The monies held in the account must be regarded as being at the joint disposal of Mr and Mrs Pflum which means when the mandate is such that either party can draw on them, that either party is free to withdraw and spend them as he or she wishes. In practice most withdrawals were made by Mrs Pflum without reference to Mr Pflum. Thus when she withdrew sums in the UK using the debit card, the cash so withdrawn would be her own money and she was drawing on an asset which was just as much her own asset as it was Mr Pflum’s. That is the essence of a joint bank account held by the holders as joint tenants. We therefore reject Mrs Teggart’s submission that because the monies were derived from Mr Pflum’s earnings he was to be regarded as not having alienated them, in the absence of clear evidence of an intention to sever the joint tenancy and confer beneficial ownership on Mrs Pflum. The application of this principle also leads to the same conclusion in relation to purchases made through use of the debit card in the UK.

After going through the above provisions of law, it is clear that the Act has not provided for any cut off date up-to which only the information available in public domain has to be taken into consideration by the TPO, while making the transfer pricing adjustments and arriving at arm’s length price. The assessee as well as the Revenue is both bound by the Act and the rules there-under and, therefore, as provided under the Act and rules, they are supposed to be taking into consideration, the contemporaneous data relevant to the previous year in which the transaction has taken place.

It is settled law that if the loan is taken for acquiring the capital asset, waiver thereof would not amount to any income exigible to tax. On the other hand, if this loan was for trading purpose and was treated as such from the very beginning in the books of account, the waiver thereof may result in the income more so when it was transferred to profit and loss account.

DCIT v. Sports Station (India) (P.) Ltd. As is apparent from the impugned order, the Assessing Officer did not bring any material on record for holding that the payment of interest at the rate of 15 per cent per annum to unsecured creditors was excessive and how interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum was reasonable or represented fair market value for the services and facilities.

After reading statutory provisions as contained in section 80IB(1), 80IB(2) & 80IB(4) of the Act, we find that provisions do not provide in any way separate registration or maintenance of separate records for claiming deduction u/s 80IB of the Act. The requirement under section 80IB(1), 80IB(2) and 80IB(4) is that profit must derive from an industrial undertaking.

With regard to the assessee’s claim for exemption under section 10(1) of the Act in respect of agricultural income, the only aspect that clinches the nature of the agricultural income is whether agricultural operations were carried out or not. Once it was established that such agricultural activities were carried out by the assessee, assessee was entitled for exemption in respect of such agricultural income under section 10(1) of the Act, irrespective of any violation of the statutory provisions as alleged by the Assessing Officer in the instant case. Such infraction of the statutory provisions may expose the assessee to the risks of being penalized or punished under the relevant statutes, but the same do not change nature of the agricultural income, and as such, cannot be fatal to the assessee’s claim for exemption under section 10(1) of the Act.

The capital expenditure incurred by the assessee on purchase of motor cars could not be considered as expenditure incurred by the assessee on in-house research & development and, therefore, the same was not eligible for weighted deduction under section 35(2AB). Similarly, capitalized interest on purchase of car was also not eligible for this benefit for same reasons because it was equal or similar to cost of car. Hence, this ground was to be rejected.

There is no dispute with the fact that assessee has commenced business activity during the year. As seen from the nature of the expenditure claim by assessee under the head research expenses, the entire expenditure pertains to use of raw material, freight and other expenditure which are in revenue field and there is no capital expenditure involved nor any capital asset was purchased as part of these expenses. Just because the benefits of research may have some enduring benefit, the expenditure cannot be considered as capital in nature. Following the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Empire Jute Co. Ltd, vs. CIT (supra), we hold that this expenditure is revenue in nature.

The assessee is an individual who is the Managing Director of Cadence Design Systems India Pvt.Ltd. For the AY 2004-05, he filed a return of income at `1,75,05,081/- comprising of salary income at `1,02,72,400/- from Cadence Design Systems India Pvt.Ltd. and salary income of `65,97,305/- from Cadence Design System Inc.,USA. The assessee has been granted stock option under an incentive stock option agreement dated17th September, 1993with Cadence Design Systems,USA. During the year under consideration, the assessee sold the stock options and received the sum of `11,36,829/- on sale of such stock options. The same was declared as long term capital gain. The Assessing Officer assessed the same as short term capital gain and also levied penalty under Section 271(1)(c) thereon at `2,50,102/- being the difference between the tax as short term capital gain and tax as long term capital gain on the sum of `11,36,829/-. The learned CIT(A) cancelled the penalty. Hence, the Revenue is in appeal.

Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Vardhman Overseas Ltd. (supra) has observed that section 41(1) has been incorporated in the Act to cover a particular facts situation. Section applies where a trading liability was allowed as a deduction in earlier years in computing the business income of the assessee and the assessee has obtained a benefit in respect of such trading liability in later year by way of remission or cessation of the liability. In such a case, the section says that whatever benefit has arisen to the assessee in the later year by way of remission of the liability will be brought to tax in that year.