GSTAT Appeal Token: 60 Calendar Days or 1,440 Hours from Generation?

Summary: The GSTAT token facility introduced by Order No. 156/2026 dated 10 July 2026 permits an appellant to record the intention to appeal under Section 112 of the CGST Act, 2017 through a token and thereafter complete filing within 60 days from token generation. The central question is whether a token generated at 4 p.m. gives 60 calendar days, ending at the close of the sixtieth day, or precisely 1,440 hours ending at 4 p.m. on that day. This article examines the wording of the token order and advisory alongside Rule 3 of the Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2025, which expressly provides that the day from which a period is to be reckoned shall be excluded. It considers Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Supreme Court decisions including Econ Antri Ltd. v. Rom Industries Ltd., Haru Das Gupta v. State of West Bengal, Saketh India Ltd. v. India Securities Ltd., Tarun Prasad Chatterjee v. Dinanath Sharma and Raj Kumar Yadav v. Samir Kumar Mahaseth on exclusion of the first day, inclusion of the last day and the treatment of fractions of a day. On the author’s considered view, the generation date should be excluded and the entire sixtieth calendar day should remain available for completing the appeal, unless an express and legally effective provision prescribes a different expiry time. A timestamp records generation but does not by itself determine the legal expiry of the filing period.

1. The question is how the period is counted

A token is generated at 4 p.m., and the appellant is allowed 60 days from the date of its generation to file an appeal. Does the period expire at 4 p.m. on the sixtieth day, or does the appellant have the whole of that day?

The arithmetic is straightforward: 60 multiplied by 24 equals 1,440 hours. The legal question is the starting point of the count. If the generation date must be excluded, the period begins with the next complete calendar day. A calculation beginning at the precise time of generation follows a different method.

For GSTAT appeals, the answer must be drawn from the token order, the Tribunal’s own rule for computation of time and the Supreme Court decisions explaining exclusion of the first day and inclusion of the last.

1.1. The GSTAT appeal token and the 60-day period

Order No. 156/2026 dated 10 July 2026, issued by the President, GSTAT, in exercise of powers under Rule 123 of the Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2025, introduced a token facility for appeals under section 112 of the CGST Act, 2017. Paragraph 2 permitted an appellant to record the intention to appeal by obtaining a token on or before 31 July 2026 and thereafter complete filing:

“within a period of 60 days from the date of token generation.”

Paragraph 3 treats timely generation of the token as sufficient compliance for filing within the due date, read with the requirement to complete filing within the allowed period. The attached advisory states that the token will lapse “after 60 days of its generation”. It also provides for recording the date and time of generation.

The dispute considered here is the computation of this special filing period. The statutory limitation for GSTAT appeals generally is a separate matter.

2. The words “of” and “from” have the same effect in this context

In Econ Antri Ltd. v. Rom Industries Ltd., (2014) 11 SCC 769, decided on 26 August 2013, a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court considered whether “of” required a different computation from “from”. Paragraph 22 states:

“the words ‘of’, ‘from’ and ‘after’ may, in a given case, mean really the same thing.”

Here, the order and advisory concern the same period and purpose. The order fixes the period by reference to the date of generation; the advisory explains its operation. Use of “of” in the advisory supplies no clear direction to include the first date or calculate expiry by the clock. The two expressions should therefore receive the same meaning for this purpose.

The Court’s qualification about context remains relevant. The proposition is that these expressions have the same effect in the wording under examination, rather than that they are interchangeable in every enactment or document.

3. Rule 3 expressly requires exclusion of the first day

Rule 3 of the GSTAT (Procedure) Rules, 2025, notified by G.S.R. 256(E) dated 24 April 2025, provides the direct legal foundation. It covers periods prescribed by the relevant laws and rules, as well as periods fixed by the Appellate Tribunal for doing an act. Its operative words are:

“the day from which the said period is to be reckoned shall be excluded”

The direction is mandatory when the rule applies. Exclusion is part of the prescribed computation; it does not depend upon an appellant proving hardship or obtaining condonation.

The token order was issued by the President, GSTAT, under Rule 123. The 60-day period is therefore a period fixed by the Appellate Tribunal for doing an act, and falls within Rule 3. Rule 123 deals with difficulties and matters on which the rules are silent. On computation of time, the rules are not silent; Rule 3 makes express provision. The order prescribes the length of the period, but the method of counting it remains that laid down in Rule 3. The order contains no express alternative, and none can be implied from its silence.

Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 reinforces the same principle. For the Central Acts and Regulations to which it applies, the word “from” is sufficient to exclude the first day, while “to” is sufficient to include the last. For the token period, Rule 3 supplies the express computation provision within GSTAT’s own procedural framework.

3.1. The rule has been consistently applied by the Supreme Court

In Haru Das Gupta v. State of West Bengal, (1972) 1 SCC 639, decided on 1 February 1972, detention commenced on 5 February 1971, and confirmation was made on 5 May 1971. The Supreme Court excluded the commencement date and held the confirmation to be within three months. It stated the general rule:

“to exclude the first day and to include the last day.”

The Court also distinguished the duration of a legal term from a period allowed for doing an act. The purpose and context matter. The GSTAT order expressly allows time to complete filing of an appeal, which supports applying the rule governing time for performance of an act.

In Saketh India Ltd. v. India Securities Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 1, decided on 10 March 1999, the Supreme Court likewise excluded the date on which the cause of action arose when computing the one-month period for filing a cheque-dishonour complaint.

Econ Antri records the Haru Das Gupta principle in paragraph 15. In paragraph 25, the three-Judge Bench expressly affirmed Saketh and disapproved the contrary view in SIL Import, USA v. Exim Aides Silk Exporters, (1999) 4 SCC 567. First-day exclusion was part of the issue actually decided.

4. Excluding the first day also removes its fractional portion

In the author’s view, excluding the very first day from counting also excludes the fraction of that day. The event may occur at 10 a.m., 4 p.m. or shortly before midnight. The portion remaining after the event is left outside the count. The prescribed period is then counted in complete calendar days.

If an event occurs at 4 p.m., only eight hours remain on that date. Treating that date as one full day could reduce a one-day allowance to eight hours. Exclusion prevents the remaining fraction from being counted as a whole day.

The explanation is supported by Tarun Prasad Chatterjee v. Dinanath Sharma, (2000) 8 SCC 649, decided on 10 October 2000. The Supreme Court explained that a late-night declaration of an election result could otherwise leave a candidate or elector with hardly any time on that date. It observed:

“Law comes to the rescue of such parties to give full forty-five days period for filing the election petition.”

The Court rejected the argument that excluding the first day improperly enlarged the limitation period. Exclusion determines the period’s lawful starting point. It does not add a day to a period already computed correctly.

The same distinction answers the GSTAT issue. Calculating 1,440 hours from 4 p.m. carries the fractional first day into the computation. Excluding the generation date instead starts the 60 complete days at midnight when the next date begins.

5. The last calendar day continues until the next day begins

Raj Kumar Yadav v. Samir Kumar Mahaseth, (2005) 3 SCC 601, decided on 11 March 2005, is a three-Judge Bench decision directly concerning filing during the last day of limitation. The Supreme Court explained that a calendar day:

“begins at midnight and covers a period of 24 hours thereafter”

The Court qualified this by the absence of anything contrary in the context. It held that the election petition could be presented until midnight at the end of the last date. The Court also held that procedural rules could not curtail the statutory period by confining presentation to ordinary court hours.

Applied to a period counted in calendar days, the last day includes its evening and its last minute. The precise expression is “until the end of the last day”, immediately before the next date begins. This principle supports availability of the whole sixtieth day under the token order.

6. Recording the generation time does not determine expiry

Econ Antri, paragraph 11, discusses Cartwright v. MacCormack, [1963] 1 All ER 11. An insurance cover note recorded 11.45 a.m. and provided fifteen days from its commencement date. The English Court of Appeal excluded that date and held an accident at 5.45 p.m. on the last date covered.

This example answers the argument based solely on the token’s timestamp. A timestamp records when generation occurred. The governing wording and computation rule decide when the permitted period ends. Recording the hour does not itself prescribe expiry at the corresponding hour on the last day.

Nor does describing the facility as a token-validity period settle the issue. The token enables completion of an appeal within the period fixed by the order. Its expiry should therefore follow the legally computed filing period.

7. Illustration of a token generated on 30 July 2026

Assume that a valid token was generated at 4 p.m. on 30 July 2026. Excluding that date produces the following calculation:

On this computation, the period ends at the close of 28 September 2026. A calculation of 1,440 hours from the actual generation time would end at 4 p.m. that day, eight hours earlier.

The 60 complete calendar days themselves still comprise 1,440 hours. Those hours run from the opening of 31 July to the close of 28 September. The eight remaining hours on 30 July are outside the count because the generation date is excluded.

This illustration assumes that the last date is a working day. Rule 3 separately deals with closure of the Tribunal’s office on the last day; that provision must be considered where relevant.

8. Computation must precede any question of delay

An appeal cannot properly be treated as late without first identifying the correct expiry date and time. Where the date of generation is excluded, and filing is completed within the last permissible day, no condonation is needed merely because more than 1,440 hours have passed since token generation.

If the portal closes the token earlier, the legal issue is whether that closure follows the governing order and rules. The appellant should preserve the token acknowledgement, screenshots of the failed attempt, the attempted filing time and any grievance lodged. These records establish the facts on which appropriate relief may be sought; an error message alone does not decide limitation.

9. The conclusion on the GSTAT token period

On a combined reading of Order No. 156/2026, its advisory and Rule 3, supported by the Supreme Court decisions discussed above, the author’s considered view is that the date of token generation must be excluded and the entire sixtieth calendar day must remain available for completing the appeal. Expiry at the corresponding hour of generation would bring the excluded fractional day back into the calculation and shorten the last day.

This conclusion applies the established computation principles to the wording of the GSTAT token facility. The cited judgments did not themselves decide GSTAT token expiry. An express and legally effective provision prescribing a different expiry time would require separate examination; recording a timestamp alone does not amount to such a provision.

The portal should display the expiry date and time computed in accordance with the governing provisions. Clear implementation would prevent a dispute over the clock from obstructing an appeal filed within the period allowed.

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Disclaimer: The views expressed are the personal views of the author and are based on Order No. 156/2026, the related advisory, the GSTAT (Procedure) Rules, 2025 and judicial decisions as available on the date of writing. The article is intended for general information only and does not constitute legal or professional advice. Readers should verify the latest orders and seek professional advice on their specific facts before acting.