretary & Anr., reported in AIR 2015 Supreme Court 2389, and in violation of Department’s own letter dated 23.08.2016.”
Most forthrightly, the Division Bench propounds in para 36 holding explicitly that, “The disciplinary authority was already having ample material in the form of complaints, statements, and enquiry reports relating to the incidents that occurred within the residential accommodation occupied by the families, as well as the allegation of leaving the headquarter without sanction of leave. Keeping the petitioner under suspension beyond 90 days by way of extension was clearly an abusive exercise of administrative power for a trivial criminal charge, which was unrelated to his official duties, particularly when the petitioner was not working in New Delhi. Further, the action was contemplated against the petitioner only, completely ignoring the counter-FIR lodged by the petitioner’s family. This amounts to selectively targeting the petitioner despite there being no fault on his part, but merely because of an alleged conflict between two families. The extension of the petitioner’s suspension is arbitrary, unreasonable, and suffers from mala fides in law. It infringed the petitioner’s right to be considered and promoted.”
While continuing in the same vein, it would be instructive to note that the Division Bench hastens to add in para 37 noting that, “The challenge to the extension orders does not become infructuous merely because of the deemed revocation resulting from the expiry of the suspension period and the failure to extend the suspension thereafter. The denial of relief by the Tribunal on the ground that the question of pay and allowances for the suspension period would be considered by the Appointing Authority only after the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings is not, in every case, justified. The availability of such a remedy does not imply that the petitioner’s right to challenge the orders extending the suspension stands defeated or rendered infructuous by such revocation or entitlement to consider after enquiry. The reason is that had the two extensions of suspension were not granted, the petitioner would have been promoted on par with his juniors on the basis of the result kept in the sealed cover. The extensions were resorted to only to convert the suspension into a punishment and to deprive the petitioner’s carrier advancement, and damage to his professional carrier for a trivial act of misconduct, even if ultimately proved, which would never warrant the penalty of removal or dismissal. Further, the suspension itself was unwarranted because the serious allegations of misconduct related to an incident in Delhi, whereas the petitioner was posted in Jodhpur. All the witnesses were high-ranking officers whom the petitioner could not have influenced. There was also no possibility of tampering with the evidence, as all the relevant material had already been collected during the disciplinary proceedings, and the petitioner had already been transferred from the place where the alleged incident had occurred. The allegations, if any, relating to Jodhpur pertain only to the petitioner leaving the headquarters without waiting for sanction of leave and the alleged misconduct committed thereafter.”
Most commendably, the Division Bench concedes in para 38 holding that, “Having regard to the overall facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned extension orders suffer from arbitrariness and unreasonable exercise of administrative power and is not supported by any valid reason or justification. On the contrary, the extension orders reflect personal vendetta, intended to inflict punishment and adversely affect the petitioner’s career. The impugned orders are, therefore, vitiated by malice in law. Such arbitrary exercise of power, motivated by personal vendetta, deserves to be strongly deprecated.”
Equally commendable is that the Division Bench also concedes further in para 39 holding that, “The Tribunal was not justified in holding that interference with the extension orders was unwarranted merely on the ground that the suspension stood deemed to have been revoked and that the petitioner’s entitlement to pay and allowances for the suspension period would be considered by the competent authority after the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings. The said finding is perverse, as the Tribunal failed to examine the legality and validity of the impugned extension orders, which had a direct bearing on the petitioner’s valuable right to be considered for promotion. Admittedly, no departmental charge-sheet had been issued to the petitioner on the date fixed for the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) meeting, and therefore, the extensions of suspension resulted in petitioner’s promotion being kept in a sealed cover, which warrants judicial interference by this Hon’ble Court.”
Most significantly and so also most rationally, the Division Bench encapsulates in para 41 what constitutes the cornerstone of this robust judgment postulating precisely that, “There is an arbitrary and capricious behaviour on the part of the disciplinary authorities in subjecting the petitioner to undue hardship and jeopardizing the career of a young officer, who had built an unblemished career of seven years prior to the alleged incident. The hardship suffered by the petitioner was the result of the arbitrary exercise of power in placing him under suspension and repeatedly extending the period of suspension. Therefore, we are inclined to award a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs only) as exemplary costs, to be paid by the respondents No.1 and 2 to the petitioner.”
Resultantly, the Division Bench then directs and holds in para 42 stating that, “In the result, the present writ petition is allowed as under:
(i) The impugned order of the Tribunal dated 16.04.2025 is set aside;
(ii) The Original Application bearing OA No.237/2026 preferred by the petitioner before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bench Jodhpur is allowed;
(iii) The impugned extension orders of the petitioner’s suspension dated 16.07.2021 and 13.01.202 are set aside.
(iv) The respondents are directed to treat the petitioner as having been reinstated with effect from the expiry of the original period of 90 days. He shall be paid his full salary, for the extended period of suspension after adjusting the salary already paid for such period.
(v) The respondents are also further directed to open the sealed cover and, if the petitioner is found fit and eligible, to promote him to the higher post from the date on which his juniors were promoted. The petitioner shall be entitled to notional promotion and all consequential notional benefits from the date his juniors were granted promotion. The aforesaid exercise shall be completed within a period of two months from the date of this order.
(vi) The respondents No. 1 and 2 are also directed to pay cost of Rs.5 lac to the petitioner within three months from the date of the order.”
Finally, the Division Bench then concludes by aptly directing and holding in para 43 that, “Pending interlocutory applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.”
In a nutshell, it is definitely most gladdening to see that the Rajasthan High Court has just not hesitated in stepping forward boldly to ensure that Centre is punished and taken to task by imposing Rs 5 lakh costs for wrongly suspending an IRS officer over rude behaviour’. This will definitely send a very loud and clear message that even Centre cannot play havoc with the career of a public servant without any prima facie cause to justify it and if it tries to play havoc then it will have to pay a heavy cost for it as we see in this leading case also! No denying it!
