Steel Authority of India Ltd. Vs Commissioner of GST (CESTAT Chennai)
Section 65B(44) defines service to mean any activity carried out by a person for another for consideration and includes a declared service. One of the declared services contemplated under section 66E is a service contemplated under clause (e) which service is agreeing to the obligation to refrain from an act, or to tolerate an act or a situation, or to do an act. There has, therefore, to be a flow of consideration from one person to another when one person agrees to the obligation to refrain from an act, or to tolerate an act, or a situation, or to do an act. In other words, the agreement should not only specify the activity to be carried out by a person for another person but should specify the:
(i) consideration for agreeing to the obligation to refrain from an act; or
(ii) consideration for agreeing to tolerate an act or a situation; or
(iii) consideration to do an act.
Thus, a service conceived in an agreement where one person, for a consideration, agrees to an obligation to refrain from an act, would be a „declared service‟ under section 66E(e) read with section 65B (44) and would be taxable under section 68 at the rate specified in section 66B. Likewise, there can be services conceived in agreements in relation to the other two activities referred to in section 66E(e).
It is trite that an agreement has to be read as a whole so as to gather the intention of the parties. The intention of the appellant and the parties was for supply of coal; for supply of goods; and for availing various types of services. The consideration contemplated under the agreements was for such supply of coal, materials or for availing various types of services. The intention of the parties certainly was not for flouting the terms of the agreement so that the penal clauses get attracted. The penal clauses are in the nature of providing a safeguard to the commercial interest of the appellant and it cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said that recovering any sum by invoking the penalty clauses is the reason behind the execution of the contract for an agreed consideration. It is not the intention of the appellant to impose any penalty upon the other party nor is it the intention of the other party to get penalized.
It also needs to be noted that section 65B(44) defines “service” to mean any activity carried out by a person for another for consideration. Explanation (a) to section 67 provides that “consideration” includes any amount that is payable for the taxable services provided or to be provided. The recovery of liquidated damages/penalty from other party cannot be said to be towards any service per se, since neither the appellant is carrying on any activity to receive compensation nor can there be any intention of the other party to breach or violate the contract and suffer a loss. The purpose of imposing compensation or penalty is to ensure that the defaulting act is not undertaken or repeated and the same cannot be said to be towards toleration of the defaulting party. The expectation of the appellant is that the other party complies with the terms of the contract and a penalty is imposed only if there is non-compliance.
The situation would have been different if the party purchasing coal had an option to purchase coal from ‘A’ or from ‘B’ and if in such a situation ‘A’ and ‘B’ enter into an agreement that ‘A’ would not supply coal to the appellant provided ‘B’ paid some amount to it, then in such a case, it can be said that the activity may result in a deemed service contemplated under section 66E (e).
The activities, therefore, that are contemplated under section 66E (e), when one party agrees to refrain from an act, or to tolerate an act or a situation, or to do an act, are activities where the agreement specifically refers to such an activity and there is a flow of consideration for this activity.
FULL TEXT OF THE CESTAT JUDGEMENT
M/s. Steel Authority of India Limited, Salem1, which is a Public Sector Undertaking engaged in the manufacture of carbon steel, carbon steel sheet, coin blanks and alloy steel has sought the quashing of the order dated 04.10.2018 passed by the Commissioner (Appeals), by which the order dated 15.11.2017 passed by the Assistant Commissioner has been upheld and the appeal has been dismissed.
2. The period involved in all the appeal is after 01.07.2012 and the case set out by the Department is that the appellant had agreed to tolerate breach of timelines stipulated in the contract; the amount imposed as liquidated damages are consideration for the act of tolerating contractual default; and that the appellant had rendered declared service of „agreeing to the obligation to refrain from an act, or to tolerate an act or a situation or to do an act‟ contemplated under section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 19942.
3. The following amounts have been alleged as consideration for “agreeing to the obligation to refrain from an act, or to tolerate an act or a situation, or to do an act” under section 66E(e) of the Finance Act.
