Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that the assessee is entitled to investment allowance on the activities of the assessee, viz., mining granite from quarries and exporting them after cutting, polishing, etc. which tantamount to manufacture for the purpose of Section 32A of the Income Tax Act, 1961?

The issue involved in these appeals is, whether leasing rights can be considered to be ‘goods’ and whether transfer of such rights would constitute sale?” This issue is answered in favour of the assessee in the case of CIT v. B. Suresh [2009] 313 ITR 149. Following the said decision, these civil appeals filed by the Department are dismissed.

The question involved in this appeal is, whether excise duty and sales tax need to be included in the total turnover in the formula – ‘Business income’ multiplied by ‘export turnover’ and divided by ‘total turnover’ in Section 80HHC(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961?

In large number of cases, we find a peculiar phenomenon. In cases, where huge revenue/demand from the Department is involved, invariably, there is inordinate delay in filing appeals before the High Court under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and in filing special leave petitions before this Court.

Whether interest paid in respect of borrowings for acquisition of capital assets not put to use in the concerned financial year can be permitted as allowable deduction under section 36(1)(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961?

We have gone through the Notice under Section 154 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 . We find that the said notice is totally vague. The Assessing Officer has not even indicated as to on what basis he has allowed excess set-off. Notice under Section 154 of the Act, therefore, was not maintainable.

Liberty is given to the Department to move the High Court pointing out that the Circular dated 9th February, 2011, should not be applied ipso facto, particularly, when the matter has a cascading effect.

We find from the records that the assessee has computed his interest income arising on the difference between purchase price of the debenture and redemption price after six years and calculated the income on amortization basis.

We see no error in the observation made by the Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgement that once limitation period of four years provided under Section 147/149(1A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, [for short, `the Act'] expires then the question of re­opening by the Department does not arise.

On going through the records, we find that an important query was raised by the Department as to whether these two donors had the financial capacity to make the gift(s) in favour of the assessees herein. This query has not at all been answered by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal ['ITAT', for short].