David George K. Vs Deputy Director (Appellate Tribunal Under SAFEMA Delhi)
SAFEMA Tribunal Upholds PMLA Attachment in PRD Mini Nidhi Scam; Holds Failure to Explain Source of Assets Justifies Attachment
The Appellate Tribunal under SAFEMA dismissed the appeal filed by David George K., upholding the attachment of his properties in connection with the PRD Mini Nidhi Ltd. deposit scam. The ED’s investigation revealed that the company had mobilised over ₹105.9 crore from depositors, while ₹44.82 crore remained payable. The Tribunal noted that the appellant was allegedly involved in siphoning investors’ funds through bogus staff loans and diversion of cash, and that he had not seriously disputed the allegations of his involvement in the scheduled offences or the quantified proceeds of crime.
The appellant argued that the attached properties had been acquired from legitimate sources such as gifts from family members, bank loans, agricultural income, personal savings and earlier purchases, with some assets having been acquired well before the alleged crime period. The Tribunal rejected these contentions, holding that the appellant had failed to satisfactorily establish the source of funds for acquisition of the properties or repayment of the loans. It observed that several cash deposits, gifts and bank transactions remained unexplained and that, under Section 24 of the PMLA, the burden lay on the appellant to prove that the assets were not linked to proceeds of crime.
The Tribunal further reaffirmed that properties acquired prior to the commission of the scheduled offence can also be attached as “equivalent value” where the actual proceeds of crime are unavailable, relying on the Punjab & Haryana High Court’s decision in Dilbag Singh and the Delhi High Court’s decision in Arun Suri. Finding no error in the Adjudicating Authority’s reasoning and concluding that the appellant had failed to discharge the statutory burden of proof, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal and sustained the provisional attachment of the properties.
Cases Discussed
- Arun Suri vs Directorate Of Enforcement (Delhi HC), MISC. APPEAL (PMLA) 13/2026 & CM APPL. 10455/2026, decided on 16.02.2026
- Dilbag Singh @ Dilbag Sandhu Vs. Union of India & Ors. (Punjab & Haryana HC), CWP 22688-2024 dated 13.11.2024
- Vijay Mandanlal Choudhary Vs. Union of India (SC), 2022 SCC Online SC 929
- Seema Garg Vs. Directorate of Enforcement (Punjab & Haryana HC), 2020 SCC Online P&H 738
- Axis Bank’s case (Delhi HC)
- Prakash Industries case (Delhi HC)
- Abdullah Ali Balsharaf’s case
- Kumar Pappu Singh’s case
- HDFC Bank’s case
- M/s. Himachal Amta Power Limited’s case
- Hemanshu Rajnikant Shah’s case
- Pavana Dibbur’s case
FULL TEXT OF THE JUDGMENT APPELLATE TRIBUNAL UNDER SAFEMA AT NEW DELHI
By this appeal under Section 26 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (in short “the Act of 2002”), a challenge has been made to the order dated 14.11.2024 passed by the Adjudicating Authority confirming the Provisional Attachment Order dated 28.06.2024.
Facts of the case:
2. The brief facts giving rise to the case pertain to registration of 18 FIRs in Pathanamthitta District, Kerala against associates with M/s PRD Mini Nidhi Ltd. It was not only against the Director of the Company but the Board Members and Manager, apart from unknown officials. The FIR was involving a scheduled offence under Section 2(1)(x) and (y) of the Act of 2002 and accordingly an ECIR was recorded for investigation. After recording of the ECIR, the Competent Authority and Secretary of the Govt. of Kerala, under Section 7(3) of the Banning of Unregulated Deposit Schemes Act, 2019, registered 122 cases at Koipuram and Thiruvalla Police Stations. The total amount payable to the depositors of PRD Chits and Investment was worked out to be Rs.44.82 Crores. The calculation of which has been given in the impugned order. During the course of investigation, the statements of the relevant persons were recorded under Section 50(2) and 50(3) of the Act of 2002. The modus operandi to acquire the proceeds of crime could be revealed.
3. It was found that the company had received Rs.105.9 Crores in the form of savings accounts, recurring deposits and fixed deposits. The conspiracy was orchestrated by the promoters of the company, in collusion with Mr. David George to siphon of those funds. They falsely recorded withdrawals from the company as loans to staff members. The staff members were misled into believing that the cash withdrawals made in their names or through their bank accounts were used to pay interest to the depositors. However, these withdrawals were actually part of a scheme to drain the company’s funds in the guise of staff loans.
4. Shri K.C. Thomas, a former employee of the company, revealed in his statement that deposits from PRD Chits and Investments were also settled and these transactions were recorded in the company’s accounts as loans. The practice of issuing bogus loans allowed the promoters to generate unaccounted cash, which was then used to acquire assets in their names. Additionally, Shri David George diverted funds from the company for his personal gain.
5. Substantial cash deposits and withdrawals in the bank accounts of the promoters and the appellant Shri David George, as well as his family members, were revealed during the course of investigation. The promoters had also taken various loans from banks and settled the dues through cash payments, further highlighting the extent of their financial misconduct. The respondents accordingly caused provisional attachment of the properties of the appellant finding it to have been acquired out of the proceeds of crime or for value equivalent to the proceeds due to non-availability of the amount matching to the proceeds of crime in his hand. The Provisional Attachment Order has been confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority finding involvement of the appellant for commission of crime and finding a case of money laundering. Aggrieved by the order, appellant has filed this appeal to challenge the impugned order.
Arguments of counsel for the appellant:
6. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the company’s source to acquire the properties has been given. However, ignoring the aforesaid, the Provisional Attachment Order was caused by the respondents followed by its confirmation by the Adjudicating Authority. The source to acquire different properties has been detailed out and, therefore, there was no reason for the respondents to cause provisional attachment of the properties or for the Adjudicating Authority to confirm it.
7. Referring to the different properties under provisional attachment, it was submitted that several of the properties were acquired much prior to the crime period thus they were unrelated to the commission of crime yet provisionally attached by the respondents. It is without showing any connection of those properties with the crime and otherwise when the properties were acquired much prior to the period of crime, there was no reason to assume them to be proceeds of crime. They could not have been provisionally attached by drawing presumption, rather it should have been after drawing money trail to connect the properties with the crime. The respondents failed to establish such a connection and, therefore, the impugned order deserves to be set aside.
8. The counsel for the appellant made detailed submissions to indicate the source of each property. It is said to be not out of the proceeds of crime but either by his own means or was out of gift from his father or with other sources. It has been ignored by the respondents and accordingly, impugned order has been caused unmindfully and, therefore, it deserves to be set aside.
9. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that Building No. 307, Ward V. Thottappuzhasserry Panchayat was given by his father, Thomas David as gift, vide Settlement Deed dated 29.03.1993 and, therefore, with no stretch of imagination, it could have been taken or said to be corresponding to the commission of crime. In ignorance of the aforesaid, provisional attachment of the said property was caused.
10. Similarly, the land measuring 7.75 acres at Survey No. 84/7-2, Thottapuzhasserry Village was purchased from one Mr. A.C. Jose in the year 2016 on a payment of total consideration of Rs.3 lakhs by cash.
11. The appellant and his father had deposited huge sum in Muthoot Finance Corporation. The amount of Rs.8,99,904/-was withdrawn on maturity and deposited it on 17.05.2011 in Joint Account in SBI, Kozhanchery branch with his daughter Jossy Achama George and, therefore, could not have been considered to be out of proceeds.
12. The appellant constructed Building No.83A on the aforesaid land in the year 2014. The building was constructed at a cost of Rs.37,80,000/- for which he entered into agreement with the Contractor. The funds for the construction were raised from different source. The appellant availed a housing loan of Rs.15 lakhs reflected in the bank account of Federal Bank, Thonippuzha Branch in 2014-15. The loan was credited for a sum of Rs.9,91,573/- on 30.09.2014 and Rs.5 Lakhs on 24.10.2014. In view of the above, the appellant was having source to incur the amount on construction of the building. It is with the further statement that the appellant availed loan of Rs.10 Lakhs from District Co-operative Bank, Maramon but has been ignored by the respondents.
13. The appellant sold the land of an area of 4.05 acres for a consideration of Rs. 1 lakh. It is received in cash in the year 2015.
14. The counsel for the appellant further submitted that certain amounts were received from Joby Mathew, son-in-law of the appellant. A sum of (1) Rs.18,000/- was received on 24.11.2014; (2) Rs.6 lakhs on 25.11.2014; (3) Rs.15,000/- on 02.05.2015 and (4) Rs.15,000/- was received on 17.08.2015. Those amounts were reflected in the bank account of the appellant with Federal Bank.
15. The appellant withdrew an amount of Rs.4 lakhs on 19.08.2014 from his bank account with District Co-operative Bank. It was with further withdrawal of an amount of Rs.50,000/- and Rs.1 lakh on 05.08.2015 and 18.08.2014, respectively.
16. The appellant further withdrew an amount of Rs.1,28,000/- on 10.02.2015, Rs.50,000/- on 13.02.2015 and Rs.2 lakhs on 18.02.2015 from his bank account with Federal Bank.
17. The appellant disclosed his agriculture income of about Rs.1 lakh in the year 2014-15 and has been reflected in his income-tax return for the year 2015-16.
18. The properties of Survey No.82/14, land measuring 3.24 acres, Survey No.82/1/1, land measuring 0.60 acres and Survey No.84/7, land measuring 6.04 acres were purchased by the appellant from one Mr. A.C. Jose vide Sale Deed dated 08.09.2016 for the total consideration of Rs.5 lakhs only. The consideration for the properties mentioned above was paid by way of a cheque of Rs.2.5 lakhs on 27.09.2016 from the bank account of the Federal Bank. It was followed by payment of an equivalent amount by his wife Mariamma George on 27.09.2016 from her bank account with Federal Bank.
19. The further statement of the appellant was regarding receipt of the Gift of Rs.50,000/- from his father-in-law, Mr. Vargese Mathew on 08.07.2016. A sum of Rs.25,000/- was credited in the account of Federal Bank on 22.07.2016. It was with further statement that the credit of Rs.25,000/- along with Rs.15,000/- was made being earnings from DTP Centre of his wife with the Federal Bank.
20. The appellant had disclosed the source of income for purchase of property and investment out of which Rs.1,50,000/- was deposited with the Federal Bank on 09.09.2016 and equivalent deposit in his wife account with the Federal Bank. The source of those amounts was disclosed.
21. On 05.09.2016, the appellant’s mother-in-law Mrs. Gracy Mathew gave a sum of Rs.1 lakh to the appellant. It was also through banking channel.
22. The personal saving was also accumulated. It was out of monthly salary and was reflected in the income tax return. In view of the above, the appellant had disclosed the source for acquisition of properties under provisional attachment but ignored by the Adjudicating Authority despite the mandate and, therefore, prayer was made to cause interference in the impugned order.
23. The learned counsel for the appellant did not raise any other argument than referred to above. It is despite an opportunity to raise any other legal or factual issue. The counsel for the appellant had shown his satisfaction to the argument raised by him and thus did not raise any other argument.
Arguments of counsel for the respondents:
24. The learned counsel for the respondents vehemently opposed the appeal. Elaborate arguments were made in reference to each issue raised by the appellant and would be referred while recording finding in reference to the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant and, therefore, it is not repeated herein for the sake of brevity.
Finding of the Tribunal:
25. I have considered the rival submissions of the parties and scanned the matter carefully.
26. In the opening para, I have referred the facts regarding registration of 18 FIRs in Pathanamthitta District, Kerala against associates with M/s PRD Mini Nidhi Ltd. It was not only against the Director of the Company but the Board Members and Manager, apart from unknown officials. M/s PRD Mini Nidhi Ltd. and other entities were found involved in luring the innocent persons to invest their money in the Scheme on the promise with higher return which they failed and accordingly number of FIRs were registered against the accused which includes the appellant.
27. It is also a fact that 122 cases were registered at Koipuram and Thiruvalla Police Stations at the instance of Competent Authority and Secretary of the Govt. of Kerala invoking Section 7(3) of the Banning of Unregulated Deposit Schemes Act, 2019. The ECIR was recorded in reference to the FIRs and accordingly investigation was caused.
28. The challenge to the impugned order was contested by the counsel for the appellant mainly on the ground that source to acquire the properties under provisional attachment was disclosed by the appellant but has been ignored by the respondents. The appellant did not challenge the allegation made against him for his involvement in the crime. It does not exist even in the written arguments submitted by the appellant in pursuance to the liberty given by the Tribunal. The only argument was that appellant was wrongly taken to be a key managerial figure in the PRD Group. The management of the company was in the hands of Anilkumar D and Deepa Divakaran and their sons Anantha Vishnu and Anantha Krishnan. The finance of the company was handled by the aforesaid persons. The account of the company was maintained by M/s Logic Solutions and M/s Elioenai Technologies. The appellant has not questioned registration of FIRs naming him as an accused or the serious allegation made against him for his involvement in the case for siphoning of the funds. Thus, it reveals nothing but admission of the allegations levelled against the appellant. Substantially, the allegations would be tried by the Special Court. However, I find a prima facie case of money laundering against the appellant and with the aforesaid I would further deal with the arguments raised by the counsel for the appellant disclosing the source for acquisition of properties without referring to the period of crime which, in fact, started from the year 2014 when the company got involved in chit funds and investment. The total proceeds of crime in the hands of the appellant has also not been disputed, as stated by the respondents. Thus, there remains admission about the quantified proceeds of crime by the appellant. The fact aforesaid is relevant for the reason that out of 8 properties, few properties were available with the appellant even prior to the crime while others were acquired during the period of crime but they were provisionally attached for the “equivalent value” or “value thereof” to the proceeds received by the appellant. It is due to non-availability of the equivalent amount in the hands of the appellant. The properties acquired even prior to the crime period may fall within the definition of “proceeds of crime”. The issue is covered by the recent judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Dilbag Singh @ Dilbag Sandhu Vs. Union of India & Ors. (CWP 22688-2024) dated 13.11.2024 where the High Court held that its earlier judgment in the case of Seema Garg Vs. Directorate of Enforcement reported in 2020 SCC Online P&H 738 is not laying down a good law. It is realizing that the celebrated judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Vijay Mandanlal Choudhary Vs. Union of India reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 929 was given subsequent to the judgment in the case of Seema Garg (supra). It is while giving interpretation to the definition of “proceeds of crime” where the Hon’ble High Court has taken three limbs of the definition and out of which middle part to be for the property for “equivalent value” or “value thereof”. If the proceeds of crime is not found available with the accused and the person despite all efforts, then property of equivalent value can be attached. Relevant paras of the judgment of the High Court in the case of Dilbagh Singh (supra) are quoted hereunder:
“3.2. In light of the Division Bench’s judgment in Seema Garg’s case (supra), this Bench would have been obligated to either follow it or refer the matter to a Larger Bench. However, the Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary’s case (supra) has interpreted the provision in para 298, which is extracted as under:
“It was also urged before us that the attachment of property must be equivalent in value of the proceeds of crime only if the proceeds of crime are situated outside India. This argument, in our opinion, is tenuous. For, the definition of “proceeds of crime” is wide enough to not only refer to the property derived or obtained as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence, but also of the value of any such property. If the property is taken or held outside the country, even in such a case, the property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad can be proceeded with. The definition of “property” as in Section 2(1)(v) is equally wide enough to encompass the value of the property of proceeds of crime. Such interpretation would further the legislative intent in recovery of the proceeds of crime and vesting it in the Central Government for effective prevention of money-laundering.”
3.3. The aforesaid observations made by the Supreme Court enable this Bench to re-examine the entire issue, as in the considered opinion of this Bench, the judgment passed in Seema Garg’s case (supra) is no longer a good law. This Court has taken this view due to the subsequent interpretation by the Supreme Court, which has superseded the legal principles established in Seema Garg’s case (supra).
3.4. It is evident that the original (unamended) definition of phrase ‘proceeds of crime’ was structured into two distinct parts. The first part relates to the property derived or obtained directly or indirectly by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence, whereas, the second part relates to the value of any such property where the proceeds of crime are not traceable. This clearly means that if the property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, from the proceeds of a crime of scheduled offence is not traceable, then any property of equivalent value falls within the scope of the expression ‘proceeds of crime’. In 2015, the amendment restructured the definition into three parts to cover the property taken or held outside the country. The concept of the property of equivalent value was introduced with respect to the aforementioned properties. The amendment enabled the authorities to go after any other property of a person of equivalent value. In 2019, the scope of the phrase ‘proceeds of crime’ was further expanded so as to include other properties which were not directly or indirectly the proceeds of crime, but were held abroad, to be liable to attachment. In 2019, the explanation has been added so as to give a wider scope to the authorities. From the objects and reasons of the ‘2002 Actç it becomes evident that the money laundering posed a serious threat not only to the financial system of the countries but also to their integrity and sovereignty. The ‘2002 Act’ was enacted to prevent money laundering and connected activities. The act of money laundering is a multi-layered, complex and complicated diversion of the property, which is required to be prevented. Consequently, the definition of proceeds of crime has undergone transformative changes from time to time so as to include all the complex acts involved in the offence of money laundering.
3.5. In Axis Bank’s case (Supra), the Delhi High Court has dissected the definition in three parts while covering tainted property and untainted property held in India; and the ‘proceeds of crime’ taken out of the country or any other property of equivalent value thereof. However, this Court is of the considered view that the definition can be divided into two broader categories namely tainted properties and untainted properties. The first part provides about the tainted properties derived or obtained directly or indirectly by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. Thereafter, the untainted properties are further divided into two parts; the first part deals with a situation where the property derived or obtained from ‘proceeds of crime’ is not traceable. In the aforesaid situation the competent authority is authorized to attach or confiscate any other property of accused, which is of the same value as that of the ‘proceeds of crime’. The second sub-category is a result of amendment brought in 2015 and 2019 in the Act. It provides that if the property derived or obtained from the proceeds of crime has already been taken out of the Country then the property equivalent in value held within the Country or abroad can be made liable to be attached. This position has been explained by the Delhi High Court in an elaborate manner in Axis Bank’s case (supra) and Prakash Industries case (supra).
3.6. It is not disputed that the Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary’s case (supra) was examining the scope of the ‘2002 Act’ including definition of phrase ‘proceeds of crime’. The submission put forth by the learned counsel that the phrase ‘or the value of any such property’ is superfluous was rejected by the Court and it was held that the definition of ‘proceeds of crime’ is wide enough to not only include to the property derived or obtained as a result of criminal activity related to a schedule offence but also any other property of equivalent value.
3.7. While interpreting a statutory provision, it is the bounden buty of the Courts to interpret it in manner so that each word used by the statute conveys a meaning it was assigned by the Legislature. The words used in statute are of utmost significance. The Court cannot widen or restrict the provisions on its own whims and fancies. When a statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, the general rule of interpretation of statute is to read the provision as a whole and the Court must adhere strictly to the ordinary, plain meaning of the words used. The words in a statute are used precisely, not loosely, and efforts must be made to interpret them in a literal manner to give effect to the objective of the Act. This approach of interpretation is based on the idea that the legislature’s intent is best reflected in the exact words of the statute.
3.8. Moreover, the reasoning adopted in Seema Garg’s case (supra) to the effect that there was no need to insert third part in the definition of the ‘proceeds of crime’ and that ‘value of such property’ is superfluous does not appear sound. It appears that transformative journey of the definition of phrase ‘proceeds of crime’ was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench in Seema Garg’s case (supra). In Abdullah Ali Balsharaf’s case (supra), Delhi High Court inadvertently overlooked the sub-category (i) of second part of definition of ‘proceeds of crime’. Similarly, Andhra Pradesh High Court in Kumar Pappu Singh’s case (supra) was not properly assisted. Furthermore, the attention of Patna High Court was not drawn to part 2(i) in HDFC Bank’s case (supra). Similar is the position in M/s. Himachal Amta Power Limited’s case (supra). In this case, the attention of the Bench was not drawn to the second broader category of the definition. In Hemanshu Rajnikant Shah’s case (supra) the Court relied upon Seema Garg’s case (supra) and held that the properties acquired before the alleged crime and before the enforcement of the ‘2002 Act’ cannot be attached.
3.9. On the other hand the judgments passed in Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary’s case (supra), Axis Bank’s case (supra) and Prakash Industries case (supra) completely answer the question in favour of ED.
3.10. The petitioner’s counsel has also heavily relied upon Pavana Dibbur’s case (supra). This Bench has carefully read the aforesaid judgment. The aforementioned case involved attachment of properly falling under the category of ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’ proceeds of crime. The complaint under Section 44-45 of 2002 Act was quashed by the Supreme Court. The Bench was never called upon to analyse the contentions based upon Section 2(i)(u) of 2002 Act, whereas, in Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary’s case (supra) the Court directly answered the aforesaid question. Hence, there is no substance in the first argument of learned counsel for petitioner”.
29. The learned counsel for the appellant made a reference of the property of Building No. 307, Ward V. Thottappuzhasserry Panchayat to have been acquired out of the Gift from his father Thomas David vide Settlement Deed dated 29.03.1993. The property aforesaid has been provisionally attached by the respondents finding non-availability of the property of equivalent amount to the proceeds in the hands of the appellant and, therefore, it was taken for “equivalent value” or “value thereof”. It is necessary to indicate that Delhi High Court in a recent judgment in the case of Arun Suri vs Directorate Of Enforcement(MISC. APPEAL (PMLA) 13/2026 & CM APPL. 10455/2026), decided on 16.02.2026 has permitted provisional attachment even of the ancestral property if the property of the equivalent amount to the proceeds is not found available.
30. The other property referred by the counsel for the appellant is at Survey No.84/7-2 Thottapuzhasserry Village, land measuring 7.75 acres. The land aforesaid has also been attached for “equivalent value” or “value thereof” finding that the property of equivalent amount to the proceeds was not available with the appellant having been laundered or vanished. Therefore, even if the property aforesaid was acquired prior to the crime period, it was provisionally attached for “value thereof”.
31. The appellant further made a reference of the deposits by him and his father in Muthoot Finance Corporation and there has been withdrawal of a sum of Rs.8,99,904/- on maturity and deposited it on 17.05.2011 in joint account with SBI with his daughter Jossy Achama George. The fact aforesaid has been narrated by the appellant but the account with SBI has not been provisionally attached. The fact aforesaid remains irrelevant to that extent.
32. The next property referred by the counsel for the appellant was for construction of building No.83A on which an amount of Rs.37,80,000/- was incurred. A reference of the agreement with a Contractor on 04.06.2014 has been given. The appellant said to have availed housing loan of Rs.15 lakhs reflected in the bank account of Federal Bank in 2014-15. The loan was credited to the extent of Rs.9,91,573/- on 30.09.2014 and Rs.5 Lakhs on 24.10.2914.
33. The reference of the loan amount has been given by the appellant, however, without disclosing how the loan amount was repaid. In fact, it was out of the proceeds of crime and mainly by using the cash amount. It was deposited in the bank so as to clear the loan amount and, therefore, the amount aforesaid was taken towards the proceeds of crime in the hands of the appellant.
34. The counsel for the appellant further referred to a loan amount of Rs.10 Lakhs obtained from District Co-operative Bank on 07.08.2015. The fact, however, remains about the repayment of the loan amount which has not been clarified by the appellant deliberately because it was again repaid by using the proceeds and the fact otherwise remains that though a sum of Rs.37,80,000/- was incurred on construction of the building, the total amount out of the loan from Federal Bank and the District Co-operative Bank remains only of less than Rs.25 Lakhs and thereby no source for remaining amount could be given by the appellant and as to how the loan was repaid to the District Co-operative Bank and Federal Bank. It is despite the fact that burden of proof lies on the appellant in view of Section 24 of the Act of 2002.
35. The next property referred by the counsel for the appellant is land measuring 4.05 acres in Survey No.224/2 though not for the purpose of this case but highlighting that he received Rs.1 Lakh with the admission that the payment was received in cash but how it was released has not been referred.
36. The learned counsel for the appellant disclosed certain amounts received from Joby Mathew, son-in-law of the appellant. These amounts were reflected in the appellant’s bank account in the year 2014-15 i.e. the crime period. However, where it has been utilized by the appellant coupled with the fact that even source for its possession by Joby Mathew remains undisclosed. It is more so when somebody transfers the money to a person is required to disclose the source which has not been given by the appellant, rather the investigation reveals huge cash deposits to settle the proceeds by laundering it or otherwise.
37. The appellant had withdrawn Rs.4 Lakhs from the District Co-operative Bank on 19.08.2014. The source of that amount has not been disclosed. The withdrawal of certain amounts from Federal Bank has also been referred but the appellant has failed to disclose the source of those amounts lying in the bank account because at one place, the appellant had shown necessity to avail the loan to acquire the property and construct the building while at the same time referred to the withdrawal of the amount from his own bank account without clarifying necessity of availing the loan. It is coupled with the fact that how the amount withdrawn from the Federal Bank was utilized. It remains unexplained. In fact, all the transactions were made during the crime period and has not been explained by the appellant despite its burden on him according to Section 24 of the Act of 2002.
38. The learned counsel for the appellant further made a reference of the properties at Survey No.82/14, land measuring 3.24 acres, Survey No.82/1/1, land measuring 0.60 acres and Survey No. 84/7, land measuring 6.04 acres. These properties were purchased by the appellant from one Mr. A.C. Jose in the year 2016 for a consideration of Rs.5 Lakhs. It is showing a payment of Rs.2.50 Lakhs from his bank account with Federal Bank and another Rs.2 Lakhs from the bank account of his wife Mariamma George. The payment aforesaid was made during the crime period without explaining the source for deposit of money in the Federal Bank account by the appellant himself and his wife. No source of Mariamma George has been disclosed for possession of the amount of Rs.2.50 Lakhs in her bank account.
39. The learned counsel for the appellant further referred to the Gift of Rs.50,000/- from father-in-law of the appellant Mr. Varghese Mathew on 08.07.2016. Rs.25000/- is said to have been deposited in the bank account of the appellant in Federal Bank and Rs.25,000/- was credited in the bank account of the wife of the appellant in Federal Bank along with Rs.15000/-being earnings out of DTP Centre. The amounts were deposited in cash without disclosing the source of Mr. Varghese Mathew to transfer the amount of Rs.50,000/-despite required to be explained in the light of Section 8 of the Act of 2002.
40. The learned counsel for the appellant tried to justify the deposit of Rs.25000/- in the bank account with Federal Bank and equivalent amount in the account of the wife but has failed to disclose the source for cash deposit.
41. The reference of accumulated salary amount has also been given without clarifying as to how the aforesaid amount was utilized for purchase of the property and in the light of the aforesaid, I find failure of the appellant to explain the source with proof as per the mandate of Section 24 of the Act of 2002. It is more so when appellant is said to have availed loan for construction of building and other loans but failed to disclose the source for its repayment and, therefore, I do not find any error in the impugned order so as to cause interference. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed.
