SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
AIR 1994 Supreme Court 787
(from: National Commission, New Delhi)
LUCKNOW DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
Vs.
M.K. GUPTA
Civil Appeal No. 6237 of 1990 (with S.L.P. (C) Nos. 659 of 191 and 16842 of 1992; C.A. Nos. 3963 of 1989, 5534, 6236 and 5257 of 1990 and 2954 – 59 of 1992)
DATE OF JUDGMENT 05/11/1993
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by R.M. SAHAI, J.- The question of law that arises for consideration in these appeals, directed against orders passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (referred hereinafter as National Commission), New Delhi is if the statutory authorities such as Lucknow Development Authority or Delhi Development Authority or Bangalore Development Authority constituted under State Acts to carry on planned development of the cities in the State are amenable to Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) for any act or omission relating to housing activity such as delay in delivery of possession of the houses to the allottees, non-completion of the flat within the stipulated time, or defective and faulty construction etc. Another aspect of this issue is if the housing activity carried on by the statutory authority or private builder or contractor came within the purview of the Act only after its amendment by the Ordinance No. 24 in 1993 or the Commission could entertain a complaint for such violations even before.
2. How the dispute arose in different appeals is not of any consequence except for two appeals which shall be adverted to later, for determining right and power of the Commission to award exemplary damages and accountability of the statutory authorities. We therefore come straight away to the legal issue involved in these appeals. But before doing so and examining the question of jurisdiction of the District Forum or State or National Commission to entertain a complaint under the Act, it appears appropriate to ascertain the purpose of the Act, the objective it seeks to achieve and the nature of social purpose it seeks to promote as it shall facilitate in comprehending the issue involved and assist in construing various provisions of the Act effectively. To begin with the preamble of the Act, which can afford useful assistance to ascertain the legislative intention, it was enacted, ‘to provide for the protection of the interest of consumers’. Use of the word ‘protection’ furnishes key to the minds of makers of the Act. Various definitions and provisions which elaborately attempt to achieve this objective have to be construed in this light without departing from the settled view that a preamble cannot control otherwise plain meaning of a provision. In fact the law meets long felt necessity of protecting the common man from such wrongs for which the remedy under ordinary law for various reasons has become illusory. Various legislations and regulations permitting the State to intervene and protect interest of the consumers have become a haven for unscrupulous ones as the enforcement machinery either does not move or it moves ineffectively, inefficiently and for reasons which are not necessary to be stated. The importance of the Act lies in promoting welfare of the society by enabling the consumer to participate directly in the market economy. It attempts to remove the helplessness of a consumer which he faces against powerful business, described as, ‘a network of rackets’ or a society in which, ‘producers have secured power’ to ‘rob the rest’ and the might of public bodies which are degenerating into storehouses of inaction where papers do not move from one desk to another as a matter of duty and responsibility but for extraneous consideration leaving the common man helpless, bewildered and shocked. The malady is becoming so rampant, widespread and deep that the society instead of bothering, complaining and fighting against it, is accepting it as part of life. The enactment in these unbelievable yet harsh realities appears to be a silver lining, which may in course of time succeed in checking the rot. A scrutiny of various definitions such as ‘consumer’, ‘service’, ‘trader’, ‘unfair trade practice’ indicates that legislature has attempted to widen the reach of the Act. Each of these definitions are in two parts, one, explanatory and the other expandatory. The explanatory or the main part itself uses expressions of wide amplitude indicating clearly its wide sweep, then its ambit is widened to such things which otherwise would have been beyond its natural import. Manner of construing an inclusive clause and its widening effect has been explained in Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps’ as under:
