Jurisdiction and power of NCLT in the light of judgment M/s. Embassy Property Developments Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (Supreme Court)
In M/s Embassy Property Developments Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 9171 of 2019 decided on 3rd December, 2019) a question arises for consideration was as
“Whether the High Court ought to interfere, under Article 226/227 of the Constitution, with an Order passed by the National Company Law Tribunal in a proceeding under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 , ignoring the availability of a statutory remedy of appeal to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal and if so, under what circumstances?”
The dispute in Embassy arose because a proposal by the resolution professional seeking extension of mining lease granted to the corporate debtor was rejected by the Government of Karnataka on the ground that the corporate debtor had violated certain provisions relating to the mining lease. An application was preferred by the resolution professional before the NCLT seeking setting aside of the Government’s decision to reject the proposal for extension and a direction to the Government to extend the lease. One of the grounds on which the Government opposed the grant of any reliefs by the NCLT was that the NCLT did not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon disputes arising out of the grant of mining leases under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (“MMDR Act”). The NCLT passed an order against the Government (i) setting aside its order rejecting the proposal for extension of the mining lease, and (ii) directing it to enter into a supplemental lease with the corporate debtor for an extended period. This order passed by the NCLT was challenged in writ proceedings initiated by the Government before the High Court of Karnataka, wherein the High Court granted a stay on the NCLT’s order. This stay order was challenged before the Supreme Court of India.
In the backdrop of the facts narrated and in the light of the rival contentions given in the aforesaid matter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it is beyond any pale of doubt that IBC, 2016 is a complete Code in itself. As observed by this Court in M/s Innoventive Industries Limited vs. ICICI Bank, it is an exhaustive code on the subject matter of insolvency in relation to corporate entities and others. It is also true that IBC, 2016 is a single Unified Umbrella Code, covering the entire gamut of the law relating to insolvency resolution of corporate persons and others in a time bound manner. The code provides a three tier mechanism namely (i) the NCLT, which is the Adjudicating Authority (ii) the NCLAT which is the appellate authority and (iii) this court as the final authority, for dealing with all issues that may arise in relation to the reorganisation and insolvency resolution of corporate persons. In so far as insolvency resolution of corporate debtors and personal guarantors are concerned, any order passed by the NCLT is appealable to NCLAT under Section 61 of the IBC, 2016 and the orders of the NCLAT are amenable to the appellate jurisdiction of this court under Section 62. It is in this context that the action of the State of Karnataka in bypassing the remedy of appeal to NCLAT and the act of the High Court in entertaining the writ petition against the order of the NCLT are being questioned. For finding an answer to the question on hand, the scope of the jurisdiction and the nature of the powers exercised by – (i) the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and (ii) the NCLT and NCLAT under the provisions of IBC, 2016 are to be seen.
Herein, we have concern with scope of the jurisdiction and nature of the power exercised by the NCLT and NCLAT under the provisions of IBC, 2016, therefore, relevant content of the aforesaid citation is mentioned and discussed.
Jurisdiction and power of NCLT
NCLT and NCLAT are constituted, not under the IBC, 2016 but under Sections 408 and 410 of the Companies Act, 2013. Without specifically defining the powers and functions of the NCLT, Section 408 of the Companies Act, 2013 simply states that the Central Government shall constitute a National Company Law Tribunal, to exercise and discharge such powers and functions as are or may be, conferred on it by or under the Companies Act or any other law for the time being in force. Insofar as NCLAT is concerned, Section 410 of the Companies Act merely states that the Central Government shall constitute an Appellate Tribunal for hearing appeals against the Orders of the Tribunal. The matters that fall within the jurisdiction of the NCLT, under the Companies Act, 2013, lie scattered all over the Companies Act. Therefore, Sections 420 and 424 of the Companies Act, 2013 indicate in broad terms, merely the procedure to be followed by the NCLT and NCLAT before passing orders. However, there are no separate provisions in the Companies Act, exclusively dealing with the jurisdiction and powers of NCLT.
In contrast, Subsections (4) and (5) of Section 60 of IBC, 2016 give an indication respectively about the powers and jurisdiction of the NCLT. Section 60 in entirety reads as follows:-
Adjudicating Authority for corporate persons. (1) The Adjudicating Authority, in relation to insolvency resolution and liquidation for corporate persons including corporate debtors and personal guarantors thereof shall be the National Company Law Tribunal having territorial jurisdiction over the place where the registered office of the corporate person is located.
(2) Without prejudice to subsection (1) and notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Code, where a corporate insolvency resolution process or liquidation proceeding of a corporate debtor is pending before the National Company Law Tribunal, an application relating to the insolvency resolution or [liquidation or bankruptcy of a corporate guarantor or personal guarantor, as the case may be, of such corporate debtor] shall be filed before such National Company Law Tribunal.
(3) An insolvency resolution process or [liquidation or bankruptcy of a corporate guarantor or personal guarantor, as the case may be, of the corporate debtor] pending in any court or tribunal shall stand transferred to the Adjudicating Authority dealing with insolvency resolution process or liquidation proceeding of such corporate debtor.
(4) The National Company Law Tribunal shall be vested with all the powers of the Debt Recovery Tribunal as contemplated under Part III in of this Code for the purpose of subsection (2).
(5) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, the National Company Law Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to entertain or dispose of –
(a) any application or proceeding by or against the corporate debtor or corporate person;
(b) any claim made by or against the corporate debtor or corporate person, including claims by or against any of its subsidiaries situated in India; and
(c) any question of priorities or any question of law or facts, arising out of or in relation to the insolvency resolution or liquidation proceedings of the corporate debtor or corporate person under this Code.
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) or in any other law for the time being in force, in computing the period of limitation specified for any suit or application by or against a corporate debtor for which an order of moratorium has been made under this Part, the period during which such moratorium is in place shall be excluded.”
Subsection (4) of Section 60 of IBC, 2016 states that the NCLT will have all the powers of the DRT as contemplated under Part III of the Code for the purposes of Subsection (2). Subsection (2) deals with a situation where the insolvency resolution or liquidation or bankruptcy of a corporate guarantor or personal guarantor of a corporate debtor is taken up, when CIRP or liquidation proceeding of such a corporate debtor is already pending before NCLT. The object of Subsection (2) is to group together (A) the CIRP or liquidation proceeding of a corporate debtor and (B) the insolvency resolution or liquidation or bankruptcy of a corporate guarantor or personal guarantor of the very same corporate debtor, so that a single Forum may deal with both. This is to ensure that the CIRP of a corporate debtor and the insolvency resolution of the individual guarantors of the very same corporate debtor do not proceed on different tracks, before different Fora, leading to conflict of interests, situations or decisions.
If the object of Subsection (2) of Section 60 is to ensure that the insolvency resolutions of the corporate debtor and its guarantors are dealt with together, then the question that arises is as to why there should be a reference to the powers of the DRT in Subsection (4). The answer to this question is to be found in Section 179 of IBC, 2016. Under Section 179 (1), it is the DRT which is the Adjudicating Authority in relation to insolvency matters of individuals and firms. This is in contrast to Section 60(1) which names the NCLT as the Adjudicating Authority in relation to insolvency resolution and liquidation of corporate persons including corporate debtors and personal guarantors. The expression “personal guarantor” is defined in Section 5(22) to mean an individual who is the surety in a contract of guarantee to a corporate debtor. Therefore the object of Subsection (2) of Section 60 is to avoid any confusion that may arise on account of Section 179(1) and to ensure that whenever a CIRP is initiated against a corporate debtor, NCLT will be the Adjudicating Authority not only in respect of such corporate debtor but also in respect of the individual who stood as surety to such corporate debtor, notwithstanding the naming of the DRT under Section 179(1) as the Adjudicating Authority for the insolvency resolution of individuals. This is also why Subsection (2) of Section 60 uses the phrase “notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Code”.
Subsection (2) of Section 179 confers jurisdiction upon DRT to entertain and dispose of (i) any suit or proceeding by or against the individual debtor (ii) any claim made by or against the individual debtor and (iii) any question of priorities or any other question whether of law or facts arising out of or in relation to insolvency and bankruptcy of the individual debtor. Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Subsection (2) of Section 179 are identical to Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Subsection (5) of Section 60. Therefore, the only reason why Subsection (4) is incorporated in Section 60 is to ensure that NCLT will exercise jurisdiction – (1) not only to entertain and dispose of matters referred to in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Subsection (5) of Section 60 in relation to the corporate debtor, (2) but also to entertain and dispose of the matters specified in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Subsection (2) of Section 179, whenever the contingency stated in Section 60(2) arises.
Interestingly there are separate provisions both in Part II and Part III of IBC, 2016 ousting the jurisdiction of civil courts. While Section 63 contained in Part II bars the jurisdiction of a civil court in respect of any matter on which NCLT or NCLAT will have jurisdiction, Section 180 contained in Part III bars the jurisdiction of civil courts in respect of any matter on which DRT or DRAT has jurisdiction. But curiously there is something more in Section 180 than what is found in Section 63, which can be appreciated if both are presented in a tabular column.
|Section 63||Section 180|
|No civil court or authority shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of any matter on which National Company Law Tribunal or the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal has jurisdiction under this Code. Civil court not to have jurisdiction.||(1) No civil court or authority shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of any matter on which the Debt Recovery Tribunal or the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal has jurisdiction under this Code.
(2) No injunction shall be granted by any court, tribunal or authority in respect of any action taken, or to be taken, in pursuance of any power conferred on the Debt Recovery Tribunal or the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal by or under this Code.
Though what is found in Subsection (2) of Section 180 is not found in the corresponding provision in Part II namely, Section 63, a similar provision is incorporated in an unrelated provision namely Section 64, which primarily deals with expeditious disposal of applications. Thus, there appears to be some mixup. However, we are not concerned about the same in this case and we have made a reference to the same only because of Subsection (4) of Section 60, vesting upon the NCLT, all the powers of the DRT.
From a combined reading of Subsection (4) and Subsection (2) of Section 60 with Section 179, it is clear that none of them hold the key to the question as to whether NCLT would have jurisdiction over a decision taken by the government under the provisions of MMDR Act, 1957 and the Rules issued thereunder. The only provision which can probably throw light on this question would be Subsection (5) of Section 60, as it speaks about the jurisdiction of the NCLT.
Clause (c) of Subsection (5) of Section 60 is very broad in its sweep, in that it speaks about any question of law or fact, arising out of or in relation to insolvency resolution. But a decision taken by the government or a statutory authority in relation to a matter which is in the realm of public law, cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be brought within the fold of the phrase “arising out of or in relation to the insolvency resolution” appearing in Clause (c) of Subsection (5). Let us take for instance a case where a corporate debtor had suffered an order at the hands of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, at the time of initiation of CIRP. If Section 60(5)(c) of IBC is interpreted to include all questions of law or facts under the sky, an Interim Resolution Professional/Resolution Professional will then claim a right to challenge the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal before the NCLT, instead of moving a statutory appeal under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Therefore the jurisdiction of the NCLT delineated in Section 60(5) cannot be stretched so far as to bring absurd results. (It will be a
different matter, if proceedings under statutes like Income Tax Act had attained finality, fastening a liability upon the corporate debtor, since, in such cases, the dues payable to the Government would come within the meaning of the expression “operational debt” under Section 5(21), making the Government an “operational creditor” in terms of Section 5(20). The moment the dues to the Government are crystalised and what remains is only payment, the claim of the Government will have to be adjudicated and paid only in a manner prescribed in the resolution plan as approved by the Adjudicating Authority, namely the NCLT.)
It was argued by all the learned Senior Counsel on the side of the appellants that an Interim Resolution Professional is duty bound under Section 20(1) to preserve the value of the property of the Corporate Debtor and that the word “property” is interpreted in Section 3(27) to include even actionable claims as well as every description of interest, present or future or vested or contingent interest arising out of or incidental to property and that therefore the Interim Resolution Professional is entitled to move the NCLT for appropriate orders, on the basis that lease is a property right and NCLT has jurisdiction under Section 60(5) to entertain any claim by the Corporate Debtor.
But the said argument cannot be sustained for the simple reason that the duties of a resolution professional are entirely different from the jurisdiction and powers of NCLT. In fact, Section 20(1) cannot be read in isolation, but has to be read in conjunction with Section 18(f)(vi) of the IBC, 2016 together with the Explanation thereunder. Section 18 (f) (vi) reads as follows:
“18. Duties of interim resolution professional. The interim resolution professional shall perform the following duties, namely:(
(f) take control and custody of any asset over which the corporate debtor has ownership rights as recorded in the balance sheet of the corporate debtor, or with information utility or the depository of securities or any other registry that records the ownership of assets including—
(vi) assets subject to the determination of ownership by a court or authority;
Explanation. For the purposes of this section, the term ‘assets’ shall not include the following namely:(a) assets owned by a third party in possession of the corporate debtor held under trust or under contractual arrangements including bailment;
(b) assets of any Indian or foreign subsidiary of the corporate debtor; and
(c) such other assets as may be notified by the Central Government in consultation with any financial sector regulator.”
If NCLT has been conferred with jurisdiction to decide all types of claims to property, of the corporate debtor, Section 18(f)(vi) would not have made the task of the interim resolution professional in taking control and custody of an asset over which the corporate debtor has ownership rights, subject to the determination of ownership by a court or other authority. In fact, an asset owned by a third party, but which is in the possession of the corporate debtor under contractual arrangements, is specifically kept out of the definition of the term “assets” under the Explanation to Section 18. This assumes significance in view of the language used in Sections 18 and 25 in contrast to the language employed in Section 20. Section 18 speaks about the duties of the interim resolution professional and Section 25 speaks about the duties of resolution professional. These two provisions use the word “assets”, while Section 20(1) uses the word “property” together with the word “value”. Sections 18 and 25 do not use the expression “property”. Another important aspect is that under Section 25 (2) (b) of IBC, 2016, the resolution professional is obliged to represent and act on behalf of the corporate debtor with third parties and exercise rights for the benefit of the corporate debtor in judicial, quasijudicial and arbitration proceedings. Section 25(1) and 25(2)(b) reads as follows:
“25. Duties of resolution professional –
(1) It shall be the duty of the resolution professional to preserve and protect the assets of the corporate debtor, including the continued business operations of the corporate debtor.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the resolution professional shall undertake the following actions:(
(b) represent and act on behalf of the corporate debtor with third parties, exercise rights for the benefit of the corporate debtor in judicial, quasi judicial and arbitration proceedings.”
This shows that wherever the corporate debtor has to exercise rights in judicial, quasijudicial proceedings, the resolution professional cannot short-circuit the same and bring a claim before NCLT taking advantage of Section 60(5).
Therefore, in the light of the statutory scheme as culled out from various provisions of the IBC, 2016 it is clear that wherever the corporate debtor has to exercise a right that falls outside the purview of the IBC, 2016 especially in the realm of the public law, they cannot, through the resolution professional, take a bypass and go before NCLT for the enforcement of such a right.
The Court held that our answer to the first question would be that NCLT did not have jurisdiction to entertain an application against the Government of Karnataka for a direction to execute Supplemental Lease Deeds for the extension of the mining lease. Since NCLT chose to exercise a jurisdiction not vested in it in law, the High Court of Karnataka was justified in entertaining the writ petition, on the basis that NCLT was coram non judice.
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