Timmasarti Venkateswara Rao Vs Teqdatum Technologies Private Limited (GSTAT Hyderabad)
Summary: The GST Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad, disposed of the Department’s appeal against an order through which the First Appellate Authority (FAA) had entertained Teqdatum Technologies Private Limited’s belated challenge to cancellation of its GST registration. The respondent had failed to furnish returns continuously for six months during financial year 2022–23, leading to retrospective cancellation. According to the order, it neither sought revocation within the prescribed period nor appealed within the three months under Section 107(1) and the additional one month available for condonation under Section 107(4) of the CGST Act. The FAA nevertheless condoned the delay, relying on Telangana High Court decisions, and permitted the appeal subject to payment of outstanding liabilities. The respondent subsequently discharged its tax liabilities, the Department restored its registration, and it continued business and filed GST returns. Its active registration status was admitted by the departmental representative and supported by the GST portal records. The respondent neither appeared before the Tribunal nor filed cross-objections.
Following its Common Order Nos. 04 to 19/COURT-II/HYD/2026 dated 18 September 2026, the Tribunal held that the FAA could not derive a power to condone delay beyond the statutory outer limit from High Court orders passed in exercise of constitutional writ jurisdiction on their particular facts. The FAA had therefore exceeded its jurisdiction. However, the Department had itself implemented the impugned order by restoring the registration, upon which the respondent continued its business. Reversing that position would expose intervening genuine transactions to uncertainty, and no effective relief could now be granted to the Department. Applying the principles recorded in the common order, including estoppel and orderly administration, the Tribunal held the appeal infructuous and disposed of it as not maintainable, without costs.
Cases Discussed
- Common Order Nos. 04 to 19/COURT-II/HYD/2026, dated 18.09.2026 (GSTAT Hyderabad). Followed because the factual and legal position was indistinguishable: the FAA exceeded its condonation powers, but departmental appeals became infructuous after implementation of registration-restoration orders.
- APICTO Limited v. Union of India, W.P. No. 4401 of 2024 (Telangana High Court). Cited by the FAA in support of its approach; the Tribunal held that the High Court decisions relied upon did not enlarge the FAA’s statutory condonation powers.
- M/s. Southern Enterprises v. State of Telangana, W.P. No. 2471 of 2023, dated 31.01.2023 (Telangana High Court). Relied upon by the FAA for condonation; the Tribunal distinguished relief granted in constitutional jurisdiction from powers available to a statutory appellate authority.
- M/s. Chenna Krishnama Charyulu Karampudi v. State of Telangana (Telangana High Court). Also relied upon by the FAA; the Tribunal held that such writ relief did not confer a general power to disregard Section 107(4).
FULL TEXT OF THE ORIGINAL GSTAT JUDGMENT/ORDER
1. The Department has instituted the present appeal under Sections 112(3) and 112(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, impugning Order-in-Appeal No. HYD-GST-MD-AP2-103-2025-26 dated 24 June 2025, rendered by the First Appellate Authority. The term ‘Act’ or ‘Rules’, wherever referred to shall mean and include the State Goods & Services Tax Act, 2017 or State Goods & Services Tax Rules, 2017, respectively, since all the provisions of both the Acts & Rules are common and that the same shall apply equally and concomitantly.
2. The Appellant-Department (the Appellant), aggrieved by the impugned order, has preferred the present appeal. The Appellant’s main contention is that the First Appellate Authority (FAA) exceeded its jurisdiction under Sections 107(1) and 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 by condoning delay beyond the maximum period prescribed by law. It is therefore submitted that the impugned order is tainted by a clear error of jurisdiction, contrary to the statutory provision, and is liable to be set aside.
3. The respondent, M/s. TEQDATUM TECHNOLOGIES PRIVATE LIMITED, are registered taxable persons who have been filing returns since the date of registration. However, during the financial year 2022–23 the respondent failed to furnish GST returns for a continuous period of six months. That persistent default falls squarely within Rule 21(h) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 read with Rule 22(3) thereof and Section 29(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, thereby justifying the suo motu cancellation of the respondent’s registration.
4. Under the statutory framework, the respondent was obliged to apply for revocation of the cancellation of registration within the prescribed period of thirty days, and only after discharging the admitted tax liability along with any applicable interest, late fee and penalty. The respondent neither filed an application for revocation nor submitted any reply seeking such relief within the stipulated period. Consequentially, the Adjudicating Authority proceeded to confirm the Show Cause Notice (SCN) and cancelled the respondent’s registration with retrospective effect.
5. The respondents subsequently instituted an appeal before the First Appellate Authority under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, after the expiry of the statutory period prescribed by Section 107(1) and beyond the further period which may be condoned under Section 107(4). Despite the clear bar of limitation, the FAA exercised its discretion to condone the delay, expressly placing reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Telangana in M/s. Southern Enterprises v. State of Telangana, W.P. No. 2471 of 2023 dated 31.01.2023.
6. In M/s. Southern Enterprises v. State of Telangana (W.P. No. 2471 of 2023) the Hon’ble High Court of Telangana condoned the delay and directed the First Appellate Authority to admit and determine the writ-petitioner’s appeal on its merits. Purporting to follow that ratio, and having regard also to the decision in M/s. Chenna Krishnama Charyulu Karampudi v. State of Telangana, the FAA condoned the delay in the respondent’s appeal and admitted it for hearing. The admission was, however, expressly conditional: the FAA permitted the respondent to prosecute the appeal only upon payment of all outstanding tax liabilities, together with accrued interest, penalties and any applicable late fees. The FAA further relied upon the decision of this Court in APICTO Limited v. Union of India (W.P. No. 4401 of 2024) in support of its approach.
7. In compliance with the order impugned, the respondent has discharged tax liabilities payable by them and sought for revocation of the cancellation of the registration, thereby enabling them to resume and continue their business operations. It is an admitted fact that the registration has been restored consequent to such payments by the respondents. It is also an admitted fact that the respondent is carrying on their business and have been filing their GST returns. The present status of the respondent’s registration is active, a position acknowledged by the learned departmental representative and corroborated by the records on the GST portal.
8. The appellant has instituted the present appeal, primarily impugning the First Appellate Authority’s exercise of jurisdiction in condoning delay beyond the period prescribed by Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. It is urged on behalf of the appellant that Section 107(1) prescribes a statutory limitation of three months from the date of communication of the order appealed against, and that Section 107(4) confers a narrowly-circumscribed power on the FAA to condone delay for a further period of one month only, and that such power is exercisable solely upon satisfaction of sufficient cause.
9. The appellant contends that the power of condonation conferred upon the FAA is circumscribed by the express language of Sec. 107(4) of the Act and that the FAA has no jurisdiction to entertain, or condone the delay in, an appeal presented beyond the maximum period prescribed therein. It is further contended that the FAA could not, by relying upon the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Telangana in M/s. Southern Enterprises vs State of Telangana and M/s. Chenna Krishnama Charyulu Karampudi vs State of Telangana and also the case of APICTO Limited vs the Union of India and Ors, assume jurisdiction which has not been conferred upon it by the statute.
10. On the aforesaid premise, the appellant seeks the setting aside of the impugned orders on the ground that they have been passed without jurisdiction and in dis-regard of the statutory limitation prescribed u/s 107(1) and 107(4) of the Act.
11. On perusal of the grounds of appeal, pleadings, submissions and material placed on record, the following two questions arise for the determination in these appeals:
i. Whether the FAA was justified in condoning the delay in preferring the appeal beyond the maximum condonable period prescribed u/s 107(4) of the Act;
ii. Whether the appeals preferred by the department are maintainable, particularly when the department has already acted upon and implemented the impugned order by revoking the cancellation of the respondent’s registration?
12. The Respondent had neither submitted their cross objections nor appeared before this Bench.
13. Learned Department Representative appearing for the Appellant fairly admits that the factual matrix in the present proceedings is indistinguishable from that considered by this Tribunal in its common orders Nos. 04-19/COURT-II/HYD/2026 dated 18.09.2026.
14. Having heard the learned representative for the Department and having perused the record, we are of the view that the question arising in the present appeal is substantially identical to the question or questions which this Tribunal has considered and determined in the common orders referred to above. In the circumstances, and for the reasons set out in those decisions, we find no substantial difference in the factual or legal background which would warrant a departure from the conclusions therein. Accordingly, this appeal shall be adjudicated in consonance with the principles and the outcome recorded in the said common orders. The operative extract from the aforementioned common order is reproduced below for convenient reference:
“18.2 …the exercise of such constitutional power by the High Court cannot, by any process of judicial osmosis, be transplanted into the jurisdiction of a statutory authority. The First Appellate Authority is a creature of the statute and must, therefore, act within the four corners of the enactment. Its jurisdiction is conditioned and circumscribed by the provisions of Section 107 of the CGST Act, and the limits prescribed therein are mandatory in nature.
18.3 The orders relied upon by the First Appellate Authority were rendered by the Hon’ble High Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 226 and were founded upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to those proceedings. Those decisions cannot be construed as laying down that the First Appellate Authority possesses an inherent or plenary power to condone delay beyond the outer limit expressly prescribed under Section 107(4) of the Act…
18.4 …aequitas sequitur legem, meaning ‘equity follows the law’, cannot be invoked by a statutory authority to override an express legislative prescription. Where the statute prescribes both the ordinary period of limitation and the maximum period for which delay may be condoned, the authority vested with appellate jurisdiction cannot extend that period on considerations of hardship, equity or substantial justice.
18.6 The First Appellate Authority, therefore, exceeded the bounds of its statutory jurisdiction and exercised a power ultra vires the provisions of Section 107 of the Act. The condonation of delay in the facts of the present cases was not an exercise of a discretion vested in the Authority, but an assumption of jurisdiction that was never available to it…
19.1 …the Hon’ble High Court exercised its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of those cases, directed that the delay be condoned and the matters be considered on merits. The orders cannot be construed as laying down any general proposition of law enlarging the jurisdiction of the First Appellate Authority under Section 107(4) of the Act…”
The said common order, however, proceeded further to hold as follows:
“20.1 It is undisputed that, after the impugned orders were passed, the Department acted upon them and restored the registrations of the concerned Respondents. Having implemented those orders and altered the Respondents’ legal and commercial position, the Department cannot now seek to invalidate the same orders without addressing the consequences of its own action.
20.3 In these circumstances, even if the Department’s objections regarding the statutory limitation period are accepted in principle, no effective relief can presently be granted to the Department through these appeals…
21.1 Having acted upon and implemented the impugned orders, the Department has, at this stage, sought to challenge their validity, thereby creating an anomalous and precarious situation. If these appeals were to be allowed, the restored registrations would once again become liable to cancellation, including with retrospective effect. Such a consequence would imperil the validity of the genuine transactions undertaken by the Respondents during the intervening period, through no fault attributable to them…
26…….we hold that the First Appellate Authority travelled beyond the statutory limits prescribed under Section 107(4) of the Act in condoning the inordinate delay in filing the appeals by the Respondents… At the same time, having implemented the impugned orders by restoring the Respondents’ registrations, the Department cannot, in the circumstances of the present case, assail the very orders upon which it has already acted… Consequently, the Department’s appeals have become infructuous and no effective relief can now be granted therein. The appeals are, therefore, disposed of as not maintainable.”
15. The facts of the present appeal are not shown to be distinguishable from those considered in the common order extracted above. The Respondent defaulted continuously for six months, its registration was cancelled under Section 29(2)(c) of the Act, the appeal before the FAA was filed grossly beyond the period condonable under Section 107(4), the delay was condoned by the FAA by reliance on the very same judgments of the High Court of Telangana, and, most significantly, the Department has already given effect to the impugned order by restoring the Respondent’s registration, upon which the Respondent has since continued to carry on business.
16. Applying the ratio of the said common order to the facts of the present case, it is held, first, that the FAA was not justified in condoning the delay in filing of the appeal before it beyond the period permissible under Section 107(4) of the Act, merely on the strength of the judgments of the High Court of Telangana relied upon, those judgments having been rendered in the exercise of writ jurisdiction on the facts peculiar to the cases before the High Court and not disclosing any general proposition enlarging the FAA’s statutory power of condonation. It is held, further, that notwithstanding the said infirmity, the Department, having itself implemented the impugned order by restoring the registration of the Respondent, and the Respondent having since continued to carry on business on the strength thereof, the present appeal has, for the same reasons as recorded in the common order extracted above, become infructuous, and no effective relief can be granted to the Department herein.
17. Having considered the matter, we find that the First Appellate Authority exceeded the limits of its power under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 by condoning the clearly excessive delay in filing the respondent’s appeal. Accordingly, the first issue framed in paragraph 7 is answered against the respondent.
18. However, it is also clear that the Department, by giving effect to the impugned order and facilitating the restoration of the respondent’s GST registration, has itself acted on the relief it now seeks to challenge. In these circumstances, allowing the Department to attack an order it implemented would be unfair and would run counter to established principles of estoppel and orderly administration. Therefore, the second issue framed in paragraph 11 must be answered in favour of the respondent.
19. As a result, because the impugned order has been implemented and there is no practical relief this Bench can now grant, the Department’s appeal has become devoid of any effective remedy. For the reasons set out above, the appeal is disposed as not maintainable.
20. Accordingly, and following this Bench’s Common Order Nos. 04 to 19/COURT-II/HYD/2026 dated 18.09.2026, the present appeal is held to be infructuous and is disposed of as not maintainable.
21. On the above terms, the appeal is disposed of.
22. No order as to costs.
(Order pronounced in open court on 16.10.2026)
