Calcutta High Court in Exide Industries case (supra) held that leave encashment is neither a statutory liability nor a contingent liability and it is a provision to be made for the entitlement of an employee achieved in a particular financial year. Testing clause (f) with the objects sought to be achieved by the introduction of Section 43 B, it was held that the same could not have any nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the original enactment.

Larsen and Toubro Ltd. v. UOI There is no provision like section 4(7) of the Andhra Pradesh VAT Act in Delhi VAT Act. The entire case of the petitioner was that there should have been a provision like this in Delhi VAT Act as well, otherwise it is leading to various difficulties. Even if one presume that the provision like section 4(7) in Andhra Pradesh VAT Act makes it a better legislation in comparison with Delhi VAT Act but absence of such a provision, cannot be a ground for declaring statute as arbitrary or ultra vires. Bad legislative drafting, if at all, cannot furnish a ground for judicial review of the legislative action. It has to be shown that a particular provision is either beyond the legislative competence and is thus ultra vires or is unconstitutional viz. namely it offends some constitutional provision.

Section 158BD is only an enabling provision to assess any other assessee other than the searched assessee if in the course of search of another assessee evidence of undisclosed income is received in respect of the assessee who is not searched. However, the assessment pursuant to the enabling provision i.e. under section 158BD also is an assessment under section 158BC and the procedure contemplated is also one and the same. In fact, what section 158BD says is that when the evidence collected in search of an assessee revealed undisclosed income of another assessee, who is not searched, the material or evidence so received can be the basis for making assessment under section 158BC of the assessee who is not searched.

CIT v. Khyber Foods The only question raised is whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that the assessments were invalid for the reason that search warrant issued in Form 45 was invalid. The contention of Senior counsel for the Revenue is that assessee never had a case on the validity of assessments except at the Tribunal stage when the assessee raised additional grounds in second appeals contending that warrants issued in the name of group concerns is invalid.

J.R. Solvent Industries (P.) Ltd. v. CIT Section 145 deals with method of accounting. However, under section 145(2) where the Income-tax Officer is not satisfied about the ‘correctness’ or ‘completeness’ of the accounts of the assessee or where no method of accounting has been regularly employed by the assessee then the Income-tax Officer may make best judgment assessment as contemplated by section 144.

The acquisition is of the year 2001 while the compensation has been paid somewhere in the year 2009. Keeping in view the law laid down by the Apex Court in the matter of Bikram Singh v. Land Acquisition Collector [1996] 89 Taxman 119, it is to be held that interest received on delayed payment is a revenue receipt exigible to Income-tax. Since the amount has already been deposited by the respondent-authority and the deduction is in accordance with section 194A, therefore, no illegality has been committed by the Court below in upholding the action taken by respondent-authority in deducting the amount.

Prakash Leasing Ltd. v. DCIT – The lease rentals is not the real income of the assessee. The lease rental consists of financing charge as well as capital recovery. The amount received towards capital recovery constitute the capital expenditure, whereas the financing charge represents the revenue receipt, which is the real income. It is as per the Accounting Standards prescribed by the ICAI. Therefore, the assessee under the Act has to offer to tax only the real income and not the total receipt. He is not liable to pay any tax under the Act on the capital recovery.

In the present case, according to the Finance Minister presenting the Bill, a valid piece of legislation has been wrongly interpreted by the Tribunal. We have already pointed out that according to the existing law, if a valid piece of legislation is wrongly interpreted by the Tribunal, the aggrieved party should move higher judicial forum for correct interpretation. As pointed by the Apex Court in the case of Pritvi Cotton Mills Ltd (supra), the legislature does not possess or exercise power to reverse the decision in exercise of judicial power.

Talluri Srinivas v. ICAI (Delhi HC)- Section 21B(3), read with rule 18 of the Rules makes it clear that the Disciplinary Committee is obliged to offer the member, whose conduct is under examination, an opportunity of being heard and to comply with the principles of natural justice. In the instant case, the period during which the interim stay of the disciplinary proceedings remained in force, the petitioner cannot be faulted for delaying the proceedings. The petitioner was entitled to agitate his legal rights, and merely because that led to deferment of the disciplinary proceedings, the said fact cannot be held against the petitioner.

It is clear to us that the Supreme Court did not hold anything contrary to what was held in the previous judgments to the effect that even if a claim is not made before the assessing officer, it can be made before the appellate authorities. The jurisdiction of the appellate authorities to entertain such a claim has not been negated by the Supreme Court in this judgment. In fact, the Supreme Court made it clear that the issue in the case was limited to the power of the assessing authority and that the judgment does not impinge on the power of the Tribunal under section 254.